The IMF and the Liberalization of Capital Flows

Using data from a panel of developing economies from the 1982-98 period, the claim that the International Monetary Fund precipitated financial crises during the 1990s by pressuring countries to liberalize their capital accounts prematurely is evaluated. Examining whether the changes in the regime governing capital flows took place during participation in IMF programs, evidence finds that IMF program participation is correlated with capital account liberalization episodes during the 1990s. Alternative indicators of capital account openness were used to test the robustness of the results by comparing the economic and financial characteristics of countries that decontrolled during IMF programs with those of countries who did so independently to determine whether decontrol was premature.

The IMF and the Liberalization of Capital Flows

We evaluate the claim that the International Monetary Fund precipitated financial crises during the 1990s by pressuring countries to liberalize their capital accounts prematurely. Using data from a panel of developing economies from 1982-98, we examine whether the changes in the regime governing capital flows took place during participation in IMF programs. We find evidence that IMF program participation is correlated with capital account liberalization episodes during the 1990s. We verify the robustness of our results using alternative indicators of capital account openness. To determine whether decontrol was premature, we compare the economic and financial characteristics of countries that decontrolled during IMF programs with those of countries who did so independently and find some evidence of IMF-led premature liberalizations.IMF programs; capital account liberalization

Alien Registration- Joyce, Joseph (Portland, Cumberland County)

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Through A Glass Darkly: New Questions (And Answers) About IMF Programs

Recent research on the International Monetary Fund has focused on the adoption, implementation and impact of their lending programs and their political dimensions. This paper evaluates this literature and suggests promising areas of future work. The first area to be surveyed deals with the initiation of a Fund program, which has been shown to be influenced by political and institutional variables. The record also shows that in some cases governments borrow from the Fund on a continuing basis. A second focus of research analyzes the design and implementation of Fund supported polices, since many programs are often not successfully completed. Political economy models attribute the incomplete implementation to a lack of domestic support for reform measures, and empirical studies provide evidence is support of this hypothesis. The third issue that is addressed is the impact of IMF policies on the economy of the borrowing government. Most of the empirical work finds that these policies improve the balance of payments but may have a negative impact on growth and income distribution. Finally, there are no signs of a catalytic effect on Fund programs on private capital flows to program countries, but some evidence of moral hazard

Promises made, promises broken : a model of IMF program implementation

This paper presents a model of the implementation of IMF programs, which is empirically tested with data from the period 1975-99. The IMF and the borrowing country are shown to have asymmetric evaluations of a program?s discounted benefits, due to differences in the measurement of the benefits, the relevant time frame and appropriate discount rate. The model also distinguishes between a government that seeks to maximize national welfare and an autocracy that seeks only to benefit the ruling group. The results of the empirical analysis demonstrate that program implementation is affected by a country?s trade openness, the ideological cohesion of the government, the duration of the political regime, and the degree of political openness

The adoption, implementation and impact of IMF programs : a review of the issues and evidence

This paper evaluates the literature on the lending programs of the IMF. The first section deals with the initiation of a Fund program, which has been shown to be influenced by political and institutional variables. A second focus of research analyzes the design and implementation of Fund supported polices, since many programs are often not successfully completed. The third issue surveyed is the impact of IMF policies on the economy of the borrowing government. The effect of Fund programs on private capital flows is also examined. The last section presents issues that merit further research

Time present and time past : a duration analysis of IMF program spells

The programs of the International Monetary Fund were originally designed to provide short-term assistance to countries implementing policies to address balance of payments disequilibria. In recent decades, however, the Fund has instituted new facilities with longer time horizons, while many developing countries have adopted consecutive programs. As a result, the length of time spent by countries in IMF programs has grown, and in some cases has extended over a decade. This paper analyzes the IMF program spells for a group of emerging economies over the period of 1982 to 1997. Duration models are used to investigate the time dependence of the failure rate of the spells and the factors that affect the duration of program spells. The hazard ratio of program spells has a non-monotonic shape, first rising and then falling over time. Program duration is extended for those countries with lower per-capita income, exports concentrated in primary goods, landlocked geographic status, and stable legal processes