The adjusted churn: an index of competitive balance for sports leagues based on changes in team standings over time

This paper introduces an index called the adjusted churn, designed to measure competitive balance in sports leagues based on changes in team standings over time. This is a simple yet powerful index that varies between zero and one. A value of zero indicates no change in league standings from year to year and therefore minimal competitive balance. A value of one indicates the maximum possible turnover in league standings from year to year and therefore a high level of competitive balance. Application of this index to Major League Baseball suggests that there has been a significant decline in competitive balance in MLB since the 1990s with the most severe decline occurring in the American League. This index also indicates minimal competitive balance for the American League Eastern Division of MLB from 1998 to 2003

The factors affecting team performance in the NFL: does off-field conduct matter?

This paper contains a statistical analysis of the factors that contribute to team wins in the NFL. The variables examined are divided into offensive, defensive, and special teams categories. In addition, net turnovers, penalties, and off-field conduct, as measured by team arrests, are also included as independent variables. The results show that the quarterback rating has the largest impact on team wins followed by field goal percentage, opponent's passing yards per game, and opponent''s rushing yards per game. Team arrests were not found to have a statistically significant impact on team performance.

The 2002 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences

this paper is precisely to present to students the key facets of the Hotelling model in a very intuitive yet comprehensive way. An interesting point is that the experiment actually allows one to deal with a priori purely technical issues such as the nonexistence problem identified by d'Aspremont et al. (1979). The purpose of the experiment is thus to capture the whole story of spatial competition, including the clustering tendency by firms, pricecompetition problems, the demand-proximity effect, regulation aspects, and the political competition interpretation of spatial model

The Sequential Equilibrium Theory of Reputation Building: A Further Test.

An experimental test of some qualitative predictions of the Kreps-Wilson (1982) model of reputation building is conducted in a version of a borrower-lender game first used experimentally by Colin Camerer and Keith Weigelt (1988). A systematic response to changes in the payoff function of borrowers is observed. However, the response is opposite to the direction predicted by the theory. Furthermore, the observed behavior cannot be reconciled with the theory by an appeal to "homemade" priors of the type specified by Camerer and Weigelt. Copyright 1992 by The Econometric Society.

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