Creative Destruction or Just Plain Destruction?: The U.S. Textile and Apparel Industries since 1972

Are the U.S. textile and apparel industries examples of creative destruction or are they just plain destructing? We investigate this question using both aggregate industry-level data and plant-level data from the U.S. Census' LRD. We find that while the aggregate-level evidence is consistent with the common view of these industries as examples of declining industries, the plant-level data support a very different and much more hopeful view. We find that in the face of intensified international competition, each industry has evolved in its own way. In textiles, there has been tremendous capitalization. In apparel, the organization of production has changed. In both cases, industry productivity has increased markedly, and this is mostly because individual plants are becoming more productive.

Why Has Unemployment Risen in the New South Africa

We document the rise in unemployment in South Africa since the transition in 1994. We describe the likely causes of this increase and analyze whether the increase in unemployment is due to structural changes in the economy (resulting in a new equilibrium unemployment rate) or to negative shocks (that temporarily have increased unemployment). We conclude the former are more important. Our analysis includes a multinomial logit approach to understanding transitions in individual-level changes in labor market status using the first nationally representative panel in South Africa. Our analysis highlights several key constraints to addressing unemployment in South Africa.

The World Bank's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Approach:

This paper is prepared for the Group of 24 research program. The opinions expresse

Asymmetric information, adverse selection and online disclosure: The case of eBay motors

Since George A. Akerlof (1970), economists have understood the adverse selection problem that information asymmetries can create in used goods markets. The remarkable growth in online used goods auctions thus poses a puzzle. Part of the solution is that sellers voluntarily disclose their private information on the auction webpage. This defines a precise contract — to deliver the car shown for the closing price — which helps protect the buyer from adverse selection. I test this theory using data from eBay Motors, finding that online disclosures are important price determinants; and that disclosure costs impact both the level of disclosure and prices. ∗This is a heavily revised version of my job market paper, supported by a Rackham Predoctoral Fellowship from the University of Michigan. I would especially like to thank Pat Bajari for his support and advice on this paper. I am also grateful for comments from three anonymous referees