Disclosure Regimes and Corporate Governance

As there is a strong relationship of disclosure regimes and corporate governance the internationally varying distribution of information rights can be interpreted as a function of different systems of corporate governance. A disclosure system comprises all legally recognized information claims that a system of corporate governance or a financial system furnishes financial contracting parties with: Both public disclosure and disclosure via private information channels may serve value-relevant information for suppliers of finance. An analysis within the framework of the New Institutional Economics brings about two findings: First, looking at the distribution of informational rights from a contractual perspective shows that the nexus of information rights formed by accounting and disclosure regulation and the distribution of power in the firm are mutually determining. For example, the main financing parties in Germany, banks and blockholders, have fairly good access to information via institutionalized internal information channels. Secondly, internationally accepted sets of accounting standards may improve the monitoring by markets. Nevertheless, accounting and disclosure regulation sometimes resemble a cookbook and should be transformed in a more principle-based and deductive system. Furthermore the whole institutional design of corporate governance should be based on realistic assumptions about human decision making to serve the intended purposes.

The role of accounting in the German financial system

This chapter analyzes the role of financial accounting in the German financial system. It starts from the common perception that German accounting is rather "uninformative". This characterization is appropriate from the perspective of an arm´s length or outside investor and when confined to the financial statements per se. But it is no longer accurate when a broader perspective is adopted. The German accounting system exhibits several arrangements that privately communicate information to insiders, notably the supervisory board. Due to these features, the key financing and contracting parties seem reasonably well informed. The same cannot be said about outside investors relying primarily on public disclosure. A descriptive analysis of the main elements of the Germany system and a survey of extant empirical accounting research generally support these arguments

How Does Fair Value Measurement under IAS 39 Affect Disclosure Choices of European Banks?

There is a considerable degree of heterogeneity in the way how European banks present their financial instruments in IFRS financial statements. We identify three major presentation formats that are currently applied: a presentation by measurement category, by product, and by purpose. We find the use of the measurement categories, which were originally designed by IAS 39 for measurement purposes, as line items to be the prevalent choice across countries. We analyze the factors that could explain this disclosure choice. We find that a corresponding regulatory recommendation has a strong effect on the choice. We further find that the disclosure of measurement categories is negatively associated with the relative book value of financial assets measured at fair value. This finding suggests discretionary disclosure management by banks. We conclude, based on behavioral theory, that banks expect investors to have a negative bias in the risk perception of assets measured at fair value.

Internationale Rechnungslegungsnormen und neue Institutionenökonomik

Die Öffnung des deutschen Bilanzrechts bewirkt eine zunehmende Anwendungsbreite von internationalen Rechnunungslegungsnormen (wie insbesondere der US-GAAP und der IAS) für deutsche Rechtsanwender;1 die heterogenen Normtypen und die – damit einhergehend – unterschiedlichen ökonomischen Eigenschaften dieser Normen erfordern für einen sinnvollen Rechnungslegungsvergleich eine komparative Rechnungslegungstheorie. Eine Besinnung auf die ökonomische Theorie ist – auch ausgelöst durch die Internationalisierung der Rechnungslegung – hier grundsätzlich festzustellen,2 wie auch das moderne deutsche Bilanzrecht seine heutige Prägung durch die ökonomische Theorie – und nicht vornehmlich durch die Anwender – erhielt.3 Es ist das Ziel des Aufsatzes, einen Beitrag zu einer institutionenökonomischen Theorie der Rechnungslegung zum Zweck der Bestimmung von Informationsinhalten und Gewinnansprüchen sowie zur vergleichenden Rechnungslegungstheorie zu leisten. In einem ersten Hauptteil (2) wird im folgenden – auf dem institutionenökonomischen Forschungsprogramm aufbauend – skizziert, welche Bedeutung Institutionen im Rahmen des Nutzenkalküls von Entscheidern zuzumessen ist; danach werden die einzelnen für eine vergleichende Rechnungslegung relevanten Institutionsarten typisiert (in formale und informelle Regeln) sowie deren Attribute im individuellen Zielstromkalkül eingeführt (nämlich Prädikate der Manipulationsfreiheit und Prädikate der Entscheidungsverbundenheit). Das Verhältnis der Institutionen zueinander wird im folgenden Abschnitt (3) anhand eines rechtlich geprägten und eines ökonomischen Systemverständnisses entwickelt. Es wird gezeigt, daß beide Systembegriffe auf einer Nichtadditivität der sie konstituierenden Institutionen gründen, die den qualitativen Vergleich unterschiedlicher Systeme erschweren; man überschätzt hingegen die Unterschiede zwischen juristischem und ökonomischem Systemverständnis: beide sind funktionsähnlich. Im letzten Hauptteil (4) werden schließlich vor dem Hintergrund einer gestaltenden Theorie die hierfür relevanten Teilbereiche (Sub-Systeme) der Rechnungslegungsordnung vorgestellt sowie einzelne Publizitätsnormen funktional ausgelegt. Der Beitrag schließt mit zusammenfassenden Thesen (5).This paper presents some consequences of economic theory for the regulation of corporate accounting and disclosure under Geman accounting legislation (de lege lata) and in an international context. The following implications are discussed: (i) It is argued that the economic income conception provides means for a better understanding of the informational needs of accounting data-users and can serve as a guidance for the interpretation of legal rules concerning disclosure. (ii) From a Law and Economics-perspective the article develops a concept to comparing the economic content of different legal regimes in an international accounting environment. (iii) It is shown that – in the „new paradigm“ of complementarities (Milgrom/Roberts) – regulation of disclosure standards can also be seen as a function of the institutional setting, e.g. of the (national) structure of corporate governance and the (national) financial system. (iv) The principle of full disclosure can be interpreted as a complementary element of the overall disclosure system in a country. Especially the fine tuning of the application of the principle of full disclosure in a national context depends on whether it figures as part of an insider control-system or an outsider control-system. (v) Finally, it is argued that the interpretation of extraordinary items in German accounting law, for the time being, does not satisfy the informational needs of market participants

Disclosure regimes and corporate governance

As there is a strong relationship of disclosure regimes and corporate governance the internationally varying distribution of information rights can be interpreted as a function of different systems of corporate governance. A disclosure system comprises all legally recognized information claims that a system of corporate governance or a financial system furnishes financial contracting parties with: Both public disclosure and disclosure via private information channels may serve value-relevant information for suppliers of finance. An analysis within the framework of the New Institutional Economics brings about two findings: First, looking at the distribution of informational rights from a contractual perspective shows that the nexus of information rights formed by accounting and disclosure regulation and the distribution of power in the firm are mutually determining. For example, the main financing parties in Germany, banks and blockholders, have fairly good access to information via institutionalized internal information channels. Secondly, internationally accepted sets of accounting standards may improve the monitoring by markets. Nevertheless, accounting and disclosure regulation sometimes resemble a cookbook and should be transformed in a more principle-based and deductive system. Furthermore the whole institutional design of corporate governance should be based on realistic assumptions about human decision making to serve the intended purposes

Evaluation and Response to Risk in International Accounting and Audit Systems: Framework and German Experiences

This paper presents arguments with respect to the evaluation and response to risk, placing an emphasis on German corporate governance. It starts by discussing opportunities and limitations of the audit risk approach in detecting accounting and economic risks. Hereafter individual responses to material risks are analyzed by considering potential shortcomings arising from systematic deviations from rational behavior. In the main part, it will be argued that German corporate governance stresses internal reporting duties, some of which could serve as models for future international standards on auditing. By internalizing the information flows regarding substantial risks, negative effects of publicizing this kind of information can be reduced (e.g. self-fulfilling prophecies and litigation risks). This also facilitates a more open communication with monitoring parties. But to ensure the effectiveness of such an internal control, it is essential that the reporting duties of the auditor and the management towards the board members are legalized and put into compulsory form. In an appendix, legislative responses to audit failures in Germany since 1870 until today are summarized. Legal requirements and their development regarding the statutory audit in general, auditor independence, the auditor�s report and the audit opinion are presented.

Can Auditors Be Independent? - Experimental Evidence

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has transformed the institutional environment in the US by making the audit committee responsible for the appointment, compensation and oversight of the auditor. We examine whether this institutional change successfully resolves the alleged problem of an unconscious favoring of the management (Bazerman et al. 1997, 2002, 2006) by changing the effects of auditors’ economic incentives and psychological pressure. In our experimental design, we make use of the particular features of the German institutional setting as it enables us to manipulate the client of the auditor in a realistic and clear-cut way. 72 German auditors with at least two years of job experience participated in our experiment. Following Turner (2001), we distinguish in our analyses between belief tasks (e.g. evidence evaluation) and action tasks (e.g. audit opinion). Our findings imply that certain institutional features seem to be helpful in ensuring auditor independence. First, we find that auditors demonstrate professional scepticism in belief tasks. This seems to counteract any potentially negative effect of the acceptability heuristic in actions tasks. Second, experience helped auditors in coping with psychological pressure. Third, making the auditor accountable to a supervisory board was helpful in reducing the risk that financial considerations would impair auditor independence.

How does fair value measurement under IAS 39 affect disclosure choices of European banks?

There is a considerable degree of heterogeneity in the way how European banks present their financial instruments in IFRS financial statements. In a sample of 109 European banks, we identify three major presentation formats that are currently applied: a presentation by measurement category, by product, and by purpose. We find the use of the measurement categories, which were originally designed by IAS 39 for measurement purposes, as line items to be the prevalent choice across countries. We analyze the factors that could explain this disclosure choice. We find that a corresponding regulatory recommendation has a strong effect on the choice. We further find that the disclosure of measurement categories is negatively associated with the relative book value of financial assets measured at fair value. This finding suggests discretionary disclosure management by banks. We conclude, based on behavioral theory, that banks expect investors to have a negative bias in the risk perception of assets measured at fair value

Bedeutung des Börsenkurses im Rahmen der Unternehmensbewertung

This paper summarizes issues and conclusions of a symposium on different aspects of business valuation which Prof. Weber and Prof. Wüstemann organized in January 2004 for accountants, lawyers, and judges. The central question has been whether the advertence of share prices in determining compensation for minority shareholders is more favourable than the use of an expert opinion. The discussion is tripartite: Part one deals with the accountants' view on the subject, part two discusses validity and objectivity of share prices in general and several problems of appraising them. Finally, the last part of the paper focuses on questions of practical application of share prices in determining a firm's value for purposes of minority shareholder compensation in court