Euro adoption and Maastricht criteria: Rules or discretion?

--

Argentina: The anatomy of a crisis

--

Exchange rate regimes in the transition economies: Case study of the Czech Republic: 1990-1997

In this paper we re-examine the experience of the Czech Republic with the exchange rate regime during the period 1990-97. We review arguments for and against choosing a peg as they appeared in the early 1990s. Then, we evaluate the success of the peg in curbing inflationary pressures stemming from price liberalization. We also show some of its unpleasant consequences. In the second part of the paper we discuss the macroecononomic precedents which most likely led to the abandoning of the peg in May 1997. Finally, we present some thoughts on possible exchange rate developments, especially with respect to a potential future membership in the European Monetary Union. --

Inflation Targeting in Transition Countries: Experience and Prospects

This paper examines the inflation targeting experience in three transition countries: the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary. While the examined countries have missed inflation targets often by a large margin, they nevertheless progressed well with disinflation. A key lesson from the experience of the inflation targeting transition countries is that economic performance will improve and support for the central bank will be higher if the central banks emphasize avoiding undershoots of the inflation target as much as avoiding overshoots. Also economic performance will be enhanced if inflation targeting central banks in transition countries do not engage in active manipulation of the exchange rate. The relationship between the central bank and the government in these countries has been quite difficult, but this can be alleviated by having a direct government involvement in the setting of the inflation target and with a more active role of the central bank in communicating with both the government and the public. In addition having technocrats appointed as the head of the central bank rather than politicians may help in depersonalizing the conduct of monetary policy and increase support for the independence of the central bank. The paper also addresses the future perspective of monetary policy in the transition economies and concludes that even after the EU accession, inflation targeting can remain the main pillar of monetary strategy in the three examined accession countries during the time before they will join the EMU.

Disagreement among Forecasters in G7 Countries

Using the Consensus Economics dataset with individual expert forecasts from G7 countries we investigate determinants of disagreement (crosssectional dispersion of forecasts) about six key economic indicators. Disagreement about real variables (GDP, consumption, investment and unemployment) has a distinct dynamic from disagreement about nominal variables (in ation and interest rate). Disagreement about real variables intensifes strongly during recessions, including the current one (by about 40 percent in terms of the interquartile range). Disagreement about nominal variables rises with their level, has fallen after 1998 or so (by 30 percent), and is considerably lower under independent central banks (by 35 percent). Cross-sectional dispersion for both groups increases with uncertainty about the underlying actual indicators, though to a lesser extent for nominal series. Countryby- country regressions for inflation and interest rates reveal that both the level of disagreement and its sensitivity to macroeconomic variables tend to be larger in Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom, where central banks became independent only around the mid-1990s. These findings suggest that more credible monetary policy can substantially contribute to anchoring of expectations about nominal variables; its eects on disagreement about real variables are moderate.disagreement, survey expectations, monetary policy, forecasting

Disagreement among forecasters in G7 countries

Using the Consensus Economics dataset with individual expert forecasts from G7 countries we investigate determinants of disagreement (crosssectional dispersion of forecasts) about six key economic indicators. Disagreement about real variables (GDP, consumption, investment and unemployment) has a distinct dynamic from disagreement about nominal variables (inflation and interest rate). Disagreement about real variables intensifies strongly during recessions, including the current one (by about 40 percent in terms of the interquartile range). Disagreement about nominal variables rises with their level, has fallen after 1998 or so (by 30 percent), and is considerably lower under independent central banks (by 35 percent). Cross-sectional dispersion for both groups increases with uncertainty about the underlying actual indicators, though to a lesser extent for nominal series. Country-by-country regressions for inflation and interest rates reveal that both the level of disagreement and its sensitivity to macroeconomic variables tend to be larger in Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom, where central banks became independent only around the mid-1990s. These findings suggest that more credible monetary policy can substantially contribute to anchoring of expectations about nominal variables; its effects on disagreement about real variables are moderate. JEL Classification: E31, E32, E37, E52, C53disagreement, forecasting, monetary policy, survey expectations

Sticky information Phillips curves: European evidence

We estimate the sticky information Phillips curve model of Mankiw and Reis (2002) using survey expectations of professional forecasters from four major European economies. Our estimates imply that inflation expectations in France, Germany and the United Kingdom are updated about once a year, in Italy about once each six months. JEL Classification: E62, H20, H50, H62inflation expectations, Inflation persistence, Phillips curve, sticky information

Sticky Information Phillips Curves: European Evidence

We estimate the sticky information Phillips curve model of Mankiw and Reis (2002) using survey expectations of professional forecasters from four major European economies. Our estimates imply that inflation expectations in France, Germany and the United Kingdom are updated about once a year, in Italy about once each six months.Inflation expectations, sticky information, Phillips curve, inflation persistence

The Dynamics of European Inflation Expectations

We investigate the relevance of the Carroll's sticky information model of inflation expectations for four major European economies (France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom). Using survey data on household and expert inflation expectations we argue that the model adequately captures the dynamics of household inflation expectations. We estimate two alternative parametrizations of the sticky information model which differ in the stationarity assumptions about the underlying series. Our baseline stationary estimation suggests that the average frequency of information updating for the European households is roughly once in 18 months. The vector error-correction model implies households update information about once a year.Inflation expectations, sticky information, inflation persistence