Capital Structure and Debt Structure

Using a novel data set that records individual debt issues on the balance sheet of a large random sample of rated public firms, we show that a recognition of debt heterogeneity leads to new insights into the determinants of corporate capital structure. We first demonstrate that traditional capital structure studies that ignore debt heterogeneity miss a substantial fraction of capital structure variation. We then show that relative to high credit quality firms, low credit quality firms are more likely to have a multi-tiered capital structure consisting of both secured bank debt with tight covenants and subordinated non-bank debt with loose covenants. Further, while high credit quality firms enjoy access to a variety of sources of discretionary flexible sources of finance, low credit quality firms rely on tightly monitored secured bank debt for liquidity. We discuss the extent to which these findings are consistent with existing theoretical models of debt structure in which firms simultaneously use multiple debt types to preserve manager and creditor incentives.

Local Overweighting and Underperformance: Evidence from Limited Partner Private Equity Investments

Institutional investors of all types exhibit substantial home-state bias when investing in private equity (PE) funds. This effect is particularly pronounced for public pension funds, where the local overweighting amounts to 9.7% of the private equity portfolio on average, based on 5-year rolling average benchmarks. Public pension funds’ own-state investments perform significantly worse than their out-of-state investments, an average of 3-4 percentage points of net IRR per year, and those that that overweight their portfolios towards home-state investments also perform worse overall. These underperformance patterns are not evident for other types of institutional investors, such as endowments, foundations and corporate pension funds, and we do not observe similar overweighting or underperformance of investments in neighboring states. Overweighting in home state investments by public pension funds is greater in states with higher levels of corruption, although there is no positive correlation of underperformance with corruption for these investors. The overweighting and underperformance of local investments cost public pension funds between $0.9 and$1.2 billion per year, depending on the benchmark.

Gender Differences in Russian Colour Naming

In the present study we explored Russian colour naming in a web-based psycholinguistic experiment (http://www.colournaming.com). Colour singletons representing the Munsell Color Solid (N=600 in total) were presented on a computer monitor and named using an unconstrained colour-naming method. Respondents were Russian speakers (N=713). For gender-split equal-size samples (NF=333, NM=333) we estimated and compared (i) location of centroids of 12 Russian basic colour terms (BCTs); (ii) the number of words in colour descriptors; (iii) occurrences of BCTs most frequent non-BCTs. We found a close correspondence between females’ and males’ BCT centroids. Among individual BCTs, the highest inter-gender agreement was for seryj ‘grey’ and goluboj ‘light blue’, while the lowest was for sinij ‘dark blue’ and krasnyj ‘red’. Females revealed a significantly richer repertory of distinct colour descriptors, with great variety of monolexemic non-BCTs and “fancy” colour names; in comparison, males offered relatively more BCTs or their compounds. Along with these measures, we gauged denotata of most frequent CTs, reflected by linguistic segmentation of colour space, by employing a synthetic observer trained by gender-specific responses. This psycholinguistic representation revealed females’ more refined linguistic segmentation, compared to males, with higher linguistic density predominantly along the redgreen axis of colour space

FIRST DRAFT PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE PLEASE DO NOT CITE The Effects of Financial Condition on Capital Investment and Financing: Evidence from Variation in Pension Fund Asset Performance

This paper examines the empirical relation between corporate capital expenditures and a firm’s financial condition as measured by shareholder net worth and market leverage. Using novel evidence on variation in pension fund asset performance, which affects the net worth of a corporation without affecting its investment opportunities, I demonstrate effects of financial condition on financing and investment that are not due to spurious correlations between unobserved investment opportunities and financial health. In response to a negatively-signed shock to net worth from pensions, firms purchase less capital. Furthermore, preliminary evidence suggests that they obtain less long-term debt financing and their near-term profitability decreases. Overall the evidence is consistent with models of underinvestment in the presence of financial constraints

Risk Shifting versus Risk Management: Investment Policy in Corporate Pension Plans

The asset allocation of defined benefit pension plans is a setting where both risk-shifting and risk-management incentives are likely be present. Empirically, firms with poorly funded pension plans and weak credit ratings allocate a greater share of pension fund assets to safer securities such as government debt and cash, whereas firms with well-funded pension plans and strong credit ratings invest more heavily in equity. These relations hold both in pooled regressions and within firms and plans over time. The incentive to limit costly financial distress plays a considerably larger role than risk shifting in explaining variation in pension fund investment policy among firms in the United States. The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected], Oxford University Press.

Capital Structure and Debt Structure

Using a novel dataset that records individual debt issues on the balance sheets of public firms, we demonstrate that traditional capital structure studies that ignore debt heterogeneity miss substantial capital structure variation. Relative to high-credit-quality firms, low-credit-quality firms are more likely to have a multi-tiered capital structure consisting of both secured bank debt with tight covenants and subordinated non-bank debt with loose covenants. We discuss the extent to which these findings are consistent with existing theoretical models of debt structure in which firms simultaneously use multiple debt types to reduce incentive conflicts. The Author 2010. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

Public Pension Promises: How Big Are They and What Are They Worth?”

Abstract We calculate two present value measures of already-promised state pension liabilities using discount rates that reflect their risk. If benefits have the same priority in default as general obligation debt, aggregate underfunding is $1.21 trillion. If states cannot default on these benefits, underfunding is$3.12 trillion. The first measure is a lower bound on the value of the liability to taxpayers, and is more than the $0.94 trillion in state municipal debt. The second measure is a better benchmark for funding adequacy. We also estimate broader concepts of accrued liabilities that account for projected salary growth and future service