CSI Las Vegas: Privacy, Policing, and Profiteering in Casino Structured Intelligence

This Article argues that the intricate, vast amounts of consumer information compiled through casino structured intelligence require greater protection and oversight in the contexts of both bankruptcy and law enforcement. Section II examines the various types of casino technology and information gathering that casinos perform. Section III considers the available protections of private information in terms of security breaches, law enforcement sharing, and sales in the context of a bankruptcy. Section IV discusses additional safeguards and ethical concerns that should be considered as casinos continue to increase their data mining efforts. Finally, Section V concludes that, minimally, consumers are entitled to more candid disclosures and a meaningful opportunity to protect their own privacy

Deploying the Secret Police: The Use of Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System

Algorithms saturate our lives today; from curated song lists to recommending “friends” and news feeds, they factor into some of the most human aspects of decision-making, tapping into preferences based on an ever-growing amount of data. Regardless of whether the algorithm pertains to routing you around traffic jams or finding your next dinner, there is little regulation and even less transparency regarding just how these algorithms work. Paralleling this societal adoption, the criminal justice system now employs algorithms in some of the most important aspects of investigation and decision-making. The lack of oversight is abundantly apparent in the criminal justice system where various algorithm-based tools are now routinely deployed to investigate, prosecute, and sentence offenders. In the absence of suitable safeguards, decisions affecting life and liberty are contained in an impenetrable “black box.

Realizing Reliability in Forensic Science from the Ground Up

This Article emphasizes that forensic flaws persist and that deficiencies in forensic science have harrowing implications for criminal justice. In the wake of numerous calls for forensic reform, I propose that we use existing models and frameworks already in place to improve the quality and cost of the U.S. forensic science program, rather than creating an entirely new and unaffordable system. At bottom, this Article calls for collaboration between crime labs, universities and research centers, and the criminal justice system with the goal of making forensic science more reliable

The Terrible \u3cem\u3eTOUSA\u3c/em\u3es: Opinions Test the Patience of Corporate Lending Practices

Two diametrically opposed decisions pit creditors against debtors. The case of troubled homebuilder TOUSA has generated shockwaves through the lending industry. Set against the backdrop of the housing collapse and risky lending, the bankruptcy court’s decision left secured creditors with a mixture of shock, anger, and worry over the repercussions. In that opinion, the bankruptcy court unwound a nearly $1 billion transaction of liens and loan proceeds, on grounds that the transactions drove the debtor company into the ground. In other words, the court found that a fraudulent transfer had occurred. Not surprisingly, the lenders appealed and the next decision in what surely will be a long line of TOUSA opinions unwound the bankruptcy court’s decision – for a limited set of defendants – and effectively blessed the transaction. How can two opinions couched in the same facts disagree so vehemently at nearly every twist and turn of the case? This article examines the TOUSA I and TOUSA II opinions. It assesses the holdings and reasoning related to fraudulent transfers, reasonably equivalent value, and indirect benefits. It compares the contrasting approaches and attempts to frame the issues for the case’s eventual turn in the Eleventh Circuit Court Appeals. Last, this article focuses on the effects of TOUSA I and TOUSA II and whether the prognostications are inevitable or mere puffery

Regulating the Science of Forensic Evidence: A Broken System Requires a New Federal Agency

Professor Gabel and Ms. Champion agree with Mr. Goldstein\u27s argument that serious validity and reliability problems plague forensic science, but, using the recent Troy Davis case in Georgia as an illustration, they argue for federal rather than state oversight. Gabel and Champion assert that many states lack the funding to construct an adequate system and that the fragmentation caused by different state systems would be a significant impediment to reform. They suggest a federal agency that, like the Environmental Protection Agency, would set minimum standards but allow states to experiment with enhanced regulation

Regulating the Science of Forensic Evidence: A Broken System Requires a New Federal Agency

Professor Gabel and Ms. Champion agree with Mr. Goldstein\u27s argument that serious validity and reliability problems plague forensic science, but, using the recent Troy Davis case in Georgia as an illustration, they argue for federal rather than state oversight. Gabel and Champion assert that many states lack the funding to construct an adequate system and that the fragmentation caused by different state systems would be a significant impediment to reform. They suggest a federal agency that, like the Environmental Protection Agency, would set minimum standards but allow states to experiment with enhanced regulation

The Collapse of Financial Fraud: Measuring Bankruptcy Avoidance Action

Ponzi schemes lay their foundation on fraud. Once the con is exposed, the culprits are usually stripped of their pilfered millions and sent off to jail. Unfortunately for the victims, the process of recovering any portion of the money they lost in the scam is, to put it mildly, complicated. The challenge rests, in part, in differences between federal forfeiture statutes and Bankruptcy Code principles in determining what assets can be recovered and who is entitled to a portion of the Ponzi pie. What is a Ponzi scheme (as defined by the courts rather than the media)? The Second Circuit defines a Ponzi scheme as a “fraudulent investment scheme in which money contributed by later investors is used to pay artificially high dividends to the original investors, creating an illusion of profitability, thus attracting new investors.” The Ninth Circuit has embraced an arguably broader description: “any sort of fraudulent arrangement that uses later acquired funds or products to pay off previous investors.” Other courts add that the scheme did not “conduct legitimate business as represented to investors.” In essence, a Ponzi scheme is a “money in, money out” con game. After the scheme collapses, as it inevitably does, Ponzi investors fall into two broad categories. The first is the “net losers” – investors who failed to receive a full return, or in many cases any return, on their principal investment, because their contributions were used to satisfy other investors’ expectations. The other broad category is “net winners” – “lucky” investors who received redemption payments that exceed the value of their principal investments. Recoupment of fictitious profits may subject the net winners to disgorgement of those profits and, in some instances, even disgorgement of principal (although this largely applies only to net winners). Beyond these broad categories, there often are “feeder funds” – various hedge funds, brokerage houses, and banks that steered large pools of investors into the Ponzi scheme. Relationships with feeder funds enable the Ponzi schemer to sustain the scam over a longer period of time by sweeping in thousands of smaller investors. These victims may find two areas of law interacting to determine recovery and distribution of the Ponzi scheme assets. Cite as 42 Golden Gate U. L. Rev 587 (2012)