Networks of attribution: the cultural origins of meaning.

Despite the fact that we commonly refer to artworks as 'meaningful' things, this is not to say that meaning is an objective property analogous to size or shape. If meaning is not a physical property, then it follows that it can only be a way of using things, of treating them as if they were imbued with features that they do not actually possess. Meaning is thus an attribution in which we agree through social consensus to use objects as tokens of power, prestige, celebration, explanation, instruction and so on. I argue that such symbolic procedures originate in practices of tool-use in which tools are commonly employed in various different ways depending on context and opportunity. The purpose of this paper is to show that the ability to interpret artworks and more generally to ascribe meanings, is a highly sophisticated cultural capacity and, more specifically, a verbal skill dependent upon a network of symbolic resources and techniques that only a socially evolved linguistic culture can provide and enable

Conquest of photography: a tale of abstraction versus the richness of images.

The aim of this presentation is to bring into relief the degree to which our language-centric view of the world obscures our understanding of photography and depiction more generally. Or, as Wittgenstein put it: 'Philosophy is the battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.

Networks of meaning and interpretation: the cultural origins of symbolisation.

Despite the fact that we commonly refer to artworks as 'meaningful' things, this is not to say that meaning is an objective property analogous to size or shape. If meaning is not a physical property then it follows that it can only be a way of using things, of treating them as if they were imbued with features that they do not actually possess. Meaning is thus an attribution in which we agree through social consensus to use objects as tokens of power, prestige, celebration, explanation, instruction and so on. I argue that such symbolic procedures originate in practices of tool-use in which tools are commonly employed in various different ways depending on context and opportunity. The purpose of this paper is to show that the ability to interpret artworks and more generally to ascribe meanings is a highly sophisticated cultural capacity and, more specifically, a verbal skill dependent upon a network of symbolic resources and techniques that only a socially evolved linguistic culture can provide and enable

How images actually work: settling a longstanding debate.

As a cultural innovation, image-making is perhaps one of our most enduring forms of new media. The many technical developments necessary for the production of convincing images have emerged over the last 40,000 years, yet there is still widespread disagreement about how images actually function. Why, for instance, are animals largely indifferent to images whereas humans are fascinated by them? Several competing theories are in general circulation but it is a matter of considerable debate whether these adequately explain the mechanisms at work (or at fault) in the substitution of flat objects made of paper, pigment or pixels for the objects they represent. Since the 1960's, Australian art theorist Donald Brook has been exploring the implications of a theory of representation that has been published widely during this period. This work has been positively received but considering its implications it is somewhat surprising that it is not more widely known and discussed. This presentation focuses on a crucial element of Brook's theory which shows how imagistic representations rely not only on systematic sensory discrimination failures but on the procedural principles by which such discrimination failures can be exploited

Networks of attribution: the cultural origins of meaning.

Despite the fact that we commonly refer to artworks as 'meaningful' things, this is not to say that meaning is a property analogous to size or shape. If meaning is not a property, then it seems reasonable to suppose that it can only be a way of using things, of treating them as if they were imbued with features that they do not actually possess. Meaning is thus an attribution in which we agree through social consensus to use objects as tokens of power, prestige, celebration, explanation, instruction and so on. I argue that such symbolic procedures originate in practices of exchange and tool-use in which the use of raw materials instantiates their identity. The purpose of this paper is to show that the ability to interpret artworks and more generally to ascribe meanings, is a highly sophisticated cultural capacity and, more specifically, a verbal skill dependent upon a network of symbolic resources and techniques that only a socially evolved linguistic culture can provide and enable

Ambient interaction and situational influence: case studies in public sites.

An audience's direct physical intervention is widely believed to be instrumental in the field of interactive art. However, this long established expectation faces new challenges through the increasing accessibility of a growing diversity of interactive technologies and ubiquitous smart media. Such innovations are often fully integrated components of interactive public artworks, many of which do not directly involve audiences or individuals as key agents in the functional or aesthetic realisation of the work. Based on three case studies of interactive artworks in public places, this article identifies an important characteristic of interactivity in interactive art, through the largely unexplored concept of 'Ambient Interaction' in which artworks are embodied and enacted through environmental conditions and situational influences rather than exclusively through people's intentional and direct physical engagement

Space Represented and Experienced

This presentation takes the form of a historical collage in order to illustrate some important and, I think, far-reaching observations about the representation and theorisation of space. As a city, Aberdeen has made its own unique but largely unacknowledged contributions to this subject. For this reason I will limit my principal reference points to several figures with close biographical connections to the city with the intention of exemplifying the scope and relevance of my research even within a restricted geographical context. My account begins with the Scottish Enlightenment philosopher Thomas Reid who was strongly opposed to the Idealism of his more famous contemporary, David Hume. This is followed by an outline of the physicist James Clerk Maxwell’s contribution to the invention of colour photography which segues into a discussion of the work of Aberdeen born philosopher Dominic McIver Lopes, who in a paper from 2003, claims: “When we look at photographs we literally see the objects that they are of.” If this is true, then when someone looks at a photograph of their grandmother, they literally see their grandmother. With the help of the work of Emeritus Professor of Psychology at Aberdeen University, Jan Deregowski, I aim to show that Lopes’ theory, and the philosophical Idealism that underlies it, is founded on various misconceptions about resemblances and the nature of illusion. The implications of this research both for theories of representation and for educational practice will then be sketched out

The Truth About Images

Many people believe that images—photographs in particular—are truth bearers; that they provide meaningful testimony and have what philosophers sometimes call "factive", as opposed to “fictive”, status. We also commonly hear of how images are untrustworthy because they can be made to falsify the facts. I aim to explain why these ways of talking about images, in terms of their truth-value, have the misleading effect of reducing images to linguistic tokens. Furthermore, doing so overlooks, misunderstands or worse still ignores, the essentially mute but nonetheless powerful effectiveness of images as substitutes for the things they represent. Almost all theories of representation refer to images as "signs" or "signifiers", as "readable" objects or "messages" that require "decoding", "deciphering" or "interpreting". In everyday language, we talk of how images "convey meaning", "have content" and are "about" the things to which they "refer". We also talk of what images "tell" us, what they "describe", "articulate", "suggest", "explain" and "imply". Characterising images as semantic entities in these ways has the great advantage of rendering them as truth-evaluable. The purpose of this paper is to explain that whilst images are indeed truth-evaluable, they are not fundamentally truth-dependent