Endogenous entry/exit as an alternative explanation for the disciplining role of independent analysts

Gu and Xue [2008. The superiority and disciplining role of independent analysts. Journal of Accounting and Economics, this issue, doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2008.02.002] study the disciplining effect of independent analysts on the accuracy and forecast relevance of the forecasts of non-independent analysts. One of the intriguing results is that while independent analysts issue inferior forecasts, their presence appears to reduce the forecast bias, improve the forecast accuracy and increase the forecast relevance of forecasts issued by non-independent analysts. We explore alternative explanations for the Gu-Xue results. Our evidence of endogenous entry and exit of independent analysts provides a more compelling explanation for the reported results.

When and why do IPO firms manage earnings?

There is significant disagreement about whether, when, and why IPO firms manage earnings. We precisely identify the timing and motives behind earnings management by IPO firms. The period around an IPO is characterized by two events: the IPO itself and the lockup expiration. Both the raising of capital at the IPO and the exit by pre-IPO shareholders at lockup expiration create incentives for firms to manage earnings. To disentangle the effect of these events, we examine quarterly, rather than annual, abnormal accruals. We find no evidence of income-increasing earnings management before the IPO. However, IPO firms exhibit positive abnormal accruals in the quarter before and the quarter of the lockup expiration. Positive abnormal accruals are concentrated in less scrutinized firms and firms with high selling by pre-IPO shareholders. Moreover, we find that these accruals subsequently reverse and that such reversals contribute to long-run IPO underperformance