A Happiness Approach to Cost-Benefit Analysis

Subjective well-being (SWB) surveys ask respondents to quantify their overall or momentary happiness or life-satisfaction, or pose similar questions about other aspects of respondents\u27 mental states. A large empirical literature in economics and psychology has grown up around such surveys. Increasingly, too, scholars have advanced the normative proposal that SWB surveys be used for policymaking—for example, by using survey results to calculate monetary equivalents for nonmarket goods (to be incorporated in cost-benefit analysis), or to calculate gross national happiness. This Article skeptically evaluates the policy role of SWB data. It is critical to distinguish between (1) using SWB surveys as evidence of preference utility versus (2) using them as evidence of experience utility. Preference utility is a measure of the extent to which someone has realized her preferences; experience utility, a measure of the quality of someone\u27s mental states. The two are quite different because individuals can have preferences regarding non-mental occurrences. Having drawn this distinction, the Article then argues, first, that SWB surveys are poor evidence of preference utility—given problems of preference and scale heterogeneity, as well as other difficulties. Stated-preference surveys are a much better survey format for eliciting preference utility. Second, in considering SWB surveys as an experience-utility measure, we should recognize that experientialism about well-being—the view that well-being is simply a matter of good experiences—is highly controversial. More plausibly, an experience-utility measure might be seen as an indicator of one aspect of well-being. However, even constructing this weak experience-utility measure is not straightforward—as the Article demonstrates by discussing Daniel Kahneman\u27s detailed proposal for such a metric

The construction and evaluation of seven lessons correlating music in grades three and six.

Thesis (Ed.M.)--Boston Universit

Monotonic Incompatibility Between Electing and Ranking

Borda a proposé une méthode qui attribue des points à chacun des m candidats. Condorcet a proposé une méthode qui attribue des points à chacun des différents m! classements des candidats. La première est plus appropriée pour élire. La seconde est plus appropriée pour classer. Chacune satisfait une certaine monotonie. Leurs monotonies sont incompatiblesChoix social, Borda, Condorcet, monotonie, incompatibilité, élire, classer.

Something new under the Rising Sun: expanding Australia–Japan defence cooperation

A number of recent policy documents signal the Australian Government’s intent to deepen defence engagement in the Asia–Pacific, and future defence policy statements are likely to reinforce that objective. The Australia in the Asian century White Paper clearly established Asia as our primary economic and strategic focus. Australia’s first National Security Strategy gave as the first of its three priorities ‘strengthening regional engagement to support security’, and the 2013 Defence White Paper—released in May 2013—sets out an ambitious plan to strengthen defence relations with Japan. There are several factors working to make the strategic environment more uncertain for Australia and other countries in the Asia–Pacific. First, and more quickly than was expected, there’s been the emergence of a sharper-toned China–US strategic competition. Military-to-military relations, in particular, are difficult. Second, there’s a curious blending of elements of cooperation and competition in Asia–Pacific affairs. The region’s tied together by economic and trade relations, but in important respects there’s an absence of trust between countries, particularly on military matters. Third, a number of middle-sized powers are emerging with stronger voices on security matters, particularly Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam, India and even Australia. Fourth, there’s been a broad increase in the capabilities of many regional military forces and with it the growing risk of military incidents, particularly in the maritime domain. Taken together, these developments point to an increasingly complex region where competitive multipolarity is the defining characteristic of international engagement. Even with an ensured American presence, because Australia’s resources are limited we can’t hope to achieve all of our strategic objectives in the region without engaging other players and finding innovative ways to develop a cooperative approach to building security. As the most capable of American partners in the region, Japan offers much as a closer partner to Australia. The bilateral relationship’s already strong—Japan’s now one of our closest Asian security partners

One Defence: one direction? The First Principles Review of Defence

Overview: The recently released report of the First Principles Review of Defence, Creating One Defence, is set to reshape the Defence enterprise over the next few years. This ASPI special report explains the review’s recommendations and analyses the consequences for Defence. It provides three perspectives on the forthcoming reforms: Peter Jennings, ‘One Defence–root causes, risks and values’; Andrew Davies, ‘The capability development life cycle’; Mark Thomson, ‘One Defence in two parts’

A versatile force: the future of Australia's special operations capability

This study aims to provide an understanding of the Australian Defence Force\u27s special operations capability and what it offers to government in both peace and wartime. Summary Over the past decade, the demands of the ADF’s global and regional operations saw an unprecedented growth in Australia’s special operations capability. Indeed, Special Operations Forces became the ‘capability of choice’ for the Australian Government. However, as the ADF enters a period of transition from almost constant high-tempo operations to what might be a ‘soft power decade’, there’s a need to consider the future of the capability. Against this background, this study aims to inform policy decisions by providing an understanding of the special operations capability and what it offers to government in both peace and wartime. It argues against possible temptations to cut the capability. In a changing strategic environment, Special Operations Forces will continue to be an important instrument of Australian defence policy. The study entails a number of concrete policy recommendations to strengthen and readjust the special operations capability for a new era

Expanding alliance: ANZUS cooperation and Asia–Pacific security

Is an alliance conceived as a bulwark against a resurgence of Japanese militarism and which cut its military and intelligence teeth in the Cold War is still relevant to today’s strategic concerns? Overview The alliance between Australia and the US, underpinned by the formal ANZUS Treaty of 1951, continues to be a central part of Australian defence and security thinking and an instrument of American policy in the Asia–Pacific. How is it that an alliance conceived as a bulwark against a resurgence of Japanese militarism and which cut its military and intelligence teeth in the Cold War is still relevant to today’s strategic concerns? The answer is partly—and importantly—that the core values of the ANZUS members are strongly aligned, and successive Australian governments and American presidential administrations have seen great value in working with like-minded partners to ensure Asia–Pacific security. Far from becoming a historical curiosity, today it’s not just relevant, but of greater importance than has been the case in the past few decades. To explore new ideas on how to strengthen the US–Australia alliance, ASPI conducted a high-level strategic dialogue in Honolulu in July this year. Discussions canvassed the future strategic environment; the forthcoming Australian Defence White Paper; budget, sovereignty and expectation risks; and cooperation in the maritime, land, air, cyber, space and intelligence domains. A key purpose of the Honolulu dialogue was to help ASPI develop policy recommendations on the alliance relationship for government. This report is the product of those discussions

Microstructure versus Size: Mechanical Properties of Electroplated Single Crystalline Cu Nanopillars

We report results of uniaxial compression experiments on single-crystalline Cu nanopillars with nonzero initial dislocation densities produced without focused ion beam (FIB). Remarkably, we find the same power-law size-driven strengthening as FIB-fabricated face-centered cubic micropillars. TEM analysis reveals that initial dislocation density in our FIB-less pillars and those produced by FIB are on the order of 10^(14)  m^(-2) suggesting that mechanical response of nanoscale crystals is a stronger function of initial microstructure than of size regardless of fabrication method

A comprehensive test of order choice theory: recent evidence from the NYSE

We perform a comprehensive test of order choice theory from a sample period when the NYSE trades in decimals and allows automatic executions. We analyze the decision to submit or cancel an order or to take no action. For submitted orders we distinguish order type (market vs. limit), order side (buy vs. sell), execution method (floor vs. automatic), and order pricing aggressiveness. We use a multinomial logit specification and a new statistical test. We find a negative autocorrelation in changes in order flow exists over five-minute intervals supporting dynamic limit order book theory, despite a positive first-order autocorrelation in order type. Orders routed to the NYSE’s floor are sensitive to market conditions (e.g., spread, depth, volume, volatility, market and individual-stock returns, and private information), but those using the automatic execution system (Direct+) are insensitive to market conditions. When the quoted depth is large, traders are more likely to “jump the queue” by submitting limit orders with limit prices bettering existing quotes. Aggressively-priced limit orders are more likely late in the trading day providing evidence in support of prior experimental results