Sabotage in dynamic tournaments

This paper studies sabotage in a dynamic tournament. Three players compete in two rounds. In the final round, a player who is leading in the race, but not yet beyond the reach of his competitors, gets sabotaged more heavily. As a consequence, if players are at the same position initially, they do not work productively or sabotage at all in the first round. Thus sabotage is not only directly destructive, but also depresses incentives to work productively. If players are heterogeneous ex ante, sabotage activities in the first round may be concentrated against an underdog, contrary to findings from static tournaments. We also discuss the robustness of our results in a less stylized environment

Sabotage in dynamic tournaments

"This paper studies sabotage in a dynamic tournament. Three players compete in two rounds. In the final round, a player who is leading in the race, but not yet beyond the reach of his competitors, gets sabotaged more heavily. As a consequence, if players are at the same position initially, they do not work productively or sabotage at all in the first round. Thus sabotage is not only directly destructive, but also depresses incentives to work productively. If players are heterogeneous ex ante, sabotage activities in the first round may be concentrated against an underdog, contrary to findings from static tournaments. We also discuss the robustness of our results in a less stylized environment." (author's abstract)"Dieser Aufsatz untersucht Sabotage in einem dynamischen Turnier. Drei Spieler konkurrieren in zwei Runden. In der letzten Runde wird ein Spieler, der einen Vorsprung hat, aber noch einholbar ist, stärker sabotiert. Deshalb wird eine Gruppe mit homogenen Spielern in der ersten Runde weder produktiv arbeiten noch sabotieren. Sabotage ist also nicht nur direkt destruktiv, sondern verringert auch die Anreize zu produktiver Anstrengung. Wenn die Spielergruppe ex-ante heterogen ist, kann sich Sabotage in der ersten Runde überwiegend gegen schwächere Spieler richten, im Gegensatz zu Ergebnissen aus statischen Turnieren. Unsere Ergebnisse bleiben auch in einem weniger eng definierten Modellrahmen robust bestehen." (Autorenreferat

Sabotage in dynamic tournaments

This paper studies sabotage in a dynamic tournament. Three players compete in two rounds. In the final round, a player who is leading in the race, but not yet beyond the reach of his competitors, gets sabotaged more heavily. As a consequence, if players are at the same position initially, they do not work productively or sabotage at all in the first round. Thus sabotage is not only directly destructive, but also depresses incentives to work productively. If players are heterogeneous ex ante, sabotage activities in the first round may be concentrated against an underdog, contrary to findings from static tournaments. We also discuss the robustness of our results in a less stylized environment.dynamic tournaments; contests; sabotage; heterogeneity

Sabotage in dynamic tournaments

This paper studies sabotage in a dynamic tournament. Three players compete in two rounds. In the final round, a player who is leading in the race, but not yet beyond the reach of his competitors, gets sabotaged more heavily. As a consequence, if players are at the same position initially, they do not work productively or sabotage at all in the first round. Thus sabotage is not only directly destructive, but also depresses incentives to work productively. If players are heterogeneous ex ante, sabotage activities in the first round may be concentrated against an underdog, contrary to findings from static tournaments. We also discuss the robustness of our results in a less stylized environment. -- Dieser Aufsatz untersucht Sabotage in einem dynamischen Turnier. Drei Spieler konkurrieren in zwei Runden. In der letzten Runde wird ein Spieler, der einen Vorsprung hat, aber noch einholbar ist, stärker sabotiert. Deshalb wird eine Gruppe mit homogenen Spielern in der ersten Runde weder produktiv arbeiten noch sabotieren. Sabotage ist also nicht nur direkt destruktiv, sondern verringert auch die Anreize zu produktiver Anstrengung. Wenn die Spielergruppe ex-ante heterogen ist, kann sich Sabotage in der ersten Runde überwiegend gegen schwächere Spieler richten, im Gegensatz zu Ergebnissen aus statischen Turnieren. Unsere Ergebnisse bleiben auch in einem weniger eng definierten Modellrahmen robust bestehen.Dynamic tournaments,contests,sabotage,heterogeneity

Accelerated physical emulation of Bayesian inference in spiking neural networks

The massively parallel nature of biological information processing plays an important role for its superiority to human-engineered computing devices. In particular, it may hold the key to overcoming the von Neumann bottleneck that limits contemporary computer architectures. Physical-model neuromorphic devices seek to replicate not only this inherent parallelism, but also aspects of its microscopic dynamics in analog circuits emulating neurons and synapses. However, these machines require network models that are not only adept at solving particular tasks, but that can also cope with the inherent imperfections of analog substrates. We present a spiking network model that performs Bayesian inference through sampling on the BrainScaleS neuromorphic platform, where we use it for generative and discriminative computations on visual data. By illustrating its functionality on this platform, we implicitly demonstrate its robustness to various substrate-specific distortive effects, as well as its accelerated capability for computation. These results showcase the advantages of brain-inspired physical computation and provide important building blocks for large-scale neuromorphic applications.Comment: This preprint has been published 2019 November 14. Please cite as: Kungl A. F. et al. (2019) Accelerated Physical Emulation of Bayesian Inference in Spiking Neural Networks. Front. Neurosci. 13:1201. doi: 10.3389/fnins.2019.0120

The Optimality of Heterogeneous Tournaments

We investigate the effect of employee heterogeneity on the incentive to put forth effort in a market-based tournament. Employers use the tournament's outcome to estimate employees' abilities and accordingly condition their wage offers. Employees put forth effort, because by doing so they increase the probability of outperforming the rival, thereby increasing their ability assessment and thus the wage offer. We demonstrate that the tournament outcome provides more information about employees' abilities in case they are heterogeneous. Thus, employees get a higher incentive to affect the tournament outcome, and employers find it optimal to hire heterogeneous contestants

Associations between depressive symptoms and disease progression in older patients with chronic kidney disease: results of the EQUAL study

Background Depressive symptoms are associated with adverse clinical outcomes in patients with end-stage kidney disease; however, few small studies have examined this association in patients with earlier phases of chronic kidney disease (CKD). We studied associations between baseline depressive symptoms and clinical outcomes in older patients with advanced CKD and examined whether these associations differed depending on sex. Methods CKD patients (>= 65 years; estimated glomerular filtration rate <= 20 mL/min/1.73 m(2)) were included from a European multicentre prospective cohort between 2012 and 2019. Depressive symptoms were measured by the five-item Mental Health Inventory (cut-off <= 70; 0-100 scale). Cox proportional hazard analysis was used to study associations between depressive symptoms and time to dialysis initiation, all-cause mortality and these outcomes combined. A joint model was used to study the association between depressive symptoms and kidney function over time. Analyses were adjusted for potential baseline confounders. Results Overall kidney function decline in 1326 patients was -0.12 mL/min/1.73 m(2)/month. A total of 515 patients showed depressive symptoms. No significant association was found between depressive symptoms and kidney function over time (P = 0.08). Unlike women, men with depressive symptoms had an increased mortality rate compared with those without symptoms [adjusted hazard ratio 1.41 (95% confidence interval 1.03-1.93)]. Depressive symptoms were not significantly associated with a higher hazard of dialysis initiation, or with the combined outcome (i.e. dialysis initiation and all-cause mortality). Conclusions There was no significant association between depressive symptoms at baseline and decline in kidney function over time in older patients with advanced CKD. Depressive symptoms at baseline were associated with a higher mortality rate in men

Sabotage in dynamischen Turnieren

This paper studies sabotage in a dynamic tournament. Three players compete in two rounds. In the final round, a player who is leading in the race, but not yet beyond the reach of his competitors, gets sabotaged more heavily. As a consequence, if players are at the same position initially, they do not work productively or sabotage at all in the first round. Thus sabotage is not only directly destructive, but also depresses incentives to work productively. If players are heterogeneous ex ante, sabotage activities in the first round may be concentrated against an underdog, contrary to findings from static tournaments. We also discuss the robustness of our results in a less stylized environment.Dieser Aufsatz untersucht Sabotage in einem dynamischen Turnier. Drei Spieler konkurrieren in zwei Runden. In der letzten Runde wird ein Spieler, der einen Vorsprung hat, aber noch einholbar ist, stärker sabotiert. Deshalb wird eine Gruppe mit homogenen Spielern in der ersten Runde weder produktiv arbeiten noch sabotieren. Sabotage ist also nicht nur direkt destruktiv, sondern verringert auch die Anreize zu produktiver Anstrengung. Wenn die Spielergruppe ex-ante heterogen ist, kann sich Sabotage in der ersten Runde überwiegend gegen schwächere Spieler richten, im Gegensatz zu Ergebnissen aus statischen Turnieren. Unsere Ergebnisse bleiben auch in einem weniger eng definierten Modellrahmen robust bestehen

Sabotage in dynamic tournaments

This paper studies sabotage in a dynamic tournament. Three players compete in two rounds. In the final round, a player who is leading in the race, but not yet beyond the reach of his competitors, is sabotaged more heavily. As a consequence, if all players start off at the same position, they do not work productively or sabotage at all in the first round. Thus sabotage is not only directly destructive, but also depresses incentives to work productively. If players are heterogeneous ex ante, sabotage activities in the first round may be concentrated against an underdog, contrary to findings from static tournaments.Dynamic tournaments Contests Sabotage Heterogeneity