The minimum liquidity deficit and the maturity structure of central banks' open market operations: lessons from the financial crisis

This paper studies the relationship between the size of the banking sector’s refinancing needs vis-à-vis the central bank and auction rates in its open market operations in times of financial market stress. In a theoretical model, it is found that marginal rates at central bank auctions may increase if the share of troubled banks becomes too high relative to the total size of the banking sector’s refinancing needs. An empirical analysis then aims at determining the size of open market operations needed to absorb large stress levels in interbank money markets and hence contain central bank auction rates. Finally, the paper analyses effects of the composition of open market operations of different maturities on auction rates. It is found that a too high share of longer-term refinancing induces a rise in auction rates which is undesirable. Therefore, the analysis suggests that there is a lower bound for the amount of liquidity provided through short-term operations. JEL Classification: G01, G10, G21Central Bank, financial crisis, money market, Open market operations

International trade, hedging and the demand for forward contracts

There is a huge literature on the effects of uncertainty on trade levels. One very strong result of that literature is that uncertainty should not matter, as long as well developed forward markets exist. The empirical implications of this result, however, are hard to find in the data. We model terms of trade uncertainty in a small open economy with uncertainty stemming from abroad and derive the equilibrium demand for forward contracts. It turns out that risk averse agents will not buy forwards at an actuarially fair price, thus rendering both the full-hedge theorem and the separation theorem of the aforementioned literature obsolete. Using real world data for Germany we calibrate our model. We find that in equilibrium risk averse agents will buy forward cover only for nvestment reasons. The amount of forwards purchased is around 20% of equilibrium imports. This is broadly in accordance with empirical observed ratios. --forward contracts,terms of trade uncertainty,hedging

International Trade, Hedging and the Demand for Forward Contracts

One of the main results of the literature on the effects of uncertainty on trade states that uncertainty should not matter in the presence of well developed forward markets. Empirical studies, however, do not support this result. We derive the demand for forward cover in a small open economy with terms of trade uncertainty. Adopting a standard and more realistic decision structure than the one usually used in this literature, we find that risk averse agents will not buy forwards at an unbiased price. Agents treat forward contracts as an asset rather than as an insurance. This is the reason why, when calibrating the model, only 17% of imports are covered by forwards. --

International Trade, Hedging and the Demand for Forward Contracts

There is a huge literature on the effects of uncertainty on trade levels. One very strong result of that literature is that uncertainty should not matter, as long as well developed forward markets exist. The empirical implications of this result, however, are hard to find in the data. We model terms of trade uncertainty in a small open economy with uncertainty stemming from abroad and derive the equilibrium demand for forward contracts. It turns out that risk averse agents will not buy forwards at an actuarially fair price, thus rendering both the full-hedge theorem and the separation theorem of the afore-mentioned literature obsolete. Using real world data for Germany we calibrate our model. We find that in equilibrium risk averse agents will buy forward cover only for investment reasons. The amount of forwards purchased is around 20% of equilibrium imports. This is broadly in accordance with empirical observed ratios.

Liquidity risk premia in unsecured interbank money markets

Unsecured interbank money market rates such as the Euribor increased strongly with the start of the financial market turbulences in August 2007. There is clear evidence that these rates reached levels that cannot be explained alone by higher credit risk. This article presents this evidence and provides a theoretical explanation which refers to the funding liquidity risk of lenders in unsecured term money markets

Bidding behaviour in the ECB’s main refinancing operations during the financial crisis

Liquidity provision through its repo auctions has been one of the main instruments of the European Central Bank (ECB) to address the recent tensions in financial markets since summer 2007. In this paper, we analyse banks’ bidding behaviour in the ECB’s main refinancing operations (MROs) during the ongoing turmoil in money and financial markets. We employ a unique data set comprising repo auctions from March 2004 to October 2008 with bidding data from 877 counterparties. We find that increased bid rates during the turmoil can be explained by, inter alia, the increased individual refinancing motive, the increased attractiveness of the ECB’s tender operations due to its collateral framework and banks’ bidding more aggressively, i.e. at higher rates to avoid being rationed at the marginal rate in times of increased liquidity uncertainty. JEL Classification: E52, D44, C33, C34Bidding Behavior, Central Bank Auctions, Financial Market Turmoil, monetary policy instruments, Panel Sample Selection Model

The minimum liquidity deficit and the maturity structure of central banks' open market operations: lessons from the financial crisis

This paper studies the relationship between the size of the banking sector’s refinancing needs vis-à-vis the central bank and auction rates in its open market operations in times of financial market stress. In a theoretical model, it is found that marginal rates at central bank auctions may increase if the share of troubled banks becomes too high relative to the total size of the banking sector’s refinancing needs. An empirical analysis then aims at determining the size of open market operations needed to absorb large stress levels in interbank money markets and hence contain central bank auction rates. Finally, the paper analyses effects of the composition of open market operations of different maturities on auction rates. It is found that a too high share of longer-term refinancing induces a rise in auction rates which is undesirable. Therefore, the analysis suggests that there is a lower bound for the amount of liquidity provided through short-term operations

International Trade, Hedging and the Demand for Forward Contracts

One of the main results of the literature on the effects of uncertainty on trade states that uncertainty should not matter in the presence of well developed forward markets. Empirical studies, however, do not support this result. We derive the demand for forward cover in a small open economy with terms of trade uncertainty. Adopting a standard and more realistic decision structure than the one usually used in this literature, we find that risk averse agents will not buy forwards at an unbiased price. Agents treat forward contracts as an asset rather than as an insurance. This is the reason why, when calibrating the model, only 17% of imports are covered by forwards

The effectiveness of the non-standard policy measures during the financial crises: the experiences of the federal reserve and the European Central Bank

A growing number of studies have sought to measure the effects of non-standard policy on bank funding markets. The purpose of this paper is to carry those estimates a step further by looking at the effects of bank funding market stress on the volume of bank lending, using a simultaneous equation approach. By separately modeling loan supply and demand, we determine how nonstandard central bank measures affected bank lending by reducing stress in bank funding markets. We focus on the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank. Our results suggest that non-standard policy measures lowered bank funding volatility. Lower bank funding volatility in turn increased loan supply in both regions, contributing to sustain lending activity. We consider this as strong evidence for a “bank liquidity risk channel”, operative in crisis environments, which complements the usual channels of transmission of monetary policy