Bus Operator Awareness Research and Development Training Program

This training is designed to enhance the abilities of bus operators to: Quickly and effectively evaluate suspicious and dangerous activities Take actions to protect yourself and your passengers, and Provide timely and accurate information to law enforcement through your control center This summary and the full instructor-led course were developed by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in cooperation with the National Transportation Security Center of Excellence (NTSCOE), managed through the Science and Technology Directorate of DHS. Through the intensive efforts of four universities and two federal agencies, the team conducted extensive research both nationally and abroad to identify appropriate countermeasures and related skill sets for bus operators relative to identifying suspicious and dangerous activity and reacting appropriately with a focus on life safety concerns

“Smashing Into Crowds” -- An Analysis of Vehicle Ramming Attacks

Vehicle ramming attacks are not new. But since 2010 Jihadists have urged their use. Is this the wave of the future, or a terrorist fad? To answer this and other questions the authors expanded and updated the database used in their May 2018 MTI Security Perspective entitled An Analysis of Vehicle Ramming as a Terrorist Threat to include 184 attacks since January 1, 1970. They also reviewed literature and examined some cases in detail. This MTI Security perspective indicates that while not new, vehicle rammings are more frequent and lethal since 2014, although the number of attacks seems to be dropping in 2019. Still it is too early to know if this is because of government countermeasures or because it is a fad that has come and gone. They also found that: (a) the majority of attacks occur in developed countries like the US and Europe; (b) though not more lethal than some other tactics they can be easily carried out by those who cannot get bombs or guns in a target-rich environment that is difficult to protect; (c) while Jihadists (responsible for only 19% of the attacks) have exhorted their use since 2010, it isn’t clear these calls have been successful -- instead the pattern of attacks suggest a kind of wider contagion; (d) attackers plowing vehicles into public gatherings and pedestrianized streets are the most lethal, particularly the attacks are planned and the drivers rent or steal large trucks or vans driven at speed; and finally, (e) government authorities cannot prevent these attacks but can and are doing things to prevent them and mitigate fatalities when they occur

Train Wrecks and Track Attacks: An Analysis of Attempts by Terrorists and Other Extremists to Derail Trains or Disrupt Rail Transportation

Attempts to sabotage rails and deliberately derail passenger trains have a long history in conventional and guerrilla warfare as well as during some particularly bitter labor disputes in the past. Since the 1970s, political fanatics have become a major adversary. Terrorists have sought to derail trains to achieve high-casualty events, while anarchists and issue oriented extremists have attacked rails to attract attention to their causes and impose economic damage. In this report, we examine the more than a thousand attempts to derail trains and to attack rail infrastructure to discern overall patterns and trends. We then look at four subsets of attacks in greater detail: those by India’s Maoist guerrillas; those by separatist insurgents in Thailand; those by various jihadist groups worldwide; and those by an assemblage of anarchists, environmental and similar cause-oriented extremists in Europe. How do these adversaries compare in terms of tactics, success rates, lethality, and other factors? Do their different objectives and circumstances affect their actions? Perhaps most important, is there evidence that they become more effective and lethal over time

Does “See Something, Say Something” Work?

Do “See Something, Say Something” programs work? The evidence strongly suggests that in the specific case of public surface transportation, the answer is “yes.” Transport staff and passengers play an important role in the prevention of terrorist attacks. By discovering and reporting suspicious objects, they have prevented more than 10 percent of all terrorist attacks on public surface transportation. Detection rates are even better in the economically advanced countries where more than 14 percent of the attempts are detected—and have been improving. This MTI Security Perspective analyzes detections since 1970 and suggests that “See Something, Say Something” campaigns are worthwhile

An Analysis of Vehicle Ramming as a Terrorist Threat

Ramming attacks in which drivers deliberately plow their vehicles into public gatherings, pedestrians, or bicyclists, have become an increasingly common terrorist tactic. This MTI Security Perspective, by Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce R. Butterworth analyzes 78 vehicular attacks between January 1973 and April 2018. According to their analysis, it is a growing trend, and a frightening one. The 78 attacks led to 281 deaths and around 1,200 injuries. Sixteen attacks took place between 1973 and 2007, while 62 took place between 2008 and April 2018. Thirty of these occurred in 2017 and the first four months of 2018 alone

The Challenge of Protecting Transit and Passenger Rail: Understanding How Security Works Against Terrorism

Terrorists see transit and passenger rail as an attractive target. Designed for public convenience, trains and stations offer terrorists easy access to crowds of people in confined environments where there are minimal security risks and attacks can cause high casualties. This report examines the unique attributes of the terrorist threat, how security measures against terrorism have evolved over the years, and their overall effectiveness. Does security work? Empirical evidence is hard to come by. Terrorist incidents are statistically rare and random, making it difficult to discern effects. The fact that terrorists focus most of their attacks on targets with little or no security suggests that security influences their choice of targets. Increased security does not reduce terrorism overall, but appears to push terrorists toward softer targets. These indirect effects are visible only over long periods of time. Public surface transportation poses unique challenges. It is not easy to increase security without causing inconvenience, unreasonably slowing travel times, adding significant costs, and creating vulnerable queues of people waiting to pass through security checkpoints. This has compelled rail operators to explore other options: enlisting passengers and staff in alerting authorities to suspicious objects or behavior, random passenger screening, designing new stations to facilitate surveillance and reduce potential casualties from explosions or fire, and ensuring rapid intervention

Implementation and Development of Vehicle Tracking and Immobilization Technologies

Since the mid-1980s, limited use has been made of vehicle tracking using satellite communications to mitigate the security and safety risks created by the highway transportation of certain types of hazardous materials. However, vehicle-tracking technology applied to safety and security is increasingly being researched and piloted, and it has been the subject of several government reports and legislative mandates. At the same time, the motor carrier industry has been investing in and implementing vehicle tracking, for a number of reasons, particularly the increase in efficiency achieved through better management of both personnel (drivers) and assets (trucks or, as they are known, tractors; cargo loads; and trailers). While vehicle tracking and immobilization technologies can play a significant role in preventing truck-borne hazardous materials from being used as weapons against key targets, they are not a & ”silver bullet.” However, the experience of DTTS and the FMCSA and TSA pilot projects indicates that when these technologies are combined with other security measures, and when the information they provide is used in conjunction with information supplied outside of the tracking system, they can provide defensive value to any effort to protect assets from attacks using hazmat as a weapon. This report is a sister publication to MTI Report 09-03, Potential Terrorist Uses of Highway-Borne Hazardous Materials. That publication was created in response to the Department of Homeland Security´s request that the Mineta Transportation Institute´s National Transportation Security Center of Excellence provide research and insights regarding the security risks created by the highway transportation of hazardous materials

Security Awareness for Public Bus Transportation: Case Studies of Attacks Against the Israeli Public Bus System, Research Report 11-07

This report presents 16 case studies of attacks planned or carried out against Israeli bus targets, along with statistical data on the number, frequency, and lethality of attacks against bus targets that have taken place in Israel since 1970 and during the Second Intifada, which occurred between September 2000 and the end of 2006. The statistical data come from MTI’s Database on Terrorist and Serious Criminal Attacks Against Public Surface Transportation. The report also includes an analysis of the effectiveness of different improvised explosive devices and methods of delivering them and raises questions for future discussion. The case studies of bus attacks were selected not because they are statistically representative, but because they provide a variety of interesting observations. They include both lethal and nonlethal attacks, attacks in which security measures were effective or were not followed or were ineffective, and attacks in which the attackers’ tactics and/or devices were lethal or failed or reduced the lethality of the attack. It is hoped that the cases presented in this report and the accompanying analysis will increase understanding of what can happen and of what can deter, prevent, and/or mitigate the occurrence of terrorist attacks against public bus systems

An Exploration of Transportation Terrorist Stabbing Attacks

In his August 22, 2018 message to supporters of the Islamic State of Iraq and [greater] Syria (ISIS), Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi implored ISIS fighters in Syria and Iraq as well as those on various jihadist fronts in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia not to be dismayed by military setbacks suffered by the Islamic State, but to continue fighting, confident that Allah would ultimately reward those who remained steadfast with victory. In the same message, he exhorted homegrown jihadists abroad— “the fierce lions in the lands of the Cross—Canada, Europe, and elsewhere” to carry out simple attacks within their limited capabilities that would nonetheless have great psychological impact because they would strike in the enemy’s homeland.Previous reports by the Mineta Transportation Institute have addressed bombings (see Suicide Bombings Against Trains and Buses Are Lethal but Few in Number and Explosives and Incendiaries Used in Terrorist Attacks on Public Surface Transportation: A Preliminary Empirical Analysis ). Car ramming attacks or what are sometimes called vehicular rammings have been the subject of more recent reporting. This report looks first at terrorist stabbing attacks against the public as a general phenomenon, and then examines stabbing attacks in public surface transportation venues

Evolving Patterns of Violence in Developing Countries

In August 2022, MTI issued a report entitled Changing Patterns of Violence Pose New Challenges to Public Surface Transportation in the United States. That report analyzed the frequency and lethality of attacks on public surface transport in economically advanced countries. But what has been going on in non-economically advanced countries – the vast majority of countries in the world? Using the MTI database of Terrorist and Serious Criminal Attacks Against Public Surface Transportation, the authors analyzed attacks against passenger trains and train stations, buses and bus stations and stops, and all rail infrastructure and operating and security personnel in both sets of countries between January 1, 2004, and December 31, 2022. For this analysis, countries that are economically advanced are based mostly on OCED membership and are designated as Group 1, and those with developing economies and others that are not OECD members, are designated as Group 2. (Group 3 countries are Israel and territory controlled by the Palestinian authority, which MTI will address in a separate report). This report focuses on Group 2 countries, comparing them to Group 1 countries. Group 2 had more than 7 times the number of attacks, and the lethality of its attacks was 3 times greater than in Group 1. In Group 2, many countries have long-running insurgencies that produce frequent and lethal attacks. There are far more attacks on buses and bus depots and stops in Group 2, reflecting greater reliance on bus travel. Explosives dominate attack methods, and while jihadist attackers are responsible for only 9.7% of attacks, they create 33.7% of fatalities. Jihadists are the most lethal attackers in both Group 1 and Group 2 countries. Suicide attacks account for only about 3% of the attacks in both groups, but while that percentage has gone down in Group 1, it has gone up in Group 2