Behavioral Macroeconomics and the New Keynesian Model

The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, a thorough presentation of the state of the art of the New Keynesian Macroeconomic model is provided. A discussion of its empirical caveats follows and some recent extensions of the standard model are evaluated in more detail. Second, a key insight of Behavioral Economics, hyperbolic discounting, is used for the derivation of the IS Curve. It is argued that this approach is more appropriate than the usual praxis of allowing for a rule-of-thumb agent in an otherwise standard optimization framework.Behavioral Economics, New Keynesian Model, Rule-of-Thumbs,Hyperbolic Discounting

A Detailed Derivation of the Sticky Price and Sticky Information New Keynesian DSGE Model

This paper aims at providing macroeconomists with a detailed exposition of the New Keynesian DSGE model. Both the sticky price version and the sticky information variant are derived mathematically. Moreover, we simulate the models, also including lagged terms in the sticky price version, and compare the implied impulse response functions. Finally, we present solution methods for DSGE models, and discuss three important theoretical assumptions.New Keynesian Model, Sticky Prices, Sticky Information, Solution Algorithms

Uncertainty, Social Norms and Consumption Theory: Post and New Keynesian Approaches

Consumption theory has always been a neglected eld in Post Keynesian economics, whereas it is at the center of New Keynesian economics. This paper investigates similarities and differences between the two approaches. I will show that the newer mainstream models indeed give results that are fairly similar, even if differences, especially concerning methodological questions, still remain. Building on insights from Economic Sociology and Behavioral Economics, the importance for consumption theory of an adequate treatment of risk and uncertainty on the one hand and the role of social norms on the other hand is emphasized

Perceived Inflation under Loss Aversion

Building on Prospect Theory, we apply the concept of loss aversion to the formation of inflation perceptions and test empirically for non- linearities in the inflation-perceptions relation for a panel of 10 Euro area countries. Specifically, under the assumption of loss aversion, inflation changes above a certain reference rate will be perceived more strongly. Rejecting rationality of inflation perceptions in general under symmetric loss and in a majority of cases under flexible loss functions, panel smooth transition models give evidence of non-linearities in the inflation perception formation regarding both actual inflation and time. This result is confirmed by dynamic fixed effects estimates, where the slope of the estimated value function is significantly steeper in the loss region and the implied average reference inflation rate is found close to 2%.Inflation Perceptions, Loss Aversion, Panel Smooth Tran- sition Models, Dynamic Panel.

Prospect Theory and Inflation Perceptions - An Empirical Assessment

Building on the hypotheses of loss aversion with respect to price increases and availability of frequently bought goods, Brachinger (2006,2008) constructs an alternative index of perceived inflation (IPI), which can reproduce the jump in the measure for perceived inflation after the Euro introduction in Germany that was not observable in standard HICP inflation. We test the hypotheses of Prospect Theory with regard to households’ inflation perceptions underlying Brachinger’s IPI in a panel estimation for 12 European countries. There is evidence that perceptions react more strongly to ‘losses’ in inflation than to ‘gains’ before the Euro cash changeover, but not afterwards. Moreover, we find empirical support for the availability hypothesis, stating that frequently bought goods have a stronger influence on inflation perceptions than the overall price index.Inflation Perceptions, Prospect Theory, Dynamic Panel

Household`s Disagreement on Inflation Expectations and Socioeconomic Media Exposure in Germany

Inflation expectations are often found to depend on socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of households, such as age, income and education, however, the reasons for this systematic heterogeneity are not yet fully understood. Since accounting for these expectation differentials could help improve the communication strategies of central banks, we test the impact of three sources of the demographic effect on inflation expectations using data for Germany. Overall, our findings suggest that household-specific inflation rates and group-specific news consumption accounts for the higher forecast errors of younger and older households, households with lower income and unemployed survey respondents, while households inflation perceptions only play a minor role

A Detailed Derivation of the Sticky Price and Sticky Information New Keynesian DSGE Model

This paper aims at providing macroeconomists with a detailed exposition of the New Keynesian DSGE model. Both the sticky price version and the sticky information variant are derived mathematically. Moreover, we simulate the models, also including lagged terms in the sticky price version, and compare the implied impulse response functions. Finally, we present solution methods for DSGE models, and discuss three important theoretical assumptions

Perceived Inflation under Loss Aversion

Building on Prospect Theory, we apply the concept of loss aversion to the formation of inflation perceptions and test empirically for non- linearities in the inflation-perceptions relation for a panel of 10 Euro area countries. Specifically, under the assumption of loss aversion, inflation changes above a certain reference rate will be perceived more strongly. Rejecting rationality of inflation perceptions in general under symmetric loss and in a majority of cases under flexible loss functions, panel smooth transition models give evidence of non-linearities in the inflation perception formation regarding both actual inflation and time. This result is confirmed by dynamic fixed effects estimates, where the slope of the estimated value function is significantly steeper in the loss region and the implied average reference inflation rate is found close to 2%

Immobilienkrise?: Warum in Deutschland die Preise seit Jahren stagnieren

Die derzeitigen Turbulenzen auf den Immobilienmärkten in Ländern wie den USA und Spanien verstellen den Blick auf die längerfristige Entwicklung der realen Immobilienpreise. Während sie in den vergangenen Jahren in vielen westlichen Industrieländern deutlich anzogen, stagnieren sie andernorts seit Jahrzehnten, so etwa in Deutschland und Kanada. Dieser langfristigen Stagnation wurde nur geringe Aufmerksamkeit zuteil. Nationale Unterschiede in der Entwicklung der realen Immobilienpreise sind vor allem auf unterschiedliche reale Einkommenszuwächse zurückzuführen. Darüber hinaus sind das Bevölkerungswachstum, der Urbanisierungsgrad sowie das Niveau der Realzinssätze wichtige Bestimmungsfaktoren. Zudem macht die Analyse deutlich, dass der Immobilienmarkt in einigen Ländern gerade in den letzten Jahren durch Übersteigerungen gekennzeichnet war. Besonders in Großbritannien lagen die Immobilienpreise 2007 um mehr als 60 Prozent über dem Niveau, das allein aufgrund der fundamentalen Einflussfaktoren zu erwarten gewesen wäre

What drives housing prices down? Evidence from an international panel

In this study, we suggest an explanation for the alarmingly low growth rates of real housing prices in Canada and Germany in comparison to other OECD countries over 1975-2005. We show that the long-run development of housing markets is determined by real disposable per capita income, real long-term interest rate, population growth, and urbanization. The differential development of real housing prices in Canada and Germany is attributed to the specific values of the fundamentals in these two countries. Canada and Germany are characterized by relatively low average growth rates of real disposable income and relatively high interest rates resulting in suppressed housing prices over long period of time. Institutional structure accentuates these tendencies. Given the importance of housing wealth for the private consumption, our paper aims at drawing attention of the policymakers to the necessity of preventing not only the overheating but also overcooling of the housing market that entails lower economic growth rate