The redistributive state and conflicts in Africa

This paper argues that ethnic problems are only one aspect of political violence in Africa, while violent conflicts must be thought about as a failure of the state to perform some of its fundamental tasks. State formation in Africa is a transition process starting from an institutional endowment of ethnic division. Ethnic capital in Africa ensures the provision of many services that a modern state has taken over in rich countries, including security, education, rules of behaviour, etc. Most African states are so far unable to deliver all these services adequately, and must go through an initial phase of federation of ethnic groups, before they can provide a credible substitute to ethnic capital. The system of redistribution within and among groups is the key to creating the solidarity links between them, and its breakdown is liable to trigger the eruption of political violence. Civil wars, or other forms of political violence, are thus an integral part of the political economy of Africa.

Poverty and Growth in the WAEMU after the 1994 Devaluation

C.te d'Ivoire, Niger, poverty, exchange rate

Inflation and macroeconomic instability in Madagascar

The relationships between inflation and macro-economic instability are discussed analytically, using a simple monetary model with rational expectations, with an application to the case of Madagascar. The recent macroeconomic history of this country suggests that high inflation is correlated with high volatility of the inflation rate and the real effective exchange rate. The relevance of this observation is confirmed by an empirical analysis of the relationships between inflation, competitiveness and instability in Madagascar.

Betting on Displacement: Oil, Violence, and the Switch to Civilian Rule in Nigeria

This paper presents an analytic narrative of three decades of oil and violence in Nigeria, assuming rational choice by all the actors. It argues that, in the 1980s and 1990s, the government had to choose between spending money on preventing pollution and terrorizing the population away from the Niger Delta states, where oil extraction is concentrated. Because of the uncertain outcome of out-migration, the latter solution seemed more efficient and was implemented by the military governments. However, xenophobic responses by the population in destination cities, where a lot of ethnic violence took place, proved out-migration to be much less attractive than expected. Niger Delta states’ populations ended up being trapped in their polluted environment where “oil bunkering” and racketeering oil firms turned out to be the only viable sources of income for many people. The implied dynamics of violence sheds some light on the switch to civilian rule that occurred in 1999.