Who Invests in Training if Contracts are Temporary? - Empirical Evidence for Germany Using Selection Correction

This study deals with the effect of fixed-term contracts on work-related training. Though previous studies found a negative effect of fixed-term contracts on the participation in training, from the theoretical point of view it is not clear whether workers with fixed-term contracts receive less or more training, compared to workers with permanent contracts. In addition to the existing strand of literature, we especially distinguish between employer- and employee-financed training in order to allow for diverging investment patterns of worker and firm. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), we estimate a bivariate probit model to control for selection effects that may arise from unobservable factors, affecting both participation in training and holding fixed-term contracts. Finding negative effects for employer-sponsored, as well as for employee-sponsored training, leads us to conclude that workers with fixed-term contracts do not compensate for lower firm investments.training, fixed-term contracts, bivariate probit model

What makes a good conference? Analysing the preferences of labor economists

Conferences are an important element in the work of researchers, requiring substantial investments in fees, travel expenses and the time spent by the participants. The aim of this paper is to identify the preferences of participants with respect to conference characteristics. Based on a sample of European labour economists, preferences are measured using the vignette approach where participants are asked to choose between hypothetical European Association of Labour Economists (EALE) conferences. We find that the keynote speakers are the most important element in the preference for a conference, followed by the location of the conference. There is substantial heterogeneity in the taste of labour economists especially with respect to location, though the link between preference parameters and measured characteristics like gender, age and seniority is limited. Factor analysis suggests that the variety in preferences can be best described by a latent variable that reflects the weights people put on content versus fun.labour economics ;

What Makes a Good Conference? Analysing the Preferences of Labor Economists

Conferences are an important element in the work of researchers, requiring substantial investments in fees, travel expenses and the time spent by the participants. The aim of this paper is to identify the preferences of participants with respect to conference characteristics. Based on a sample of European labour economists, preferences are measured using the vignette approach where participants are asked to choose between hypothetical European Association of Labour Economists (EALE) conferences. We find that the keynote speakers are the most important element in the preference for a conference, followed by the location of the conference. There is substantial heterogeneity in the taste of labour economists especially with respect to location, though the link between preference parameters and measured characteristics like gender, age and seniority is limited. Factor analysis suggests that the variety in preferences can be best described by a latent variable that reflects the weights people put on content versus fun.vignette-method, economics profession, conference participation, random-coefficients model

The role of peers in estimating tenure-performance profiles: Evidence from personnel data

In this paper, we estimate tenure-performance profiles using unique panel data thatcontain detailed information on individual workers’performance. We find that 10per cent increase in tenure leads to an increase in performance of 5.5 per cent of astandard deviation. This translates to an average performance increase of about 75per cent within the first year of the employment relationship. Furthermore, we showthat there are peer effects in learning on-the-job: Workers placed in teams with moreexperienced and thus more productive peers perform significantly better than thoseplaced in teams with less experienced peers. An increase in the average team tenure byone standard deviation leads to an increase of 11 to 14 per cent of a standard deviationin performance.education, training and the labour market;

The role of peers in estimating tenure-performance profiles: evidence from personnel data

In this paper, we estimate tenure-performance proles using unique panel data that containdetailed information on individual workers'' performance. We find that a 10 per cent increase intenure leads to an increase in performance of 5.5 per cent of a standard deviation. Thistranslates to an average performance increase of about 75 per cent within the first year of theemployment relationship. Furthermore, we show that there are peer effects in learning on-the-job:Workers placed in teams with more experienced and thus more productive peers performsignificantly better than those placed in teams with less experienced peers. An increase in theaverage team tenure by one standard deviation leads to an increase of 11 to 14 per cent of astandard deviation in performance.labour economics ;

Hat die Befristung von Arbeitsverträgen einen Einfluss auf die Weiterbildung geringqualifiziert beschäftigter Personen?

Fixed-term contracts are considerd as one of the most popular instruments of labour market flexibility. Although they provide new labour market options for employer and employees, it is argued that they may lead to decreasing investments in human capital. From the theoretical point of view it is not clear wheter a fixed-term contract is a drawback for the participation in work-related training. The paper deals with the influence of fixed-term contracts on work-related training especially for low-skilled workers. Based on the Micro Census data of 2004, we estimate a bivariate probit model for the probability of fixed-term employment and participating in work-related training. This model enables us to control for selection effects that may arise from unobservable factors. From the estimation results we can conclude that holding a fixed-term contract does not mean a systematical disadvantage for the training probability of low-skilled employees.training, low-skilled occupation, fixed-term contracts