The Effect of Ambient Noise on Cooperation in Public Good Games

Environmental stressors such as noise, pollution, extreme temperatures, or crowding can pose relevant externalities in the economy if certain conditions are met. This paper presents experimental evidence that exposure to acute ambient noise decreases cooperative behavior in a standard linear public good game

Willingness to Pay for Individual Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reductions: Evidence from a Large Field Experiment

In the climate policy debate, a rhetoric has evolved that attributes a high potential to "voluntary climate action". We turn to the population of Germany, the fourth largest cumulative GHG emitter, to obtain an Internet-)representative estimate of the individual willingness to abate one ton of CO2, the equivalent of 10 percent of annual per-capita CO2 emissions. The estimate derives from a large-scale (n=2,440) framed field experiment in which subjects choose between a guaranteed reduction of one ton of EU CO2 emissions and a randomly drawn cash award between €2 and €100. At €6.30, estimated mean WTP is considerably lower than prior hypothetical or non-representative estimates. Median WTP is non-positive. The almost bimodal nature of WTP in the population has important policy implications

Does Mitigation Begin At Home?

In a climate system that is indifferent about where mitigation is carried out, the logic of comparative advantages favors abatement locations in developing and rapidly industrializing countries. There is evidence, however, that citizens of industrialized countries who voluntarily fund climate mitigation activities are not indifferent about the mitigation location. In our artifactual online experiment, subjects located in a European Union member state took a dichotomous choice between a cash prize and the verified mitigation of one metric ton of CO2. The treatment condition varied the location of the mitigation activity between the European Union and developing countries. We test whether the location impacts on the probability that the mitigation activity is chosen, harnessing between- and within-subject Variation in our panel data. Our evidence shows that subjects responded to the location being made salient, but, contrary to previous concerns, were indifferent between mitigation sites in the EU or developing countries

Giving in a Large Economy: Price vs. Non-Price Effects in a Field Experiment

We conduct a large-scale field experiment with 2,440 subjects in which we exogenously vary the price of contributing to the closest empirical counterpart of an infinitely large public good, climate change mitigation. We find that the price effect is robust and negative, but quantitatively weak, with a price elasticity of -0.25. Socioeconomic variables such as education, situational variables such as meteorological conditions around the time of the experiment, and attitudinal variables that can be linked to guilt and moral responsibility dominate the price effect. The latter also explain better than price arbitrage the decision of subjects to declare to be field price censored. The results provide an experimental window on the absolute and relative role of price effects on public goods contributions in a large economy and inform current attempts to build a coherent theory of charitable giving

Self-nudging is more ethical, but less efficient than social nudging

Manipulating choice architectures to achieve social ends (‘social nudges’) raises problems of ethicality. Giving individuals control over their default choice (‘selfnudges’) is a possible remedy, but the trade-offs with efficiency are poorly understood. We examine under four different information structures how subjects set own defaults in social dilemmas and whether outcomes differ between the self-nudge and two exogenous defaults, a social (full cooperation) and a selfish (perfect free-riding) nudge. Subjects recruited from the general population (n = 1,080) play a ten-round, ten-day voluntary contribution mechanism online, with defaults triggered by the absence of an active contribution on the day. We find that individuals’ own choice of defaults structurally differs from full cooperation, empirically affirming the ethicality problem of social nudges. Allowing for self-nudges instead of social nudges reduces efficiency at the group level, however. When individual control over nudges is non-negotiable, self-nudges need to be made public to minimize the ethicality-efficiency trade-off

How to Design the Ask? Funding Units vs. Giving Money

Charities frequently deviate from the standard donation scheme in which potential donors are asked how much money they are willing to give. Instead, they ask donors to choose how many units of a charitable good (e.g. meals, bed nets, or trees) to fund at a given unit price. In an onlne donation experiment, we compare the performance of such a "unit donation" scheme with that of the standard "money donation" and investigate the factors that could explain differences. We find that despite the additional demands that it imposes on the charity, the unit donation does not outperform the money donation scheme in terms of overall donations. It significantly differs, however, with respect tot the propensity to give. The sign of the difference depends on the granularity of the scheme. When one unit of the charitable good is cheap, unit donation schemes increase the propensity to give and can serve as an effective tool for recruiting donors

Determinants of the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Investigations

The private provision of public goods (PPPG) is still one of the most fascinating puzzles in economics. Underpredicted by standard economic theory but outrightly evident in empirical evidence, its presence opened doors for new methods to enter the economist’s toolkit and helped birthing the nowadays more vibrant than ever field of behavioral economics. Variants of the question of what determines giving in PPPG make up, for the most part, the research questions of the five articles that constitute this dissertation. Residing on the overlap of public economics, environmental economics, and behavioral/experimental economics, it reports on two field-experimental and one lab-experimental projects, delivering results with respect to, for example, the price elasticity of giving to public goods, the willingness to pay for a voluntary one-ton emissions reduction, the pronounced effect of education on PPPG, the "pure" effect of group size in public good provision, and the effects of ambient noise and outdoor temperature on PPPG

Subsidizing Unit Donations: Matches, Rebates, and Discounts Compared

An influential result in the literature on charitable giving is that matching subsidies dominate rebate subsidies in raising funds. We investigate whether this result extends to ‘unit donation’ schemes, a popular alternative form of soliciting donations. There, the donors’ choices are about the number of units of a charitable good to fund at a given unit price, rather than the amount of money to give. Comparing matches and rebates as well as simple discounts on the unit price, we find no evidence of dominance in our online experiment: The three subsidy types are equally effective overall. At a more disaggregate level, rebates lead to a higher likelihood of giving while matching and discount subsidies lead to larger donations by donors. This suggests that charities using a unit donation scheme enjoy additional degrees of freedom in choosing a subsidy type. Rebates merit additional consideration if the primary goal is to attract donors

You are an Idiot! – How Conversational Agent Communication Patterns Influence Frustration and Harassment

Conversational Agents (CA) in the form of digital assistants on smartphones, chatbots on social media, or physical embodied systems are an increasingly often applied new form of user interfaces for digital systems. The human-like design of CAs (e.g., having names, greeting users, and using self-references) leads to users subconsciously reacting to them as they were interacting with a human. In recent research, it has been shown that this social component of interacting with a CA leads to various benefits, such as increased service satisfaction, enjoyment, and trust. However, numerous CAs were discontinued because of inadequate responses to user requests or only making errors because of the limited functionalities and knowledge of a CA, which can lead to frustration. Therefore, investigating the causes of frustration and other related emotions and reactions highly relevant. Against this background, this study investigates via an online experiment with 169 participants how different communication patterns influence user’s perception, frustration, and harassment behavior of an error producing CA