Redefining delusion based on studies of subjective paranormal ideation

The DSM-IV definition of delusion is argued to be unsatisfactory because it does not explain the mechanism for delusion formation and maintenance, it implies that such beliefs are necessarily dysfunctional (pathological), it underestimates the social component to some delusions, and it is inconsistent with research indicating that delusions can be modified through techniques such as contradiction, confrontation, and cognitive-behavioral therapy. However, a well-replicated mathematical model of magical/delusional thinking based on a study of paranormal beliefs and experiences is consistent with the hypothesis that attributional processes play a central role in delusion formation and maintenance. The model suggests attributional processes serve the adaptive function of reducing fear associated with ambiguous stimuli and delusional thinking is on a continuum with nonpathological forms. Based on this collective research an amendment to the definition of delusion is proposed and its clinical implications are addressed.J. Houran and R. Langehttp://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/1515417

Using co-occurrence to evaluate belief coherence in a large non clinical sample.

Much of the recent neuropsychological literature on false beliefs (delusions) has tended to focus on individual or single beliefs, with few studies actually investigating the relationship or co-occurrence between different types of co-existing beliefs. Quine and Ullian proposed the hypothesis that our beliefs form an interconnected web in which the beliefs that make up that system must somehow "cohere" with one another and avoid cognitive dissonance. As such beliefs are unlikely to be encapsulated (i.e., exist in isolation from other beliefs). The aim of this preliminary study was to empirically evaluate the probability of belief co-occurrence as one indicator of coherence in a large sample of subjects involving three different thematic sets of beliefs (delusion-like, paranormal & religious, and societal/cultural). Results showed that the degree of belief co-endorsement between beliefs within thematic groupings was greater than random occurrence, lending support to Quine and Ullian's coherentist account. Some associations, however, were relatively weak, providing for well-established examples of cognitive dissonance