Postindustrial elite and non-elite insecurities

Two growing conflicts, peculiar to postindustrial societies, challenge the ability of elites to keep postindustrial politics manageable. These are (1) a conflict between elites and those non-elites who remain reasonably well integrated in the productive and social orders of postindustrial societies but who feel themselves vulnerable to elite personnel decisions they regard as arbitrary and uninformed – ‘insiders’; (2) a conflict between insiders and the many persons in postindustrial societies who are more or less unemployable for objective or subjective reasons and located in strictly marginal or wholly superfluous work and dependency statuses – ‘outsiders’. Both conflicts impede the managerial roles of elites and raise questions about how postindustrial societies can be sustained without suffering organizational paralysis and the socioeconomic retrogression that would accompany it

Democratic elitism and western political thought (2009)

"Many political thinkers have viewed democratic elitism as closing a democratic road they believe is or should be open-ended. Their view of democratic possibilities reflects the auspicious circumstances of Western societies during the past several centuries and especially since World War II. However, it involves a conflation of liberal and democratic values. I examine why and how this has occurred, and I argue that liberal and democratic values must be more clearly separated in today's dangerous world. In step with Schumpeter, democracy must be regarded as a method or instrumental value that in some but by no means all circumstances promotes the ultimate liberal value of actively individualistic free people." (author's abstract

Elite power garnes and democratic consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe (1999)

"Postcommunist elites play rational power games throughout East Central and Eastern Europe today. But their games differ according to the structure, behavioral codes, and informal orientations associated with the paths of elite change. Although democratic institutions and procedures are in place just about everywhere, the differing elite power games account for major differences in extra-electoral politics and, thus, for wide variations in the quality of postcommunist democracies. The extent of the particularisms - clientelism and patronage, blurred functional autonomies and boundaries, violations of horizontal accountabilities, manipulations of the media and judiciary, harassment of Opposition elites, personal vendettas, persecutions of minorities - define these power games, and they can be linked systematically to the patterns of elite unity, differentiation, and circulation. We view combinations of these patterns as constituting the critical elite conditions for different types of political regimes, including consolidated democracies." (author's abstract

Elite theory versus Marxism: the twentieth century's verdict (2000)

"Noting that Marxist and elite paradigms birthed competing theories on social and political change and that the differential development of these theories depends less on evidence than on ideological leanings, the epilogue to a collection of essays on postsocialist elites compares these paradigms in terms of their polarity in the 20th century. Although fading by the end of the 19th century, Marxism saw renewed vitality as it was embraced as a theoretical and ideological tool of radical and reforrnist leaders of the European Left. Elite theory's decline is attributed less to a lack of its plausibility than to a lack of Lies to organized political forces. However, Marxism's emergence as a major global intellectual and political movement had a concomitant destructive impact on its explanatory power. By the end of the 20th century, Marxist theory comprised many dissipating streams. The decline of elite theory is delineated, noting that its tenets remained intact despite its unpopularity among activists and intellectuals. The negative effect of fascism - i.e., the dubious notion that elite theory leads to fascism - is noted, along with the idea that a combination of socioeconomic and sociocultural factors further eclipsed elite theory's development and popularity. Latter-20th-century elite theory lacked urgency in discussions on Western democracies and non-Western developing countries. However, three trends led to the reinvigoration of elite theory: economic advances of Japan and the Asian tigers, state socialism in Eastern Europe, and the elite-driven Soviet collapse. Thus, political developments driving the revival of elite theory include the centrality of elite choices and actions guiding these changes; and the theoretical developments include the exhaustion of Marxist theory's credibility and the reformulation of elite-centered democratic theory. Five suppositions underlying the analyses of contributions are delineated." (author's abstract

Elite and leadership change in liberal democracies (2007)

"This article presents and assesses the thesis that a shift in the character of governing elites and leaders has been occurring in several important liberal democracies during recent years. Ascendant elites are more leonine and top leaders are more pugnacious. We attribute the shift to strong centripetal pressures that now impinge on elites and leaders, and we ask about the shift's consequences for the Operation of liberal democracies." (author's abstract

Elites, crises, and regimes in comparative analysis (1998)

"Most political regimes, whether authoritarian or democratic, are born in abrupt, brutal, and momentous crises. In this volume [Mattei Dogan, and John Higley: Elites, Crises and the Origins of Regimes], a group of prominent scholars explores how these seminal events affect elites and shape regimes. Combining theoretical and case study chapters, the authors draw from a wide range of historical and contemporary examples to challenge mainstream developmental explanations of political change, which emphasize incremental changes and evaluations stretching over generations. Instead, the authors argue here, political leaders and elites possess significant autonomy and latitude for maneuver, especially in times of crisis. And their choices are frequently decisive in the making of regimes and the forging of national political histories. Providing a sustained comparative analysis of elites, their circulation, and behavior across times and countries, this lucid volume will be invaluable for scholars and students alike." (author's abstract

The elite variable in democratic transitions and breakdowns (1989)

"Stable democratic regimes depend heavily on the 'consensual unity' of national elites. So Jong as elites remain disunified, political regimes are unstable, a condition which makes democratic transitions and democratic breakdowns merely temporary oscillations in the forms unstable regimes take. Disunity appears to be the generic condition of national elites, and disunity strongly tends to persist regardless of socioeconomic development and other changes in mass populations. The consensually unified elites that are necessary to stable democracies are created in only a few ways, two of the most important of which involve distinctive elite transformations. After elaborating this argument, we examine the relationship between elites and regimes in Western nation-states since they began to consolidate after 1500. We show that our approach makes good sense of the Western political record, that it does much to clarify prospects for stable democracies in developing societies today, and that it makes the increasingly elite-centered analysis of democratic transitions and breakdowns more systematic." (author's abstract

The effect of vertical angular subtense on accuracy of response to a tachistoscopic recognition task

The effect of vertical angular subtense on accuracy of response to a tachistoscopic recognition tas