Environmental Standards under International Oligopoly

We explore the effects of domestic environmental standards when a domestic firm and a foreign rival compete in the domestic market. We focus on a situation where the introduction of environmental standards forces the foreign product out of the domestic market because it does not meet the standards. Such prohibitive standards may induce the foreign firm to produce an environmentally friendly good through R&D or licensing obtained from the domestic firm. However, this does not guarantee that the product, which now complies with the environmental standards, will improve the environment. In the case of licensing, governments may intervene to shift the rent from the domestic firm. In certain circumstances, the shifted rent could exceed the amount paid by the foreign firm for licensing.environmental standards, international oligopoly, R&D, licensing, rent-shifting

Environmental Product Standards in North-South Trade

One channel through which environment is damaged is consumption. To protect environment, various product standards are introduced all over the world. By using a new economic geography framework, this paperexplores the effects of environmental product standards on environment in a North-South trade model. We examine a situation in which North unilaterally introduces an environmental product standard. Specifically, those products that do not meet the standard are not allowed to be sold in the North market. We find that such a standard may worsen North environment but improve South environment through firm relocation.enviromental product standards, compliance costs, firm location, footloose capital model

Price Undertakings, VERs, and Foreign Direct Investment: The Case of Foreign Rivalry

Antidumping (AD) petitions are often withdrawn in favor of VERs and price undertakings. We compare foreign firms' incentive to engage in foreign direct investment (FDI) under a VER and a price undertaking, with special emphasis on foreign rivalry. We show that a VER is less likely to induce FDI than a price undertaking or AD. Thus, the importing country can increase the level of protection by replacing an AD duty with a VER. This may account for the GATT ban on VERs, given the proliferation of AD cases during the 1990s.

Greenhouse-gas Emission Controls and International Carbon Leakage through Trade Liberalization

This paper studies greenhouse-gas (GHG) emission controls in the presence of carbon leakage through international firm relocation. The Kyoto Protocol requires developed countries to reduce GHG emissions by a certain amount. Comparing emission quotas with emission taxes, we show that taxes coupled with lower trade costs facilitate more firm relocations than quotas do, causing more international carbon leakage. Thus, if a country is concerned about global emissions, emission quotas would be adopted to mitigate the carbon leakage. Firm relocation entails a trade-off between trade liberalization and emission regulations. Emission regulations may be hampered by trade liberalization, and vice versa.trade liberalization, global warming, Kyoto Protocol, emission tax, emission quota, carbon leakage

Environmental Management Policy under International Carbon Leakage

This paper studies environmental management policy when two fossil-fuel-consuming countries non-cooperatively regulate greenhouse-gas emissions through emission taxes or quotas. The presence of carbon leakage caused by fuel-price changes affects the tax-quota equivalence. We explore each country's incentive to choose an environment regulation instrument within a framework of a two-stage policy choice game and find subgame-perfect Nash equilibria. This sheds a new light on the question of why adopted policy instruments could be different among countries. We also analyze the welfare effect of creating an international market for emission permits. International trade in emission permits may not benefit the fuel-consuming countries.Global Warming, Carbon Leakage, Emission Tax, Emission Quota, Tax-quota Equivalence, Emission Trading

Environmental Product Standards in North-South Trade

One channel through which environment is damaged is consumption. To protect environment, various product standards are introduced all over the world. By using a new economic geography framework, this paper explores the effects of environmental product standards on environment in a North-South trade model. We examine a situation in which North unilaterally introduces an environmental product standard. Specifically, those products that do not meet the standard are not allowed to be sold in the North market. We find that such a standard may worsen North environment but improve South environment through firm relocation.environmental product standards, compliance costs, firm location, footloose capital model

Environmental Standards under International Oligopoly

We explore the effects of domestic environmental standards when a domestic firm and a foreign rival compete in the domestic market. We focus on a situation where the introduction of environmental standards forces the foreign product out of the domestic market because it does not meet the standards. Such prohibitive standards may induce the foreign firm to produce an environmentally friendly good through R&D or licensing obtained from the domestic firm. However, this does not guarantee that the product, which now complies with the environmental standards, will improve the environment. In the case of licensing, governments may intervene to shift the rent from the domestic firm. In certain circumstances, the shifted rent could exceed the amount paid by the foreign firm for licensing.environmental standards, international oligopoly, R&D, licensing, rent-shifting

"International Trade and Global Warming"

In a non-cooperative strategic environmental regulation, unilateral regulation may yield the so-called "carbon-leakage" and the government choice over the emission taxes and quotas play an important role. Furthermore, the trade and industrial structure of a country critically hinges on the government's policy tools. The paper shows that emission taxes makes the competitive production equilibrium unstable, while emission standards work as "hidden production subsidy" towards emission-intensive industries.

Greenhouse-gas Emission Controls and International Carbon Leakage through Trade Liberalization

This paper studies greenhouse-gas (GHG) emission controls in the presence of carbon leakage through international firm relocation. The Kyoto Protocol requires developed countries to reduce GHG emissions by a certain amount. Comparing emission quotas with emission taxes, we show that taxes coupled with lower trade costs facilitate more firm relocations than quotas do, causing more international carbon leakage. Thus, if a country is concerned about global emissions, emission quotas would be adopted to mitigate the carbon leakage. Firm relocation entails a trade-off between trade liberalization and emission regulations. Emission regulations may be hampered by trade liberalization, and vice versa.Trade liberalization, Global warming, Kyoto Protocol, Emission tax, Emission quota, Carbon leakage

Environmental Management Policy under International Carbon Leakage

This paper studies environmental management policy when two fossil-fuel-consuming countries non-cooperatively regulate greenhouse- gas emissions through emission taxes or quotas. The presence of carbon leakage caused by fuel-price changes a.ects the tax-quota equivalence. We explore each country.s incentive to choose an environment regula- tion instrument within a framework of a two-stage policy choice game and .nd subgame-perfect Nash equilibria. This sheds a new light on the question of why adopted policy instruments could be di.erent among countries. We also analyze the welfare e.ect of creating an interna- tional market for emission permits. International trade in emission permits may not bene.t the fuel-consuming countries.global warming, carbon leakage, emission tax, emission quota, tax-quota equivalence, emission trading