Punishing without rewards? A comprehensive examination of the asymmetry in economic voting

It has been controversial whether incumbents are punished more for a bad economy than they are rewarded for a good economy due to mixed results from previous studies on one or handful number of countries. This paper makes an empirical contribution to this lingering question by conducting extensive tests on whether this asymmetry hypothesis is a cross-nationally generalizable phenomenon using all currently available modules of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems survey from 122 elections in 42 representative democracies between 1996 and 2016, as well as macro-economic indicators and individual-level economic perception. In general, this paper finds little support for the asymmetry hypothesis; although the evidence of such asymmetric economic voting is found in some subpopulations using certain economic indicators, these conditional effects are largely inconsistent, suggesting that it is still safe to assume a linear relationship between economic conditions and support for the incumbent

A Lab Experiment on Committee Hearings: Preferences, Power, and a Quest for Information

In principle, committees hold hearings to gather and provide information to their principals, but some hearings are characterized as political showcases. This article investigates conditions that moderate committee members' incentives to hold an informative hearing by presenting a game‐theoretic model and a lab experiment. Specifically, it studies when committees hold hearings and which types of hearing they hold by varying policy preferences of committee members and the principal and political gains from posturing. Findings provide new insights to how preferences and power distribution affect individuals' incentives to be informed when they make decisions as members of a committee in many contexts

When Do Politicians Grandstand? Measuring Message Politics in Committee Hearings

While congressional committee members sometimes hold hearings to collect and transmit specialized information to the floor, they also use hearings as venues to send political messages by framing an issue or a party to the public which I refer to as “grandstanding.” However, we lack clear understanding of when they strategically engage in grandstanding. I argue that when committee members have limited legislative power they resort to making grandstanding speeches in hearings to please their target audience. Using 12,820 House committee hearing transcripts from the 105th to 114th Congresses and employing a crowd-sourced supervised learning method, I measure a “grandstanding score” for each statement that committee members make. Findings suggest that grandstanding efforts are made more commonly among minority members under a unified government, and non-chair members of powerful committees, and in committees with jurisdiction over policies that the president wields primary power, such as foreign affairs and national security

Electoral rewards for political grandstanding

Many assumed that legislators send political messages or even grandstand in expectation of gaining electoral rewards. However, largely due to a lack of proper data and measurements, this assumption has not been tested. Publicized committee hearings provide a unique environment to consistently observe changes in legislators’ speech patterns and test this assumption. Using House committee hearing transcripts from 1997 to 2016 and Grandstanding Scores–which capture the intensity of political messages conveyed in members’ statements in hearings–I find that an increase in a member’s messaging efforts in a given Congress leads to increased vote share in the following election. This suggests that legislators’ grandstanding remarks, often regarded as cheap talk, can be an effective electoral strategy. Additional findings suggest that PAC donors respond differently to members’ grandstanding behavior. Specifically, while voters react to members’ grandstanding positively but are ignorant about their legislative effectiveness, PAC donors are unmoved by members’ grandstanding behaviors and reward members’ effective law-making activities instead. These asymmetric reactions from voters and donors may provide members with a twisted incentive to appeal to voters merely by making impressive, political speeches while legislating in favor of organized interests, which raises concerns about how representative democracy works

Linkage analysis of longitudinal data

BACKGROUND: We propose a statistical model for linkage analysis of the longitudinal data. The proposed model is a mixed model based on the new Haseman and Elston model and allows several random effects. Specifically, the proposed model includes a random effect for correlation among sib pairs having one sibling in common, and one for the correlation among siblings from the same parents. RESULTS: The proposed model was applied to the analysis of the Genetic Analysis Workshop 13 simulated data set for a quantitative trait of the systolic blood pressure. A simple independence model and two kinds of random effects models yielded good power for detecting linkage for these data sets, while the random effects models performed slightly better than the independence model. Both random effects models showed similar performance. CONCLUSIONS: The proposed models seem not only quite useful in detecting linkage with the longitudinal data for the trait but also quite flexible. They can handle a wide class of correlation structures. Models with a more general class of covariance structure are desirable

Atomic Resolution Imaging of Rotated Bilayer Graphene Sheets Using a Low kV Aberration-corrected Transmission Electron Microscope

Modern aberration-corrected transmission electron microscope (TEM) with appropriate electron beam energy is able to achieve atomic resolution imaging of single and bilayer graphene sheets. Especially, atomic configuration of bilayer graphene with a rotation angle can be identified from the direct imaging and phase reconstructed imaging since atomic resolution Moir pattern can be obtained successfully at atomic scale using an aberration-corrected TEM. This study boosts a reliable stacking order analysis, which is required for synthesized or artificially prepared multilayer graphene, and lets graphene researchers utilize the information of atomic configuration of stacked graphene layers readily.ope

The Analysis of Antecedents for the Video Telephony Service Adoption: From the Value-Based Perspective

Korean Telecommunications Industry has a large scale market and boasts on high service quality and high technologies enough to provide the Video Telephony Service (VTS) satisfactorily. For many years, Korean telephone companies have been investing enormous sums to advertise their services widely and to allow their customers to change their cell phones for the third-generation (3G) devices indispensable for the service. However, despite their efforts, the VTS adoption rate in Korea is very low and it seems that customers seldom feel the necessity to use. From this viewpoint, it becomes necessary to find the antecedents influencing the intention to use for the VTS empirically. For this purpose, we proposed several hypotheses from the perspective of the Value-based Adoption Model (VAM). VAM is a conceptual model suggested to overcome some limitations of the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) in explaining the adoption of new Information and Communication Technology (ICT) such as Mobile Internet where customers play the role of service consumer rather than simply technology users. We conducted a survey on 125 samples and found that customers perceive the value of VTS when they can recognize the service is functionally useful (Perceived Usefulness) and when they feel they can put themselves forward by using it (Self-Expression). On the other hand, the other factors including Technical Complexity, Privacy Concern and Perceived Price (Fee) don’t have statistically significant influences on the Perceived Value of VTS

Committee chair’s majority partisan status and its effect on information transmission via hearings

While US Congress assigns only the members of a majority party to committee chairs, some state legislatures and other legislative bodies using a proportional representation system also consider members of a minority party for the position to promote a bipartisan policy making practice. Although previous literature investigates the effects of bipartisan rules and practices exploiting such institutional variations, the informational benefit of having a minority partisan committee chair has not been explored. By extending a recent study exploring conditions under which information transmission from agents to a principal is improved, this research note theoretically examines the effect of the committee chair’s majority partisan status on information acquisition and transmission via committee hearings. Findings suggest that under some conditions, the floor can informationally benefit more from having a chair representing a minority party in the chamber with opposite bias call a hearing than with a chair representing a majority party

How Are Politicians Informed? Witnesses and Information Provision in Congress

How are politicians informed and who do politicians seek information from? The role of information has been at the center for research on legislative organizations but there is a lack of systematic empirical work on the information that Congress seeks to acquire and consider. To examine the information flow between Congress and external groups, we construct the most comprehensive dataset to date on 74,082 congressional committee hearings and 755,540 witnesses spanning 1960-2018. We show descriptive patterns of how witness composition varies across time and committee, and how different types of witnesses provide varying levels of analytical information. We develop theoretical expectations for why committees may invite different types of witnesses based on committee intent, inter-branch relations, and congressional capacity. Our empirical evidence shows how committees' partisan considerations can affect how much committees turn to outsiders for information and from whom they seek information