Shirking, Standards and the Probability of Detection

Publisher PD

The Impact of Parental Education on Earnings : New Wine in an Old Bottle?

We examine the impact of parental education on the shape of an individual’s experience-earnings profile. A number of factors suggest that parental education will affect the ability of an individual to translate labor market experience into earnings. Our empirical analysis of US data suggests that this is indeed the case. Higher parental education shifts the earnings profile significantly to the left – the profile of individuals with parents who both have 15 years of education peaks at 16 years of experience when their wages are 52% (24%) greater than those whose parents both have only 5 (10) years of education.earnings; human capital; parental education

The Impact of Parental Education on Earnings: New Wine in an Old Bottle?

We examine the impact of parental education on the shape of an individual's experience-earnings profile. A number of factors suggest that parental education will affect the ability of an individual to translate labor market experience into earnings. Our empirical analysis of US data suggests that this is indeed the case. Higher parental education shifts the earnings profile significantly to the left – the profile of individuals with parents who both have 15 years of education peaks at 16 years of experience when their wages are 52% (24%) greater than those whose parents both have only 5 (10) years of education.parental education, human capital, earnings

Paid to Perform? Compensation Profiles under Pure Wage and Performance Related Pay Arrangements

Whilst existing efficiency wage literature assumes detection probabilities of shirkers are exogenous, this paper finds them positively and endogenously dependent on non-shirkers' effort. It shares the result with the endogenous monitoring models where, in some regions, workers reduce effort in response to higher wages, but differs in that firms never operate in those regions. The paper further provides theoretical reasons for the empirical regularity that increased usage of performance related pay (PRP) flattens the pay-tenure profile. Wages and effort increase over the lifecycle, both with and without PRP, but with late payments in PRP falling short of pure wage arrangements.monitoring, tenure, efficiency wages

Tenure, Wage Profiles and Monitoring

Efficiency wage theory predicts that firms can induce worker effort by the carrot of high wages and / or the stick of monitoring worker performance. Another option available to firms is to tilt the remuneration package over time such that the lure of high future earnings acts as a deterrent to current shirking. In this paper we undertake the first empirical investigation of this relationship between the slope of the wage-tenure profile and the level of monitoring. On the assumption that firms strive for the optimal trade-off between these various instruments, we hypothesise that increased monitoring leads to a decline in the slope of the wage-tenure profile. Our empirical analysis, using two cross sections of matched employer-employee British data, provides robust support for this prediction.Monitoring, Tenure, Efficiency, Wages.

Wages, Supervision and Sharing:An Analysis of the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey

Instrumental efficiency wage models predict an inverse relationship between wages and supervision with this relationship becoming more pronounced amongst firms that participate in some form of employee sharing. To be sure, our theoretical exposition predicts that an increase in total remuneration will elicit a larger cut in optimal monitoring in ‘sharing’ rather than ‘non sharing’ firms. In this paper, we explore these predictions empirically using the British 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey. Our results confirm an inverse relationship between supervision and pay but the trade-off is only heightened by the presence of performance related pay and employee share ownership schemes. We also find that employee share ownership and performance related pay are relatively more successful in alleviating the need to monitor, with the rate of profit sharing impacting insignificantly on the level supervision.Monitoring; supervision; profit sharing; employee share ownership; efficiency wages

Tenure, Wage Profiles and Monitoring

We undertake the first empirical investigation of the relationship between the slope of the wagetenure profile and the level of monitoring. On the assumption that firms strive for the optimal trade-off between these various instruments, we hypothesise that increased monitoring leads to a decline in the slope of the wagetenure profile. Our empirical analysis, using two cross sections of matched employer-employee British data, provides robust support for this prediction.efficiency wages; tenure; monitoring

Tenure, Wage Profiles and Monitoring

We investigate the relationship between the slope of the wage-tenure profile and the level of monitoring across two cross sections of matched employer-employee British data. Our theoretical model predicts that increased monitoring leads to a decline in the slope of the wage-tenure profile. Our empirical analysis provides strong support for this prediction.monitoring, tenure, efficiency wages

Cross-Assignment Discrimination in Pay: A Test Case of Major League Baseball

The traditional Becker/Arrow style model of discrimination depicts majority and minority and workers as perfectly substitutable inputs, implying that all workers have the same job assignment. The model is only appropriate for determining whether pay differences between, for example, whites and non-whites doing job assignment A are attributable to prejudice ('within-assignment discrimination'); It is inappropriate, however, for determining whether pay differences between whites in job assignment A and non-whites in job assignment B reflect discriminatory behaviour ('cross-assignment discrimination'). We test the model of such cross assignment discrimination developed by Bodvarsson and Sessions (2011) using data on Major League Baseball hitters and pitchers for four different seasons during the 1990s, a decade during which monopsony power fell. We find strong evidence of ceteris paribus racial pay differences between hitters and pitchers, as well as evidence that cross-assignment discrimination varies with labour market structure.wage discrimination, complementarity, monopsony power