22 research outputs found

    A Theory of Rent Seeking with Informational Foundations

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    I develop a model of rent seeking with informational foundations and an arbitrary number of rent seekers, and I compare the results with Tullock’s (1980) classic model where the influence activities are “blackboxed.” Given the microfoundations, the welfare consequences of rent seeking can be studied. In particular, I show that competition among rent seekers can be socially beneficial, since the additional information that the decision maker gets access to makes the increase in rent-seeking expenditures worthwhile. However, the analysis also highlights a logic that, under natural parameter assumptions, makes the rent seekers spend more resources on rent seeking than is in society’s interest, which is consistent with the spirit of the rent-seeking literature

    Does Cost Uncertainty in the Bertrand Model Soften Competition?

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    Hybrid All-Pay and Winner-Pay Contests

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    Does Cost Uncertainty in the Bertrand Model Soften Competition?

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    The answer is no. Although naive intuition may suggest the oppo-site, uncertainty about costs in the homogeneous-good Bertrand model intensifies competition: it lowers price and raises total surplus (but also makes profits go up). For some economic environments, this is implied by Hansen’s (RAND, 1988) analysis of a procurement auction. However, sev-eral authors appear to have overlooked Hansen’s results. Moreover, his results are derived under two assumptions that, if relaxed, conceivably could reverse them. The contributions of the present paper are threefold. First, it clarifies the implications of Hansen’s results for the relationship between uncertainty and competition in the Bertrand model. Second, it shows that his results hold also if drastic innovations are possible. Finally, the paper assumes asymmetric cost distributions and shows, using numer-ical methods, that then uncertainty lowers price and raises total surplus even more than under symmetry. If the asymmetry is large enough, how-ever, industry profits are lower under uncertainty. This is in contrast to the known results and reinforces the notion that uncertainty intensifies competition rather than softens it
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