Revolution in military affairs, missile defence and weapons in space: The US strategic triad

American plans for Missile Defence (MD) and the weaponisation of space should be analysed in the larger framework of the contemporary Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).1 Soviet military analysts have written about this revolution from as early as the 1970s, but it was the application of information age technology (IT) in the 1991 Gulf War that captured the imagination of military planners and policy makers, especially in the US. The US is actively pursuing an RMA, conceptualised as integrating new IT into weapons systems and integrated command, control, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) and, in turn, doctrinal, operational and organisational change in the military to take advantage of information dominance on the battlefield. This relates to MD and the weaponisation of space in two ways. Firstly, very few countries have the financial and technological capability to modernise their defence forces along the lines of a US-defined RMA, which means that they may resort to so-called asymmetric means to exploit the vulnerabilities or weaknesses of a strong, conventional power. Ballistic missiles (in association with chemical, biological or nuclear payloads) are one of the asymmetrical threats most commonly cited in speeches and military documents of the US and used as justification of MD. Secondly, the RMA increases the US military’s reliance on space-based military assets for C4ISR. Placing weapons in space to protect these assets is seen as a logical step to ensure a key aspect of US dominance on the battlefield. This paper explores the extent to which the strategic framework of the RMA has a bearing on US MD and space weaponisation arguments.Department of HE and Training approved lis

Africa–India nuclear cooperation: pragmatism, principle, post-colonialism and the Pelindaba Treaty

The United States India nuclear agreement, announced in 2005, was a first step in the process to normalise India’s international nuclear relations despite the fact that India is not a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Africa is largely seen as a uranium supplier rather than nuclear power producer in the world nuclear order. The position that African states take towards Africa India nuclear cooperation, uranium supply to India in particular, is informed by two seemingly contrasting factors, namely economic and political pragmatism on the one hand, and non-proliferation imperatives and norms on the other. The African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty, also referred to as the Pelindaba Treaty, prohibits uranium and nuclear-related exports to states without comprehensive safeguards of their nuclear facilities, but the case of India is still open for interpretation. Africa and India’s shared post-colonial consciousness, manifesting in their historical ties, membership of the Non-Aligned Movement and South South cooperation, is often regarded as another factor facilitating Africa India nuclear relations. A more critical view points to the different notions of post-coloniality in Africa and India, resulting in different approaches to nuclear non-proliferation that constrain their nuclear relations.International Bibliography of Social Science

Redefining defence in the post-apartheid security imaginary: The politics of meaning-fixing

This article traces the politics of meaning-fixing with respect to the role of the defence force as apartheid declined from the mid-1980s, as it was negotiated from a current to a past organising principle of the “security imaginary” in the period 1990 to 1994 and as the post-apartheid period commenced after the 1994 elections.Department of HE and Training approved lis

Nuclear Politics of Denial: South Africa and the Additional Protocol

South Africa was one of the first states to conclude an Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2002, allowing the IAEA greater right of access to safeguard nuclear activities and material. In light of this, some observers in the arms control community find it odd that South Africa’s representatives at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) would be the main objectors to making the conclusion of an Additional Protocol a precondition for states wishing to import uranium enrichment and reprocessing technology (classified as sensitive nuclear technology and material). The South African objection should be viewed as only the most recent in a series of objections to measures that may seem obviously in line with nuclear non-proliferation. This emerging pattern in South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy and, more specifically, the objection to the Additional Protocol condition are related to its membership in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and can be investigated through the lens of a politics of denial. Denial is the act of saying “no”, but it is also in psychological parlance the unconscious thought process manifesting a refusal to acknowledge the existence of certain unpleasant aspects of external reality. It will be argued that South Africa’s opposition to the Additional Protocol condition can be explained in the context of two instances of denial: (i) a perceived denial by the nuclear haves of what the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty codifies as an inalienable right to peaceful nuclear technology – something that South Africa is cautious to be complicit in; and (ii) the nuclear weapon states’ denial (the psychological meaning) of the unpleasant reality of a hypocritical nuclear order – something that South Africa wants to expose or at least something with which to engage to limit the effects for itself and other NAM members. The politics of denial does not yield to a pragmatist/utopian dichotomy in the nuclear realm, but instead reveals the dialectic nature of realism and idealism in nuclear politics, especially as reflected in South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy.Department of HE and Training approved lis

Eroding the middle ground: the shift in foreign policy underpinning South African nuclear diplomacy

In international relations states labelled as ‘middle powers’ are often responsible for crafting a middle way to bridge conflicting international interests. They typically favour multilateralism and cooperative international behaviour. Middle power diplomacy has played a crucial role in the establishment and maintenance of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. South Africa has played the role of a middle power in nuclear diplomacy since 1994, drawing on its moral position after giving up its nuclear weapons. This role has especially involved joining the efforts of middle powers in the North, such as Norway and Canada, to indefinitely extend the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). However, South Africa’s foreign policy has shown a gradual shift away from a middle power orientation not least due to an increasing non-aligned position that calls for deep reforms to the perceived unfair world order tilted in the favour of the developed North. This shift is also visible in South African nuclear diplomacy and is eroding the middle ground that has so far sustained the nonproliferation regime. The paper argues that South Africa’s middle power diplomacy has allowed it to punch above its weight in the nuclear realm, but its pursuit of international reforms has resulted in the drawing of a fault line between developed and developing countries. It is in the interest of nuclear non-proliferation to regain the middle ground by forming broad coalitions amongst all actors interested in nuclear disarmament.Web of Scienc

Ethics and international security in the information age

According to Moore’s Law, every 18 months technology is developed reducing electronic systems to half their previous size.1 The resultant impact upon the field of information and communication has been revolutionary and can be framed in terms of three orders of manifestation. The first order manifestation of the information revolution is technological and refers to the unprecedently cheap, fast and user-friendly information devices that have been developed in the past two to three decades. Digitization, miniaturization and conversion of different media into each other have been the impetus for a worldwide communications infrastructure – the apex of which is the Internet. The first order (or technological) implications of the information revolution have, in the second order, impacted on social, political and economic activities allowing for the almost instant mobility of capital, the proliferation of multinational corporations, the global reach of news media coverage, and cross-border mobilization of individuals and interest groups. The behavioral implications of the information revolution, in the third order, raise questions of a structural nature about the validity of the nation-state, the expression of identity and the organization of the international community. This article aims to tease out the ethical implications of the technological, behavioral and structural dimensions of the information revolution and in turn international security in two ways. First, the impact of information technology (IT) on contemporary ethical issues in the pursuit of international security, for example weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and redistributive justice and human rights, are explored. Second, IT also introduces a whole new set of ethical questions to international security issues. These questions are most often related to the causes and conduct of war, personal privacy in opposition to state security, and information inequality

Why treating water scarcity as a security issue is a bad idea.

Helen Zille, the Premier of the Western Cape in South Africa, has made two startling claims about the water crisis in the province. She says there will be anarchy when the taps run dry, and that normal policing will be inadequate. She stated this as fact. Neither claim has any basis in truth. But they reflect an “elite panic”: society’s elite’s fear of social disorder. We see this when public officials and the media draw on stereotypes of public panic and disorder, or, in Zille’s words, “anarchy

"Dubula ibhunu" (shoot the boer): A psycho-political analysis of farm attacks in South Africa

Post-colonial archetypes in the collective unconscious of South African society have actualised themselves powerfully in the discourses that have usurped the framing of what has come to be called “farm attacks” in South Africa. These attacks are often a grotesque enactment of a violent script that blurs crime and postapartheid comeuppance on the farm as mythical representation of the post-apartheid state. Framing these attacks as a Boer Genocide or justifying them as a form of colonial struggle / restitution remains rooted in totalising Afrikaner and black nationalisms respectively that not only renders the potential for addressing / redressing this violence barren, but actually inform it. Post-colonial psychology offers a lens to analyse the psychopolitical underpinnings of this violence and its framing

The Technological culture of war

The article proceeds from the argument that war is a social institution and not a historical inevitability of human interaction, that is, war can be “unlearned.” This process involves deconstructing/dismantling war as an institution in society. An important step in this process is to understand the philosophical and cultural bases on which technology is employed as “tools” of war. The article focuses on such questions as, Is technology just viewed as instruments in the hand of its human masters in war? Does technology take on an autonomous role in war? How should we assess the impact of context (political, economic, and cultural) of technology when employed in war? By exploring these points, the article hopes to provide input into the discussion on the control of war technologies and ultimately the dismantling of war as an institution in society

The Security imaginary: Explaining military isomorphism

This article proposes the notion of a security imaginary as a heuristic tool for exploring military isomorphism (the phenomenon that weapons and military strategies begin to look the same across the world) at a time when the US model of defence transformation is being adopted by an increasing number of countries. Built on a critical constructivist foundation, the security-imaginary approach is contrasted with rationalist and neo-institutionalist ways of explaining military diffusion and emulation. Merging cultural and constructivist themes, the article offers a ‘strong cultural’ argument to explain why a country would emulate a foreign military model and how this model is constituted in and comes to constitute a society’s security imaginary.Web of Scienc