Are Banks Dead? Or Are the Reports Greatly Exaggerated?

This paper reexamines the conventional wisdom that commercial banking is an industry in severe decline. We find that a careful reading of the evidence does not justify this conclusion. It is true that on-balance sheet assets held by commercial banks have declined as a share of total intermediary assets. But this measure overstates any drop in banking, for three reasons. First, it ignores the rapid growth in commercial banks' off-balance sheet activities. Second, it fails to take account of the substantial growth in off-shore C&I lending by foreign banks. Third, it ignores the fact that over the last several decades financial intermediation has grown rapidly relative to the rest of the economy. We find that after adjusting the measure of bank assets to account for these considerations there is no clear evidence of secular decline. To corroborate these findings, we also construct an alternative measure of the importance of banking, using data from the national income accounts. Again, we find no clear evidence of a sustained decline. At most the industry may have suffered a slight loss of market share over the last decade. But as we discuss, this loss may reflect a transitory response to a series of adverse shocks and the phasing in of new regulatory requirements, rather than the beginning of a permanent decline.

The profitability and risk effects of allowing bank holding companies to merge with other financial firms: a simulation study

Bank mergers ; Bank holding companies ; Nonbank activities

Investigating the banking consolidation trend

This paper examines whether the U.S. banking industry's recent consolidation trend--toward fewer and bigger firms--is a natural result of market forces. The paper finds that it is not: The evidence does not support the popular claims that large banking firms are more efficient and less risky than smaller firms or the notion that the industry is consolidating in order to eliminate excess capacity. The paper suggests, instead, that public policies are encouraging banks to merge, although it acknowledges that other forces may be at work as well.Bank mergers

The Stock Market's Reaction to Unemployment News: Why Bad News is Usually Good for Stocks

We find that on average an announcement of rising unemployment is 'good news' for stocks during economic expansions and 'bad news' during economic contractions. Thus stock prices usually increase on news of rising unemployment, since the economy is usually in an expansion phase. We provide an explanation for this phenomenon. Unemployment news bundles two primitive types of information relevant for valuing stocks: information about future interest rates and future corporate earnings and dividends. A rise in unemployment typically signals a decline in interest rates, which is good news for stocks, as well as a decline in future corporate earnings and dividends, which is bad news for stocks. The nature of the bundle -- and hence the relative importance of the two effects -- changes over time depending on the state of the economy. For stocks as a group, and in particular for cyclical stocks, information about interest rates dominates during expansions and information about future corporate earnings dominates during contractions.

Leadership in community oriented policing

Police and the community--COP program

Moral hazard under commercial and universal banking

Many claims have been made about the potential benefits, and the potential costs, of adopting a system of universal banking in the United States. We evaluate these claims using a model where there is a moral hazard problem between banks and “borrowers,” a moral hazard problem between banks and a deposit insurer, and a costly state verification problem. Under conditions we describe, allowing banks to take equity positions in firms strengthens their ability to extract surplus, and exacerbates problems of moral hazard. The incentives of universal banks to take equity positions will often be strongest when these problems are most severe.Universal banks

Deposit insurance: a reconsideration

This paper undertakes a simple general equilibrium analysis of the consequences of deposit insurance programs, the way in which they are priced and the way in which they fund revenue shortfalls. We show that the central issue is how the government will make up any FDIC losses. Under one scheme for making up the losses, we show that FDIC policy is irrelevant: it does not matter what premium is charged, nor does it matter how big FDIC losses are. Under another scheme, all that matters is the magnitude of the losses. And there is no presumption that small losses are “good.” We also show that multiple equilibria can be observed and Pareto ranked. Some economies may be “trapped” in equilibria with inefficient financial systems. Our analysis provides counterexamples to the following propositions. (1) Actuarially fair pricing of deposit insurance is always desirable. (2) Implicit FDIC subsidization of banks through deposit insurance is always undesirable. (3) “Large” FDIC losses are necessarily symptomatic of a poorly designed deposit insurance system.Deposit insurance

Inflation, financial markets and capital formation

Capital ; Financial markets ; Inflation (Finance)