804 research outputs found
Multiples of Pfister forms
The isotropy of multiples of Pfister forms is studied. In particular, an
improved lower bound on the values of their first Witt indices is obtained. A
number of corollaries of this result are outlined. An investigation of generic
Pfister multiples is also undertaken. These results are applied to distinguish
between properties preserved by Pfister products.Comment: 14 page
Group and round quadratic forms
We offer some elementary characterisations of group and round quadratic
forms. These characterisations are applied to establish new (and recover
existing) characterisations of Pfister forms. We establish "going-up" results
for group and anisotropic round forms with respect to iterated Laurent series
fields, which contrast with the established results with respect to rational
function field extensions. For forms of two-power dimension, we determine when
there exists a field extension over which the form becomes an anisotropic group
form that is not round.Comment: 12 page
âPsychological Nominalismâ and the Given, from Abstract Entities to Animal Minds
ABSTRACT: Sellars formulated his thesis of 'psychological nominalism' in two very different ways: (1) most famously as the thesis that 'all awareness of sortsâŠis a linguistic affair', but also (2) as a certain thesis about the 'psychology of the higher processes'. The latter thesis denies the standard view that relations to abstract entities are required in order to explain human thought and intentionality, and asserts to the contrary that all such mental phenomena can in principle âbe accounted for causally' without any use of normative terms in the explanation. Recent 'Hegelian Sellarsians' such as Rorty, McDowell, and Brandom have argued that the holistic, normative themes in (1) support various non-realist or rather (German) 'idealist but common-sense realist' outlooks. By contrast, Sellars' own defenses of (2) reveal psychological nominalism itself to be a naturalistic empiricism intended to sustain the normative-holistic themes in (1) within an exhaustively scientific naturalist conception of reality
Concepts of Objects as Prescribing Laws: A Kantian and Pragmatist Line of Thought
Abstract: This paper traces a Kantian and pragmatist line of thinking that connects the ideas of conceptual content, object cognition, and modal constraints in the form of counterfactual sustaining causal laws. It is an idea that extends from Kantâs Critique of Pure Reason through C. I. Lewisâs Mind and the World-Order to the Kantian naturalism of Wilfrid Sellars and the analytic pragmatism of Robert Brandom. Kant put forward what I characterize as a modal conception of objectivity, which he developed as an extended argument stretching from the transcendental deduction through the analogies of experience to the regulative maxims of reason and reflective judgment. In related ways in Lewis and Sellars, the very idea of an object of knowledge (and of intentionality more generally) is connected with a certain lawfulness or modal constraint the necessary representation of which, they argue, is an achievement of conceptualization. While Sellars agreed with the spirit of Lewisâs famous pragmatic conception of the a priori, Sellarsâs conception of meaning and conceptual content differed in crucial ways with important consequences for this issue. I argue furthermore that a certain phenomenalist temptation threatens to spoil this insight both among some of Kantâs interpreters and in Lewisâs thought. Finally, I point out that Brandomâs âKant-Sellars thesisâ provides new support for this line of thought. Although questions concerning idealism continue to raise controversies for neo-Kantians and pragmatists, the line of thought itself represents a distinctive and still promising approach to questions concerning intentionality and conceptual content
After Kant, Sellars, and Meillassoux: Back to Empirical Realism?
ABSTRACT: I examine how Meillassouxâs conception of correlationism in After Finitude, as I understand it, relates firstly to Kantâs transcendental idealist philosophy, and secondly to the analytic Kantianism of Wilfrid Sellars. I argue that central to the views of both Kant and Sellars is what might be called, with an ambivalent nod to Meillassoux, an objective correlationism. What emerges in the end as the recommended upshot of these analyses is a naturalistic Kantianism that takes the form of an empirical realism in roughly Kantâs sense, but one that is happily wed with Sellarsâ scientific realism, once the latter is disentangled from two implausible commitments that made such a reconciliation seem impossible to Sellars himself
The Web of Addiction An Exploration of the Complex Physiological, Psychological, Social and Political Forces Involved in the Development of Addictive Behaviours.
This study aimed to critically evaluate contemporary theory on the development of
addictive behaviours. It acknowledged the complex dynamic relationships between five
key variables including; individual, family, society, "stakeholders" and "addictive"
substances in developing an interactive model of addiction. The hypothesis suggested
that unitary definitions were inadequate, and that addiction was best understood as a
complex phenomenon intimately linked to the prevailing social and political climate.
The research employed three complimentary methods of inquiry including; a
comprehensive review of relevant literature, a questionnaire administered to a group of
adult students (to "reality check" theoretical frameworks) and a semi-structured
groupwork session.
The principle findings included; that there was a perceived preoccupation with
pathological models of addiction, that addictive behaviours may be seen as functional at
several levels of society and that drug and alcohol use were seen to be treated
dichotomously in Ireland. It was also suggested that the role of gender issues in
substance misuse were poorly understood, that the clear link between social disadvantage
and problem use was largely ignored by policy makers and that key stakeholders were
seen to create the reality of addiction by defining its parameters, diagnosing it and
determining appropriate responses
Inferentialism, Naturalism, and the Ought-To-Bes of Perceptual Cognition
Abstract: Any normative inferentialist view confronts a set of challenges in the form of how to account for the sort of ordinary empirical descriptive vocabulary that is involved, paradigmatically, in our noninferential perceptual responses and knowledge claims. This chapter lays out that challenge, and then argues that Sellarsâ original multilayered account of such noninferential responses in the context of his normative inferentialist semantics and epistemology shows how the inferentialist can plausibly handle those sorts of cases without stretching the notion of inference beyond its standard uses. Finally, it is suggested that for Sellars there were deeply naturalistic motivations for his own normative inferentialism, though the latter raises further questions as to whether this really represents, as Sellars thought, a genuinely scientific naturalist outlook on meaning and conceptual cognition
The Analytic Pragmatist Conception of the A Priori: C. I. Lewis and Wilfrid Sellars
ABSTRACT: It is a familiar story that Kantâs defence of our synthetic a priori cognition in the Critique of Pure Reason suffered sharp criticism throughout the extended philosophical revolutions that established analytic philosophy, the pragmatist tradition, and the phenomenological tradition as dominant philosophical movements in the first half of the twentieth century. One of the most important positive adaptations of Kantâs outlook, however, was the combined analytic and pragmatist conceptions of the a priori that were developed by the American philosophers C. I. Lewis (1883â1964) and Wilfrid Sellars (1912â1989), most notably in Lewisâs 1929 classic, Mind and the World Order, followed by Sellarsâ critical reworking of Lewisâs outlook in âIs There a Synthetic A Priori?â (1953) and other mid-century articles. Both Lewis and Sellars defended central aspects of Kantâs analysis of our a priori knowledge of mind-independent physical objects and necessary causal connections. But both also radically transformed Kantâs view by defending the idea that there are alternative a priori conceptual frameworks that are subject to an ongoing process of reassessment and replacement on overall pragmatic and explanatory grounds. Furthermore, while Sellarsâ answer to his question, âIs There a Synthetic A Priori?â thus represented a partial endorsement of Lewisâs pragmatic relativization of the a priori, I argue that Sellarsâ account of meaning diverged from Lewis in ways that constituted a significant improvement upon the previous âanalyticâ defenses of the a priori, not only in Lewis but in general. This arguably has implications for wider disputes concerning the nature and possibility of a priori knowledge in non-formal domains
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