Birds observed at Ghubrah Bowl, Saiq Plateau and Jabal Shams, Northern Oman; 19 March-26 April 2005 with comments on their status and population

The current study was part of a series of environment related studies of the Jabal Akhdar sponsored by the Sultan Qaboos University, Al Khoud, Sultanate of Oman. The present study aimed to establish the range, habitat, status and population of breeding species in the area, review the historical perspective and list migrant and visitor species noted during the survey

Flora, fauna and natural habitats recorded during field observations along the Shabab 1 Pipeline (Abqaiq to Rub al Khali) and in the Shaybah Oilfield, Rub al Khali, Eastern Province, Saudi Arabia: 24 May - 1 June 2010

During the period 24 May to 1 June 2010 observations were made of the flora, fauna and habitats of two study areas in the Rub al Khali in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. Firstly the route of an existing pipeline, known as Shabab 1, which runs from the Jafurah desert south of Abqaiq to a point 211 km west of the Shaybah oil field, a distance of 422 km. Secondly the Shaybah oilfield area (administered by Saudi ARAMCO), paying particular attention to the sites listed at paragraph 6. (See also the map at Fig. 1.) In the following paragraphs the two sites are often identified simply as Shabab and Shaybah

Using Similarity Criteria to Make Negotiation Trade-Offs

This paper addresses the issues involved in software agents making trade-offs during automated negotiations in which they have information uncertainty and resource limitations. In particular, the importance of being able to make trade-offs in real-world applications is highlighted and a novel algorithm for performing trade-offs for multi-dimensional goods is developed. The algorithm uses the notion of fuzzy similarity in order to find negotiation solutions that are beneficial to both parties. Empirical results indicate the benefits and effectiveness of the trade-off algorithm in a range of negotiation situations

SOME ISSUES CONCERNING SPECIFICATION AND INTERPRETATION OF OUTDOOR RECREATION DEMAND MODELS

Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

Rationalising ‘Irrational’ Support for Political Violence

This paper provides a rationale for group support for political violence in situations where violence does not provide a material benefit. Rabin’s (1993) theory of fairness is adopted to demonstrate that although group violence may not be the equilibrium of a material game it may be a fairness equilibrium in a game containing psychological payoffs. For this to happen the material stakes must be perceived as low and psychological payoffs are expressive. Although the material stakes are actually high, members of each group may choose expressively to support the use of violence because the probability of being decisive is low. The paper also considers the possibility of peace emerging as a fairness equilibrium. This can only happen if each group perceives the other as making some sacrifice in choosing peace

Rationalising ‘Irrational’ Support for Political Violence

This paper provides a rationale for group support for political violence in situations where violence does not provide a material benefit. Rabin’s (1993) theory of fairness is adopted to demonstrate that although group violence may not be the equilibrium of a material game it may be a fairness equilibrium in a game containing psychological payoffs. For this to happen the material stakes must be perceived as low and psychological payoffs are expressive. Although the material stakes are actually high, members of each group may choose expressively to support the use of violence because the probability of being decisive is low. The paper also considers the possibility of peace emerging as a fairness equilibrium. This can only happen if each group perceives the other as making some sacrifice in choosing peace