Is there any room for the doctrine of fundamental rights of states in today's international law?

This article serves as a general substantive introduction to the special issue on the fundamental rights of states in international law. It introduces the concept in theoretical and doctrinal terms, and lays out the questions that will be addressed by the contributions to the special issue. These questions include: 1) What do attributes like ‘inherent’, ‘inalienable’ and ‘permanent’ mean with regard to state rights?; 2) Do they lead to identifying a unitary distinct category of fundamental rights of states?; 3) If so, what is their source and legal character?; 4) What are their legal implications, eg, when they come into conflict with other obligations of the right holder or with the actions of other states and international organisations?; and ultimately, 5) Is there still room in today’s international law for a doctrine of ‘fundamental’ rights of states? The article reviews the fundamental rights of states in positive law sources and in international legal scholarship, and identifies the reasons for a renaissance of attention for this doctrine

Iran\u27s Nuclear Program and International Law

In this article, Professor Daniel Joyner analyzes the legal arguments on both sides of the Iran nuclear issue. The article address what the sides regard as the relevant sources of international nuclear law, and their respective interpretations of these sources law. Professor Joyner argues that Iran’s case illustrates warped and incorrect legal interpretations of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and other sources of law, and a prejudicial and inconsistent application of the law by the West and by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The article posits that this warped interpretation of NPT obligations has led to a bleak future for the Treaty as the normative cornerstone of international law’s regulation of nuclear energy. The article concludes by calling for a new grand bargain—one that progresses the aim of global nuclear disarmament, strengthens the legal framework governing nonproliferation, and ensures that civilian nuclear energy programs may be freely pursued and developed by states that choose to do so

Disarmament Is Good, but What We Need Now Is Arms Control

This article aims to correct a number of misconceptions held by both scholars and activists about the United Nations Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), and international nuclear weapons law generally. It first reviews the development of international law related to nuclear weapons, and provides a novel taxonomy of legal obligations divided into three substantive categories. It then examines the TPNW within that taxonomy, and considers how it should be understood to fit within this legal context. It concludes that the TPNW is essentially a nuclear disarmament treaty. While it should be welcomed as a contribution to nuclear disarmament law, it should not be confused with nuclear arms control treaties, which are distinct in role and purpose. The article concludes that at the current moment of crisis in nuclear arms control law, a refocusing of attention is needed to conclude a successor treaty to New START, which is due to expire in 2026

Fundamental Rights of States in International Law and the Right to Peaceful Nuclear Energy II. Case Studies

This article first discusses the overall theme of this special issue of the Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law from a legal theoretical perspective, namely, the concept of the fundamental rights of states in international law. It concludes that fundamental rights of states exist in international law as autonomous juridical principles. The article then proceeds to discuss one such asserted fundamental right of states: the right to peaceful nuclear energy, as codified in the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. It argues that the right to peaceful nuclear energy is indeed a fundamental right of states, and that it has juridical substance, and carries juridical implications, as a rule of law on par with other rules of the jus dispositivum