Impact of Job Complexity and Performance on CFO Compensation

Prior research suggests that Big 4 auditors provide higher quality audits by virtue of their large size. Still, the recent reforms mandated by the Sarbanes Oxley Act – by increasing client and auditor incentives for accurate reporting – may have narrowed audit quality differences across auditor groups. In this paper, we examine audit quality for Big 4 and Mid-tier auditors during 2003-06 and include clients of other smaller audit firms for comparison purposes. We examine actual audit quality (as proxied by earnings management metrics) as well as perceived audit quality (as proxied by the client- and year-specific eloading and ex ante equity risk premium metrics). We include in our analysis only those Big 4 clients for whom the Mid-tier firms are potentially viable as auditors. Relative to other smaller audit firm clients, we find Big 4 and Mid-tier audit clients to have (1) lower levels of accrual management, (2) higher levels of real earnings management, and (3) higher levels of investor-perceived accruals quality. In each case, we were unable to reject the null that Big 4 and Mid-tier audits are similar. However, we find Big 4 audit clients to have a lower client-specific ex ante equity risk premium relative to both Mid-tier and other smaller audit firm clients. Collectively, our findings indicate that in situations where a Mid-tier auditor is potentially viable, Big 4 clients could utilize a Mid-tier firm without adversely affecting audit quality. Still, the results suggest that Big 4 clients have a lower ex ante cost of equity capital which is likely related to the insurance considerations (“deep pockets”) – rather than the audit quality -- associated with having a Big 4 auditor.Auditor concentration, Audit quality, Earnings management, Cost of equity capital.

Litigation Risk and Abnormal Accruals

In this paper, we examine the relation between auditor litigation risk and abnormal accruals over the 1989-2007 time period. We address potential endogeneity in prior studies by jointly modeling abnormal accruals and litigation risk in a simultaneous equation system. Our findings suggest that client-specific litigation risk affects auditor incentives to acquiesce to client demands for earnings management, i.e., the higher the risk of auditor litigation, the greater the auditor’s restraining influence on the abnormal accruals reported by the client. We also find evidence that abnormal accruals increase the likelihood of auditor litigation. We also document that the 1995 Public Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) lowered the client-specific risk of auditor litigation. Litigation reform remains a topic of ongoing interest. Our findings contribute to a better understanding of the effects of litigation reform (and related changes in legal exposure) on auditor incentives and earnings management.: Litigation risk, abnormal accruals, auditor incentives

Financial Characteristics of Companies Audited by Large Audit Firms

Purpose “ The purpose of this paper is to examine how financial characteristics associated with the choice of a big audit firm with further investigation on the agency costs of free cash flows.Design/methodology/approach “ The sample used for this work includes industrial listed companies from Germany and France. To test our hypothesis, we used a number of logit models, extending the standard model selection audit firm, to include the variables of interest. Following previous work, our dependent dummy variable is Big4 or non-Big4.Findings “ We observed that most independent variables in the German companies show similar results to previous work, but we did not have the same results for the French industry. Moreover, our findings suggest that the total debt and dividends can be an important reason for determining the choice of a large audit firm, reducing agency costs of free cash flows.Research limitations/implications “ This study has some limitations on the measurements of the cost of the audit fees and also generates opportunities for additional searching.Originality/value “ The paper provides only one aspect to explain the relationship between the problems of agency costs of free cash flow and influence in choosing a large auditing firm, which stems from investors\u27 demand for higher quality audits

Do the Big 4 and the Second-tier firms provide audits of similar quality?

In this paper, we examine audit quality for Big 4 and Second-tier auditors during 2003-2006. We utilize the auditor's propensity to issue a going concern audit report for distressed clients as a measure of audit quality. In addition, since the purpose of an audit is to improve financial reporting quality, we utilize abnormal accruals as an observable proxy for audit quality. Further, we utilize the client- and year-specific ex ante equity risk premium as a proxy for audit quality as perceived by investors. We control for auditor self-selection bias using the matched-pairs sample approach discussed by Francis and Lennox (2008). We find weak evidence that the Big 4 have a higher propensity to issue going concern audit opinions for distressed companies. However, the level of performance-adjusted abnormal accruals for Big 4 and Second-tier audit firm clients appears to be similar. With respect to investor perceptions, we find the client-specific ex ante equity risk premium to be lower for Big 4 clients than for Second-tier audit firm clients. Overall, our findings suggest little difference in actual audit quality but a more pronounced difference in perceived audit quality. Collectively, the evidence we provide informs the current discourse on audit quality, auditor choice, and the viability of Second-tier auditors as an alternative to the Big 4.