The development of an incremental debugging system : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Computer Science at Massey University

Debugging is a major area of software development that has received little attention. This thesis starts by looking at work done in the area of bug prevention, bug detection, bug location and bug correction. A debugging system, BIAS, is proposed to help in detecting, locating and correcting bugs. Three major design goals are established. Firstly, the system should be simple and easy to understand as this will encourage use. Secondly, the system should be general so that it will be available to a large number of users. Finally, it should be incremental as this will save users' time. An incremental language, STILL, is designed to show how BIAS applies to structured languages. The construction of the system is shown. Each data structure, and how it is used, is described. BIAS uses an interpretive system and runs threaded code on a pseudo-machine. How the threads are interpreted and how they are set up is shown next. The use of BIAS is shown by following through an example session with the system. This consists of entering a program, editing it, and running it. As bugs show themselves, various debugging commands are used to locate the bugs. The program is then edited, and the corrections linked into the code so that it will run correctly. This cycle is repeated until no bugs remain, without at any time recompiling the whole program. It turns out that the best way of achieving the design goals is to extend an incremental compiler host to include debugging commands. This gives a clear emphasis to the power of incremental compilers

Complementarity of Dark Matter Searches at Resonance

We consider models of dark matter where the couplings between the standard model and the dark sector fall at resonance due to kinematics and direct detection experiments become insensitive. To be specific, we consider a simple model of 100 GeV - TeV scale dark matter coupled to the standard model via a vector boson. We explore whether it will be possible to exclude such regions of the parameter space using future observations of dijet rates at the LHC and CTA and AMS observations of the Galactic Centre.Comment: 7 pages, 9 figure

Competition Policy in Indonesia

The Indonesian economy was dominated by the government in the decades of the 1970s and 1980s through its control of major mining, manufacturing and agricultural activities. Hill (2000) estimates that as much as 40% of non-agricultural GDP was accounted for by government entities in the late 1980s There were still a lot of government corporations up until the late 1980s and early 1990s and governmental control over the banking system was still substantial. Non-financial state owned enterprises (SOEs) contributed 14.5% of GDP in the late 1980s. They also accounted for another 9% of gross domestic investment which rose to 15.7% over the period 1990 1997 (World Bank, 2000). Three SOEs are of particular note that dominate the sector in terms of revenue and assets are Pertamina (monopoly in oil and gas with diversified holdings in hotels, an airline and office buildings); PLN and PTTelkolm (monopoly in power and telecommunications industry respectively). The SOEs also employ a significant percentage of the labor force (25% according to data from the Indonesia Statistics Office). This strong role of the state was derived from the historical break with its colonial past under President Suharto and the distrust of capitalists. There was also a need for the Suharto regime in the three decades when he ruled to maintain control of enough industries to maintain its base for extortion and corruption. There was only a gradual and delayed shift toward export promotion and away from import substitution. This was partly the result of lobbying by entrenched interests that were making monopoly profits from new protected industries and corrupt officials that were operating the customs and port facilities. It also had to do with the control of key allocation and production agencies like Bulog and Pertamina. The decline in oil prices in the mid-1980s put pressure on the government to develop a more competitive economic environment which was reinforced by the growing integration of economies in Southeast Asia in conjunction with commitments to the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement. Policy measures focused on trade barriers. Tariffs were lowered and some import monopolies and import licenses were converted to tariff equivalents. There were also reforms in banking and the regulation of foreign direct investment. However, these reforms were partial in nature. Several banks remain under government control and policy required domestic partnerships for foreign direct investment (FDI) approval (see Dowling and Yap (2005) for further details. Nevertheless, despite these shortcomings in the policy environment, there was a measurable improvement in competition and economic efficiency, particularly in the manufacturing sector. Pangestu et al (2002) show that there was a decline in the level of industrial concentration and that the size distribution of firms has become more equal over time. There was also a decline in the prevalence of dominant firms therefore enhancing competition and reducing monopoly power. Finally, there was less stability in market shares after 1990, a development which reflects greater competition1. The evidence of enhanced competition over the decades of the 80s and90s is much less compelling in other sectors of the economy, including agriculture, services, infrastructure and some parts for manufacturing and mining sectors. There are a number of examples that can be cited to support this conclusion including the cement industry (where there were high tariffs on imports, restrictions on number of distributors and allocation of markets) as well as gas distribution, telecommunications and electricity (where an opaque regulatory framework prohibited a level playing field from developing as new entrants came into the market). Furthermore, in the telecoms sector the government remained the majority shareholder in PT. Telkom and Indosat.FTA, Indonesia, competition, telecom

Competition Policy in Indonesia

The Indonesian economy was dominated by the government in the decades of the 1970s and 1980s through its control of major mining, manufacturing and agricultural activities. Hill (2000) estimates that as much as 40% of non-agricultural GDP was accounted for by government entities in the late 1980s There were still a lot of government corporations up until the late 1980s and early 1990s and governmental control over the banking system was still substantial. Non-financial state owned enterprises (SOEs) contributed 14.5% of GDP in the late 1980s. They also accounted for another 9% of gross domestic investment which rose to 15.7% over the period 1990 –1997 (World Bank, 2000). Three SOEs are of particular note that dominate the sector in terms of revenue and assets are Pertamina (monopoly in oil and gas with diversified holdings in hotels, an airline and office buildings); PLN and PTTelkolm (monopoly in power and telecommunications industry respectively). The SOEs also employ a significant percentage of the labor force (25% according to data from the Indonesia’ Statistics Office). This strong role of the state was derived from the historical break with its colonial past under President Suharto and the distrust of “capitalists”. There was also a need for the Suharto regime in the three decades when he ruled to maintain control of enough industries to maintain its base for extortion and corruption. There was only a gradual and delayed shift toward export promotion and away from import substitution. This was partly the result of lobbying by entrenched interests that were making monopoly profits from new protected industries and corrupt officials that were operating the customs and port facilities. It also had to do with the control of key allocation and production agencies like Bulog and Pertamina. The decline in oil prices in the mid-1980s put pressure on the government to develop a more competitive economic environment which was reinforced by the growing integration of economies in Southeast Asia in conjunction with commitments to the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement. Policy measures focused on trade barriers. Tariffs were lowered and some import monopolies and import licenses were converted to tariff equivalents. There were also reforms in banking and the regulation of foreign direct investment. However, these reforms were partial in nature. Several banks remain under government control and policy required domestic partnerships for foreign direct investment (FDI) approval (see Dowling and Yap (2005) for further details. Nevertheless, despite these shortcomings in the policy environment, there was a measurable improvement in competition and economic efficiency, particularly in the manufacturing sector. Pangestu et al (2002) show that there was a decline in the level of industrial concentration and that the size distribution of firms has become more equal over time. There was also a decline in the prevalence of dominant firms therefore enhancing competition and reducing monopoly power. Finally, there was less stability in market shares after 1990, a development which reflects greater competition1. The evidence of enhanced competition over the decades of the ‘80s and’90s is much less compelling in other sectors of the economy, including agriculture, services, infrastructure and some parts for manufacturing and mining sectors. There are a number of examples that can be cited to support this conclusion including the cement industry (where there were high tariffs on imports, restrictions on number of distributors and allocation of markets) as well as gas distribution, telecommunications and electricity (where an opaque regulatory framework prohibited a level playing field from developing as new entrants came into the market). Furthermore, in the telecoms sector the government remained the majority shareholder in PT. Telkom and Indosat.

It's hip to be square : The CubeSat revolution

With the launch of the UK’s first commercial CubeSat, UKube-1, on the horizon, Malcolm Macdonald and Christopher Lowe look at what the future holds for this standardised spacecraft platform

Phenomenological Constraints on Anomaly-Free Dark Matter Models

We study minimal benchmark models of dark matter with an extra anomaly-free U(1)' gauge boson Z'. We find model parameters that give rise to the correct cosmological dark matter density while evading the latest direct detection searches for dark matter scattering produced by the XENON1T experiment, including the effects of Z-Z' mixing. We also find regions of parameter space that evade the constraints from LHC measurements of dileptons and dijets, precision electroweak measurements, and LHC searches for monojet events with missing transverse energy. We study two benchmark Z' models with Y-sequential couplings to quarks and leptons, one with a vector-like coupling to the dark matter particle and one with an axial dark matter coupling. The vector-like model is extremely tightly constrained, with only a narrow allowed strip where $m_\chi \simeq M_{Z'}/2$, and the axial model is excluded within the parameter range studied. We also consider two leptophobic Z$^\prime$ benchmark models, finding again narrow allowed strips where $m_\chi \simeq M_{Z'}/2$ as well as more extended regions where $\log_{10} (m_\chi/ {\rm GeV}) \gtrsim 3.2$.Comment: 29 pages, 18 figures, 0 anomalie

Anomaly-Free Dark Matter Models are not so Simple

We explore the anomaly-cancellation constraints on simplified dark matter (DM) models with an extra U(1)$^\prime$ gauge boson $Z'$. We show that, if the Standard Model (SM) fermions are supplemented by a single DM fermion $\chi$ that is a singlet of the SM gauge group, and the SM quarks have non-zero U(1)$^\prime$ charges, the SM leptons must also have non-zero U(1)$^\prime$ charges, in which case LHC searches impose strong constraints on the $Z'$ mass. Moreover, the DM fermion $\chi$ must have a vector-like U(1)$^\prime$ coupling. If one requires the DM particle to have a purely axial U(1)$^\prime$ coupling, which would be the case if $\chi$ were a Majorana fermion and would reduce the impact of direct DM searches, the simplest possibility is that it is accompanied by one other new singlet fermion, but in this case the U(1)$^\prime$ charges of the SM leptons still do not vanish. This is also true in a range of models with multiple new singlet fermions with identical charges. Searching for a leptophobic model, we then introduce extra fermions that transform non-trivially under the SM gauge group. We find several such models if the DM fermion is accompanied by two or more other new fermions with non-identical charges, which may have interesting experimental signatures. We present benchmark representatives of the various model classes we discuss.Comment: 19 pages, 0 figures, this v2 matches version accepted for publicatio