CONSUMER PRICE AWARENESS IN FOOD SHOPPING: THE CASE OF QUANTITY SURCHARGES

Data from 54 grocery regions is on tuna sales, prices, and consumer demographics is used to examine why consumers purchase large sizes when unit prices are higher. Results strongly indicate that this is done on the mistaken belief that large sizes are always cheaper: buyers are not examining prices.quantity surcharges, price awareness, Consumer/Household Economics,

The incidence of sanctions against U. S. employers of illegal aliens

Emigration and immigration ; Labor market

A Laboratory Investigation of Compliance Behavior under Tradable Emissions Rights: Implications for Targeted Enforcement

This paper uses laboratory experiments to test the theoretical observations that both the violations of competitive risk-neutral firms and the marginal effectiveness of increased enforcement across firms are independent of differences in their abatement costs and their initial allocations of permits. This conclusion has important implications for enforcing emissions trading programs because it suggests that regulators have no justification for targeting their enforcement effort based on firm-level characteristics. Consistent with the theory, we find that subjects’ violations were independent of parametric differences in their abatement costs. However, those subjects that were predicted to buy permits tended to have higher violation levels than those who were predicted to sell permits. Despite this, we find no statistically significant evidence that the marginal effectiveness of enforcement depends on any firmspecific characteristic. We also examine the determinants of compliance behavior under fixed emissions standards. As expected, we find significant differences between compliance behavior under fixed standards and emissions trading programs.enforcement, compliance, emissions trading, permit markets, standards, commandand- control

The incidence of sanctions against U.S. employers of illegal aliens

Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 ; Wages

An Investigation of Voluntary Discovery and Disclosure of Environmental Violations Using Laboratory Experiments

This paper uses laboratory experiments to test individual responses to policies that seek to encourage firms to voluntarily discover and disclose violations of environmental standards. We find that while it is possible to motivate a significant number of voluntary disclosures without adversely affecting environmental quality, this result is sensitive to both the fine for disclosed violations and the assumption that firms know their compliance status without cost. When firms have to expend resources to determine their compliance status, motivating a significant number of violation disclosures yields worse environmental quality. Finally, relative to conventional enforcement, disclosure polices will result in more violations being sanctioned, but fewer of these sanctions are for violations that are uncovered by the government.enforcement, compliance, environmental standards, self-reporting, self-auditing voluntary disclosure

ESTIMATION OF WHEAT ACREAGE RESPONSE FUNCTIONS FOR THE NORTHWEST

Acreage response functions for wheat are fitted to aggregate data and pooled time-series and cross-sectional data for the Northwest. It was hypothesized that the pooled data approach provides a useful alternative to using aggregate data since it requires fewer timer-series observations for reliable parameter estimation and it does not require the assumption of constant acreage response elasticities throughout the region. The results of this study verify this hypothesis as well as indicate that regional response elasticities for Northwest wheat acreage may differ greatly from national estimates.Crop Production/Industries,

AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE BEHAVIOR IN EMISSIONS TRADING PROGRAMS: SOME PRELIMINARY RESULTS

While there is a substantial body of economic theory about compliance and enforcement in emissions trading programs, and readily available information about how existing emissions trading programs are enforced, there are no empirical analyses of the determinants of compliance decisions in emissions trading programs. This paper contains preliminary results from laboratory experiments designed to examine compliance behavior in emissions trading programs.Environmental Economics and Policy,

An Experimental Analysis of Compliance in Dynamic Emissions Markets

Two important design elements for emission trading programs are whether and to what extent firms are able to bank emissions permits, and how these programs are to be enforced. In this paper we present results from laboratory emissions markets designed to investigate enforcement and compliance when these markets allow permit banking. Banking is motivated by a decrease in the aggregate permit supply in the middle of multi-period trading sessions. Consistent with theoretical insights, our experiments suggest that high permit violation penalties have little deterrence value in dynamic emissions markets, and that the main challenge of enforcing these programs is to motivate truthful self-reports of emissions.compliance, enforcement, emissions trading, laboratory experiments, permit markets, permit banking

Imperfect Enforcement of Emissions Trading and Industry Welfare: A Laboratory Investigation

This paper uses laboratory experiments to investigate the performance of emission permit markets when compliance is imperfectly enforced. In particular we examine deviations in observed aggregate payoffs and expected penalties from those derived from a model of risk-neutral payoff-maximizing firms. We find that the experimental emissions markets were reasonably efficient at allocating individual emission control choices despite imperfect enforcement and significant noncompliance. However, violations and expected penalties were lower than predicted when these are predicted to be high, but were about the same as predicted values when these values were predicted to be low. Thus, although a standard model of compliance with emissions trading programs tends to predict significantly higher violations than we observe when subjects have strong incentives to violate their emissions permits, individual emissions control responsibilities are distributed among firms as predicted.enforcement, compliance, emissions trading, permit markets, pollution, laboratory experiments

MARKET COMPETITION AND METROPOLITAN-AREA GROCERY PRICES

This paper examines the relationship of 1987 retail grocery prices to supermarket sales concentration across 95 U.S. metropolitan areas. The regression model incorporates a large number of population, retail-cost, and retail competition factors and separate prices by type of grocery item. We find that the concentration-price relationship is sensitive to item type: positive for packaged, branded, dry groceries and unrelated for produce, meat, and dairy product prices. As for market rivalry, we find that small grocery stores provide no grocery price competition for supermarkets. However, branded grocery prices are driven down by fast-food places and by rapid price churning, whereas for unbranded foods the presence of warehouse stores places downward pressure on supermarket prices while fast-food presence does not. For the branded-groceries component, we also find prices higher in large, fast-growing, low- income, Eastern cities. We also find that cities where rents, wages, and electricity costs are high tend to have high dry grocery prices. However, for the unbranded-products component retail costs are unrelated to prices, and cities in the South have the highest prices.retail grocery trade, pricing policy, variable price merchandising, market competition, category management, market structure, sales concentration, price discrimination, price rivalry, oligopoly, food demand, food prices, Consumer/Household Economics,