Interstate Cigarette Bootlegging: Extent, Revenue Losses, and Effects of Government Intervention

In this paper, we develop and estimate a model of commercial smuggling in which some, but not all, firms smuggle a portion of the cigarettes they sell. The model is used to examine the effects on interstate cigarette smuggling of the Contraband Cigarette Act and a change in the federal excise tax. We find that both policies have unintentional effects. While the Contraband Cigarette Act was imposed to reduce interstate smuggling, we find it had the opposite effect. In contrast, an increase in the federal tax is not intended to affect smuggling, but we find it increases the portion of cigarette sales that is commercially smuggled.

US Faculty Patenting: Inside and Outside the University

This paper examines the empirical anomaly that in a sample of 5811 patents on which US faculty are listed as inventors, 26% of the patents are assigned solely to firms rather than to the faculty member's university as is dictated by US university employment policies or the Bayh Dole Act. In this paper we estimate a series of probability models of assignment as a function of patent characteristics, university policy, and inventor fields in order to examine the extent to which outside assignment is nefarious or comes from legitimate activities, such as consulting. Patents assigned to firms (whether established or start-ups with inventor as principal) are less basic than those assigned to universities suggesting these patents result from faculty consulting. A higher inventor share increases the likelihood of university assignment as compared with assignment to a firm in which the inventor is a principal but it has no effect on consulting with established firms versus assignment to the university. Faculty in the physical sciences and engineering are more likely to assign their patents to established firms than those in biological sciences.

Shirking, Sharing Risk, and Shelving: The Role of University License Contracts

In this paper, we develop a theoretical model of university licensing to explain why university license contracts often include payment types that differ from the fixed fees and royalties typically examined by economists. Our findings suggest that milestone payments and annual payments are common because moral hazard, risk sharing, and adverse selection all play a role when embryonic inventions are licensed. Milestones address inventor moral hazard without the inefficiency inherent in royalties. The potential for a licensee to shelve inventions is an adverse selection problem which can be addressed by annual fees if shelving is unintentional, but may require an upfront fee if the firm licenses an invention with the intention to shelve it. Whether the licensing contract prevents shelving depends in part on the university credibly threatening to take the license back from a shelving firm. This supports the rationale for Bayh-Dole march-in rights but also shows the need for the exercise of these rights can be obviated by contracts.

Who is Selling the Ivory Tower? Sources of Growth in University Licensing

Historically, commercial use of university research has been viewed in terms of spillovers. Recently, there has been a dramatic increase in technology transfer through licensing as universities attempt to appropriate the returns from faculty research. This change has prompted concerns regarding the source of this growth - specifically, whether it suggests a change in the nature of university research. We develop an intermediate input model to examine the extent to which the growth in licensing is due to the productivity observable inputs or driven by a change in the propensity of faculty and administrators to engage in commercializing university research. We model licensing as a three stage process, each involving multiple inputs. Nonparametric programming techniques are applied to survey data from 65 universities to calculate total factor productivity (TFP) growth in each state. To examine the sources of TFP growth, the productivity analysis is augmented by survey evidence from business who license-in university inventions. Results suggest that increased licensing is due primarily to an increased willingness of faculty and administrators to license and increased business reliance on external R&D rather than a shift in faculty research.

Are Faculty Critical? Their Role in University-Industry Licensing

Understanding the nature of the involvement of faculty in university licensing is im-portant for understanding how technology is transferred through licensing as well as more controversial issues, such as the need for university licensing. Using data from a survey of firms that actively license-in from universities we explore the importance of faculty in the licensing and development of inventions, as well as how and why they are used and how the use of faculty relates to characteristics of firms. In particular we find that the use of faculty through sponsored research in lieu of a license is closely related to the amount of basic research conducted by firms whereas the use of faculty within the terms of a license is related to the prevalence of personal contacts between industry R&D researchers and university faculty.

Smuggling, Camouflaging, and Market Structure

We examine how market structure and enforcement affect smuggling and welfare in a model where smuggling is camouflaged by legal sales. Conditions are given for when some, but not necessarily all, firms smuggle. With camouflaging, the market price is below the price when all sales are legal, so smuggling improves welfare if the price effect outweighs excess smuggling cost. This welfare effect is directly related to the degree of competition. Increased enforcement in this model potentially reduces welfare. The model is shown to be consistent with evidence on cigarette smuggling in the United States for 1975-1982.

The Disclosure and Licensing of University Inventions

We examine the interplay of the three major university actors in technology transfer from universities to industry: the faculty, the technology transfer office (TTO), and the central administration. We model the faculty as an agent of the administration, and the TTO as an agent of both the faculty and the administration. Empirical tests of the theory are based on evidence from our survey of 62 US research universities. We find that the TTOs reported licensing objectives are influenced by their views of faculty and administration, which supports the assumption that the TTO is a dual agent. The theory yields predictions for whether or not faculty disclose inventions and if so, at what stage, which in turn affects license contract terms. We also examine how the portion of inventions disclosed at different stages varies with faculty quality. Quality is found to be inversely related to the share of license income allotted to faculty.

Elasticities in International Trade: Theoretical and Methodological Issues

This paper is a survey of recent research on specification, estimation and evaluation of trade elasticities. Since our focus is primarily methodological we do not give a compendium of recent estimates. Given the excellent and comprehensive nature of previous surveys, the marginal benefit of doing so would be small. In addition, we shall argue that any hope of obtaining a consensus of parameter values from trade equations must rely on taking a different approach. The approach involves using (and allowing the reader to use) as much information as is practically possible. There are both theoretical and econometric reasons to pursue such an approach, and we shall focus on studies which clarify them.Research Seminar in International Economics, Department of Economics, University of Michiganhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/101016/1/ECON455.pd

Bilateral Trade Flows, The Linder Hypothesis, and Exchange Risk

Bilateral trade flows are used to examine the Linder hypothesis and the effect of exchange-rate variability in a gra vity-type trade model derived from an underlying demand and supply mo del. A behavioral model is used to justify examining these issues joi ntly. The model performs well empirically using a sample of seventeen countries for the period 1974-82. The authors find overwhelming supp ort for the Linder hypothesis and this version of the gravity model. Moreover, they find strong support for the hypothesis that increased exchange-rate variability affects bilateral trade flows.Research Seminar in International Economics, Department of Economics, University of Michiganhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/101017/1/ECON456.pd

Smuggling, Camouflaging, and Market Structure

We examine how market structure and enforcement affect smuggling and welfare in a model where smuggling is camoflaged by legal sales. Conditions are given for when some, but not necessarily all, firms smuggle. With camouflaging, the market price is below the price when all sales are legal, so smuggling improves welfare if the price effect outweighs excess smuggling cost. This welfare effect is directly related to the degree of competition. Increased enforcement in this model potentially reduces welfare. The model is shown to be consistent with evidence on cigarette smuggling in the United States for 1975-1982.Research Seminar in International Economics, Department of Economics, University of Michiganhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/100799/1/ECON259.pd