Who Invests in Training if Contracts are Temporary? - Empirical Evidence for Germany Using Selection Correction

This study deals with the effect of fixed-term contracts on work-related training. Though previous studies found a negative effect of fixed-term contracts on the participation in training, from the theoretical point of view it is not clear whether workers with fixed-term contracts receive less or more training, compared to workers with permanent contracts. In addition to the existing strand of literature, we especially distinguish between employer- and employee-financed training in order to allow for diverging investment patterns of worker and firm. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), we estimate a bivariate probit model to control for selection effects that may arise from unobservable factors, affecting both participation in training and holding fixed-term contracts. Finding negative effects for employer-sponsored, as well as for employee-sponsored training, leads us to conclude that workers with fixed-term contracts do not compensate for lower firm investments.training, fixed-term contracts, bivariate probit model

What makes a good conference? Analysing the preferences of labor economists

Conferences are an important element in the work of researchers, requiring substantial investments in fees, travel expenses and the time spent by the participants. The aim of this paper is to identify the preferences of participants with respect to conference characteristics. Based on a sample of European labour economists, preferences are measured using the vignette approach where participants are asked to choose between hypothetical European Association of Labour Economists (EALE) conferences. We find that the keynote speakers are the most important element in the preference for a conference, followed by the location of the conference. There is substantial heterogeneity in the taste of labour economists especially with respect to location, though the link between preference parameters and measured characteristics like gender, age and seniority is limited. Factor analysis suggests that the variety in preferences can be best described by a latent variable that reflects the weights people put on content versus fun.labour economics ;

What Makes a Good Conference? Analysing the Preferences of Labor Economists

Conferences are an important element in the work of researchers, requiring substantial investments in fees, travel expenses and the time spent by the participants. The aim of this paper is to identify the preferences of participants with respect to conference characteristics. Based on a sample of European labour economists, preferences are measured using the vignette approach where participants are asked to choose between hypothetical European Association of Labour Economists (EALE) conferences. We find that the keynote speakers are the most important element in the preference for a conference, followed by the location of the conference. There is substantial heterogeneity in the taste of labour economists especially with respect to location, though the link between preference parameters and measured characteristics like gender, age and seniority is limited. Factor analysis suggests that the variety in preferences can be best described by a latent variable that reflects the weights people put on content versus fun.vignette-method, economics profession, conference participation, random-coefficients model

The role of peers in estimating tenure-performance profiles: Evidence from personnel data

In this paper, we estimate tenure-performance profiles using unique panel data thatcontain detailed information on individual workers’performance. We find that 10per cent increase in tenure leads to an increase in performance of 5.5 per cent of astandard deviation. This translates to an average performance increase of about 75per cent within the first year of the employment relationship. Furthermore, we showthat there are peer effects in learning on-the-job: Workers placed in teams with moreexperienced and thus more productive peers perform significantly better than thoseplaced in teams with less experienced peers. An increase in the average team tenure byone standard deviation leads to an increase of 11 to 14 per cent of a standard deviationin performance.education, training and the labour market;

What affects international migration of European science and engineering graduates?

In public policy, international migration of scientists and engineers is often seen as achance of recruiting the most talented and productive workers. However, it can alsobe a risk in terms of loosing a country’s talented workers. In this paper, we analysemigration of graduates from science and engineering studies from nine Europeancountries. Using a dataset with information on personal characteristics, previousmigration experience, as well as study- and work-related variables, we analyse thedeterminants of migrating to the country of the first job and to the country of subsequentjobs after graduation. We find that not only wage gains are driving the migrationdecision. Differences in labour market opportunities related to R&D spending area strong predictor of future migration. Furthermore, past migration experiences arerelated to a higher probability of labour migration. Moreover, we find evidence ofselective migration: the best graduates are most likely to migrate. Contrary to ourexpectation, qualitative aspects of the job match such as the utilisation of skills in thejob and involvement in innovation hardly seem to matter in the decision whetheror not to migrate. Interestingly, the wage level affects migration towards countriesin continental Europe, whereas Anglo-Saxon countries seem to attract migrants duetheir larger R&D intensity.education, training and the labour market;

The role of peers in estimating tenure-performance profiles: evidence from personnel data

In this paper, we estimate tenure-performance proles using unique panel data that containdetailed information on individual workers'' performance. We find that a 10 per cent increase intenure leads to an increase in performance of 5.5 per cent of a standard deviation. Thistranslates to an average performance increase of about 75 per cent within the first year of theemployment relationship. Furthermore, we show that there are peer effects in learning on-the-job:Workers placed in teams with more experienced and thus more productive peers performsignificantly better than those placed in teams with less experienced peers. An increase in theaverage team tenure by one standard deviation leads to an increase of 11 to 14 per cent of astandard deviation in performance.labour economics ;

The Role of Peers in Estimating Tenure-Performance Profiles: Evidence from Personnel Data

In this paper, we estimate tenure-performance profiles using unique panel data that contain detailed information on individual workers' performance. We find that a 10 per cent increase in tenure leads to an increase in performance of 5.5 per cent of a standard deviation. This translates to an average performance increase of about 75 per cent within the first year of the employment relationship. Furthermore, we show that there are peer effects in learning on-the-job: Workers placed in teams with more experienced and thus more productive peers perform significantly better than those placed in teams with less experienced peers. An increase in the average team tenure by one standard deviation leads to an increase of 11 to 14 per cent of a standard deviation in performance.tenure-performance profiles, experience, learning on-the-job, peer effects, productivity, call centres