1,691 research outputs found
Minimizing Flow-Time on Unrelated Machines
We consider some flow-time minimization problems in the unrelated machines
setting. In this setting, there is a set of machines and a set of jobs,
and each job has a machine dependent processing time of on machine
. The flow-time of a job is the total time the job spends in the system
(completion time minus its arrival time), and is one of the most natural
quality of service measure. We show the following two results: an
approximation algorithm for minimizing the
total-flow time, and an approximation for minimizing the maximum
flow-time. Here is the ratio of maximum to minimum job size. These are the
first known poly-logarithmic guarantees for both the problems.Comment: The new version fixes some typos in the previous version. The paper
is accepted for publication in STOC 201
Constant-Competitive Prior-Free Auction with Ordered Bidders
A central problem in Microeconomics is to design auctions with good revenue
properties. In this setting, the bidders' valuations for the items are private
knowledge, but they are drawn from publicly known prior distributions. The goal
is to find a truthful auction (no bidder can gain in utility by misreporting
her valuation) that maximizes the expected revenue.
Naturally, the optimal-auction is sensitive to the prior distributions. An
intriguing question is to design a truthful auction that is oblivious to these
priors, and yet manages to get a constant factor of the optimal revenue. Such
auctions are called prior-free.
Goldberg et al. presented a constant-approximate prior-free auction when
there are identical copies of an item available in unlimited supply, bidders
are unit-demand, and their valuations are drawn from i.i.d. distributions. The
recent work of Leonardi et al. [STOC 2012] generalized this problem to non
i.i.d. bidders, assuming that the auctioneer knows the ordering of their
reserve prices. Leonardi et al. proposed a prior-free auction that achieves a
approximation. We improve upon this result, by giving the first
prior-free auction with constant approximation guarantee.Comment: The same result has been obtained independently by E. Koutsoupias, S.
Leonardi and T. Roughgarde
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