Incorporation by law

El presente trabajo hace hincapié en un tema clásico dentro de la Filosofía jurídica: las relaciones entre Derecho y moral. No obstante, son dos las novedades que presenta. Por un lado, plantea cómo el Derecho afecta a la moral, es decir, cómo puede afectar a los derechos y obligaciones morales que tienen los seres humanos. Por otro lado, considera cómo la moral afecta al Derecho, esto es, si la moral puede ser incorporada al Derecho. Este último aspecto también es novedoso en cuanto que toma en consideración la cuestión del llamado “incorporacionismo” o, más ampliamente, positivismo jurídico incluyente, ante el que se plantean serias dudas

Agency and Luck

Advancing an account of responsibility which is based on the functioning of our rational capacities, the paper revisits some central aspects of the moral luck puzzle. It proposes a new variant of Williams’ agent-regret, but concludes that its scope does not coincide with cases of moral luck. It then distinguishes different ways in which the factors beyond our control feature in our engagement with the world which show how the guidance principle (we are responsible for actions guided by our rational powers) recognises a narrower range of situations of moral luck than is often supposed, allowing to distinguish between responsibility for intentions, (some) attempts and actions, as well as for responsibility for thoughts and emotions. Finally, relying on the fact that for each person some actions are within his or her range of secure competence the paper argues that responsibility extends beyond the guidance principle. It concludes with a brief outline discussion of the relations between responsibility and blame

Reason, Reasons and Normativity

All normative phenomena are normative in as much as, and because, they provide reasons or are partly constituted by reasons. This makes the concept of a reason key to an understanding of normativity. Believing that, I will here present some thoughts about the connection between reasons and Reason and between Reason and normativity

Promises in Morality and Law

J.L. Austin thought that philosophers have much to learn from lawyers and the law. No doubt philosophers and lawyers have a lot to learn from each other wherever their interests intersect. But until now philosophical analysis has done more to elucidate important legal concepts and distinctions than viceversa. P.S. Atiyah\u27s Promises, Morals, and Law may redress this imbalance. In this book, one of today\u27s most accomplished students of the common law examines the nature of promises and the grounds of their binding force. Written in Atiyah\u27s characteristically vigorous and lucid style, the book is a philosophical treatise, but one that benefits from the author\u27s ability to draw on his vast knowledge of English contract law. His use of legal examples is nontechnical and judicious, and presents no difficulty to the nonlawyer. On the contrary, it serves to illuminate and illustrate the author\u27s drift

On The Guise of the Good

I will provisionally take the Guise of the Good thesis to consist of three propositions: (1) Intentional actions are actions performed for reasons, as those are seen by the agents. (2) Specifying the intention which makes an action intentional identifies central features of the reason(s) for which the action is performed. (3) Reasons for action are such reasons by being facts which establish that the action has some value. From these it is said to follow that (4) Intentional actions are actions taken in, and because of, a belief that there is some good in them. I will examine reasons for, and objections to these theses, and offer a defence of a modified version of the thesis

Value: A Menu of Questions

The paper considers some questions arising out of reflection on Finnis\u27s writings about value, exemplifying them by consideration of the putative value of knowledge. They include the role of harmony, and of self-evidence, in identifying or constituting values, and the ways in which values can provide reasons

On the Socratic Maxim

Many years ago John Finnis and I became interested in the Socratic view that it is better to suffer wrong than to do it. My interest was triggered by Anselm Müller\u27s lecture on the subject given at Balliol at that time. Finnis discussed the issue in his Fundamentals of Ethics, where Müller\u27s influence on him is acknowledged. At the time John Finnis and I debated the maxim and had a lengthy correspondence about it, but we did not convince each other. Now when I return to the issue, I can no longer remember the position I then took, except that I was the skeptic and Finnis the believer in the maxim. It is beyond doubt a dramatic and high-minded maxim. I remained intrigued by it and am glad of the opportunity to make this brief return visit. I should, however, declare at the outset that my interest is not historical. The different readings of the maxim and the different ideas associated with it in the discussion below are not brought forward as so many attempts to understand the historic Socrates or Plato. Rather, they are explorations of what role, if any, a maxim like this can have within a sound ethical outlook. As before, I find the maxim\u27s beguiling appeal in its ambiguities. It can be understood in a sense which makes it trivially true and in a way which makes it fairly clearly false. It can also be understood to be interestingly true, but not in a sense we can sensibly attribute to Socrates, nor one which expresses the high drama of Socrates\u27s own choice when he refused to obey the Thirty Commissioners when they ordered him, on pain of death, to fetch Leon of Salamis to be executed. In what follows I will briefly explain a few different readings and the defects associated with them. I will explain why I remain a skeptic, why I feel that the rhetorical power of the maxim outstrips the insight it affords into the nature of morality

Rights and Politics

It is an honour to join you today in celebrating Professor Jerome Hall. Professor Hall\u27s work was ahead of its time. I did not know him, but his independence of mind and his spirited devotion to scholarship were striking in all I heard and read. Professor Hall\u27s fame was at its height when I was beginning my research into the philosophy of law. And his name stood out as among the most distinguished American jurisprudential scholars. It stood out for his good sense, balanced judgment, and strong-minded convictions. His Foundations of Jurisprudence is thoroughly resistant to fashion. It is an open-minded, undogmatic, and sympathetic exploration of a variety of intellectual trends and tendencies. His work on criminal law was an outstanding attempt at a thorough examination of a major branch of the law from a systematic and theoretical perspective. It set a standard for legal scholarship way above anything else accomplished in America at the time