Lowness notions, measure and domination

We show that positive measure domination implies uniform almost everywhere domination and that this proof translates into a proof in the subsystem WWKL$_0$ (but not in RCA$_0$) of the equivalence of various Lebesgue measure regularity statements introduced by Dobrinen and Simpson. This work also allows us to prove that low for weak $2$-randomness is the same as low for Martin-L\"of randomness (a result independently obtained by Nies). Using the same technique, we show that $\leq_{LR}$ implies $\leq_{LK}$, generalizing the fact that low for Martin-L\"of randomness implies low for $K$

A Modest Proposal for Expediting Manuscript Selection at Less Prestigious Law Reviews

The matching market in unsolicited manuscripts, submitted to general law reviews, suffers from far too much wasted student effort. This is especially so among the less prestigious law review staffs, which scramble to read submissions they cannot land in the misguided belief they owe authors serious scholarly engagement with the drafts they submit. If they set aside this quaintly artisanal view—an apparent relic of the “Paper Chase” era that ill suits the age of ExpressO and Scholastica—students can process manuscripts far more efficiently. They need only update their manuscript-review systems according to the same market imperatives that drive the professors who submit the manuscripts, thus putting their respective interests on the same self-directed footing. For less prestigious journals, key moves include short-fuse automated offers and targeted categorical rejections of requests for expedited review

U.S. Supreme Court I.P. Cases, 1810-2019: Measuring & Mapping the Citation Networks

Intellectual property law in the United States, though shaped by key statutes, has long been a common-law field to a great degree. Many decades of decisional law flesh out the meaning of broad-textured, sparely worded statutes. Given the key roles of patent law and copyright law, both federal, the Supreme Court of the United States is i.p. law’s leading apex court. What are the major topical currents in the Supreme Court’s i.p. cases, both now and over the course of the Court’s work? This study uses network-analysis tools to measure and map the entirety of the Court’s i.p. jurisprudence. It goes deeper than existing studies of judicial citation networks by focusing on a topically defined subnetwork. It goes further than existing studies by analyzing, in addition to basic citation networks, a time series of co-citation networks — using techniques developed within bibliometrics, for mapping a scholarly field’s conceptual terrain, to track and describe doctrinal change. Emerging bottom up from the Court’s citations, the co-citation map charted here reveals, surprisingly, a core of antitrust and patent-misuse cases from the 1920s-1940s exerting significant influence on i.p. doctrine

Patent Law: Cases & Materials ~ Version 2.0

The book contains edited cases, patent figures, and excerpts, along with brief introductions on patent law. This book is designed for use in close conjunction with a specific softcover hornbook published by Wolters Kluwer, Janice Mueller’s, Patent Law, Fourth Edition (Aspen Student Treatise Series 2013). If you decide to use this case collection to teach a course of your own — as I hope people will — please check back to ensure that you have the most up-to-date version. This version, which is 2.0, was posted in June 2015. Reproduced and linked with permission of the author.https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/books/1101/thumbnail.jp

Remixing Obviousness

In April 2007, the Supreme Court, for the first time in 41 years, decided a case about the basic contours of patent law\u27s nonobviousness standard. The case, KSR, upends 25 years of Federal Circuit jurisprudence, and on a legal requirement that every patent must satisfy. In this essay, I show how KSR dismantles two predicates that have long shaped Federal Circuit nonobviousness cases - namely, the intertwined premises that hindsight-driven distortion is the gravest risk to an accurate nonobviousness requirement, and that the person of ordinary skill in the art (from whose perspective nonobviousness is judge) is singularly uncreative. In place of hindsight dread and the dullard artisan, the Supreme Court gives us caution against overpatenting and the creative artisan. Perhaps most important is that, consistent with these new predicates, the Supreme Court revives its holding from 1950 that a combination claim, i.e., a claim that simply remixes prior art technologies according to their established functions, must be scrutinized with great caution because it is likely unpatentable. I propose an evidentiary presumption framework to regularize KSR\u27s mandate