Derivative Market Competition

Recent regulatory initiatives in the United States have again raised the issue of a ''''level regulatory and supervisory playing field'''' and the degree of competition globally between over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives and organized derivative exchange (ODE) markets. This paper models some important aspects of how an ODE market interrelates with the OTC markets. It analyzes various ways in which an ODE market can respond to competition from the OTC markets and considers whether ODE markets would actually benefit from a more level playing field. Among other factors, such as different transaction costs, different abilities to mitigate credit risk play a significant role in determining the degree of competition between the two types of markets. This implies that a potentially important service ODE markets can provide OTC market participants is to extend clearing services to them. Such services would allow the OTC markets to focus more on providing less competitive contracts/innovations and instead customize its contracts to specific investors'' risk preferences and needs.Securities regulations;Economic models;investors, derivative markets, risk exposure, commodity futures, otc transactions, regulatory reform, short sales, risk preference, institutional investors, international finance, regulatory action, expected value, commercial banks, global trading

Debt-Related Vulnerabilities and Financial Crises

The analysis of currency and maturity mismatches in sectoral balance sheets has increasingly become a regular element in the IMF’s tool kit for surveillance in emerging market countries. This paper describes this so-called balance sheet approach and shows how it can be applied to detect vulnerabilities and shape policy advice. It also provides a broad-brushed overview of how balance sheet vulnerabilities have evolved over the past decade and cites a number of case studies.