The Trade and Labour Approaches to Wage Inequality

We compare the trade and labour approaches to wage inequality. We first look at the theoretical differences, stressing the different roles ascribed to sector and factor bias, labour supply and the theory of technical change in trade models with endogenous prices. We then briefly review some of the evidence on the sector bias of prices and technology.Wage inequality, Technical change, Stolper-Samuelson effects

Does the Sector Bias of Skill-Biased Technical Change Explain Changing Wage Inequality?

This paper examines whether the sector bias of skill-biased technical change (sbtc) explains changing skill premia within countries in recent decades. First, using a two-factor, two-sector, two-country model we demonstrate that in many cases it is the sector bias of sbtc that determines sbtc's effect on relative factor prices, not its factor bias. Thus, rising (falling) skill premia are caused by more extensive sbtc in skill-intensive (unskill-intensive) sectors. Second, we test the sector-bias hypothesis using industry data for many countries in recent decades. An initial consistency check strongly supports the hypothesis. Among ten countries we find a strong correlation between changes in skill premia and the sector bias of sbtc during the 1970s and 1980s. The hypothesis is also strongly supported by more structural estimation on U.S. and U.K. data of the economy-wide wage changes mandated' to maintain zero profits in all sectors in response to the sector bias of sbtc. The suggestive mandated-wage estimates match the direction of actual wage changes in both countries during both the 1970s and the 1980s. Thus, the empirical evidence strongly suggests that the sector bias of sbtc can help explain changing skill premia.

Global Engagement and the Innovation Activities of Firms

Firms that export or, even more so, are part of a multinational enterprise tend to exhibit higher productivity than their purely domestic counterparts. To better understand this correlation, we incorporate the perspective of industrial organization that one of the main drivers of differences in productivity is differences in knowledge. We examine a new data set of several thousand U.K. enterprises covering all industries from 1994 through 2000. For each enterprise we have multiple detailed measures of knowledge outputs, knowledge investments, and sources of existing knowledge. We find that globally engaged firms do innovate more. But this is not just because globally engaged firms use more researchers. It is also because they learn more from more sources such as suppliers and customers, universities, and their intra-firm worldwide pool of information. We also find that the relative importance of knowledge sources varies systematically with the type of innovation.

Does Inward Foreign Direct Investment Boost the Productivity of Domestic Firms?

Are there productivity spillovers from FDI to domestic firms, and, if so, how much should host countries be willing to pay to attract FDI? To examine these questions we use a plant-level panel covering U.K. manufacturing from 1973 through 1992. Across a wide range of specifications, we estimate a significantly positive correlation between a domestic plant's TFP and the foreign-affiliate share of activity in that plant's industry. This is consistent with positive FDI spillovers. We do not generally find significant effects on plant TFP of the foreign-affiliate share of activity in that plant's region. Typical estimates suggest that a 10 percentage-point increase in foreign presence in a U.K. industry raises the TFP of that industry's domestic plants by about 0.5 percent. We also use these estimates to calculate the per-job value of these spillovers. These calculated values appear to be less than per-job incentives governments have granted in recent high-profile cases, in some cases several times less.Multinational firms, Foreign direct investment, Productivity spillovers

Does Inward Foreign Direct Investment Boost the Productivity of Domestic Firms?

Are there productivity spillovers from FDI to domestic firms, and, if so, how much should host countries be willing to pay to attract FDI? To examine these questions we use a plant-level panel covering U.K. manufacturing from 1973 through 1992. Across a wide range of specifications, we estimate a significantly positive correlation between a domestic plant's TFP and the foreign-affiliate share of activity in that plant's industry. This is consistent with positive FDI spillovers. We do not generally find significant effects on plant TFP of the foreign-affiliate share of activity in that plant's region. Typical estimates suggest that a 10 percentage-point increase in foreign presence in a U.K. industry raises the TFP of that industry's domestic plants by about 0.5 percent. We also use these estimates to calculate the per-job value of these spillovers. These calculated values appear to be less than per-job incentives governments have granted in recent high-profile cases, in some cases several times less.

Productivity Growth, Knowledge Flows, and Spillovers

This paper explores the role of knowledge flows and productivity growth by linking direct survey data on knowledge flows to firm-level data on TFP growth. Our data measure the information flows often considered important, especially by policy-makers, such as from within the firm and from suppliers, customers, and competitors. We examine (a) what are the empirically important sources of knowledge flows? (b) to what extent do such flows contribute to TFP growth? (c) do such flows constitute a spillover of free knowledge? (d) how do such flows correspond to suggested spillover sources, such as multinational or R&D presence? We find that: (a) the main sources of knowledge are competitors; suppliers; and plants that belong to the same business group ; (b) these three flows together account for about 50% of TFP growth; (c) the main "free" information flow spillover is from competitors; and (d) multinational presence contributes to this spillover.

Globalization and U.S. Wages: Modifying Classic Theory to Explain Recent Facts

This paper seeks to review how globalization might explain the recent trends in real and relative wages in the United States. We begin with an overview of what is new during the last 10-15 years in globalization, productivity, and patterns of U.S. earnings. To preview our results, we then work through four main findings: First, there is only mixed evidence that trade in goods, intermediates, and services has been raising inequality between more- and less-skilled workers. Second, it is more possible, although far from proven, that globalization has been boosting the real and relative earnings of superstars. The usual trade-in-goods mechanisms probably have not done this. But other globalization channels—such as the combination of greater tradability of services and larger market sizes abroad—may be playing an important role. Third, seeing this possible role requires expanding standard Heckscher-Ohlin trade models, partly by adding insights of more recent research with heterogeneous firms and workers. Finally, our expanded trade framework offers new insights on the sobering fact of pervasive real-income declines for the large majority of Americans in the past decade