Email from Campbell Cole Regarding Visitors List From The Morning

Email (9/15/2008)From: Campbell Cole To: James Narron, Michael Silva, Michael Held, Gregory Farmer, Lola Judge, Richard Prisco, cc: Rose Carofalo, Bettyann Griffith, Hortense Hope re: Visitors List from this morning Attaching FRBNY Visitors List from Sept. 15 - a

Email from Campbell Cole Regarding Visitors List for 9-16-08 6:30 am

Email (9/16/2008 6:50 am)From: Campbell Cole To: James Narron, Michael Silva, Michael Held, Gregory Farmer, Lola Judge, Richard Prisco, Charles Duffy, cc: Rose Carofalo, Bettyann Griffith, Hortense Hope re: Visitors List for 9-16-08 6:30 am Attaching Visitors Lis

United Kingdom: Bank of England Lending during the Panic of 1825

Although historians continue to debate what exactly sparked the Panic of 1825, it is clear that by December of that year, a widespread bank run had erupted, and bankers flocked to the discount window of the Bank of England. While not yet the central bank, the Bank had special legal authority over note issuance and banking, which led to its operation as a semipublic bank. The Bank refused to accept any explicit commitment to act as a lender of last resort, despite being perceived as such by the market. The Bank initially restricted lending to protect its reserves. This policy backfired, and the Bank swiftly switched to a more expansionary approach to lending. During the depths of the panic, the Bank purchased almost 9 million British pounds sterling (GBP) in bills of exchange (discounts) and made GBP 7 million in advances, which were loans secured against collateral with an agreement to repurchase at a later day (akin to modern day repurchase agreements). This assistance nearly made the Bank insolvent. The Bank also expanded the collateral that it was willing to lend against, including accepting longer maturities. These actions calmed the British money markets, with the activity at the Bank’s discount window subsiding largely by December 24, 1825. Despite this successful crisis intervention, banking sector fragility continued into 1826, when 10% of the banks in England and Wales failed

Joint Exhibit List - Starr International Company, Inc. v. The United States

Joint Exhibit List including all JX numbers, bates, document descriptions, dates, and time

United States: New York Clearing House Association, the Panic of 1873

In the absence of a central bank, the New York Clearing House Association (NYCH), a group of 60 New York City banks, stepped in as a private lender of last resort in response to banking runs during the Panic of 1873. The NYCH issued clearinghouse loan certificates (CLCs) to member banks that could use them as temporary payment substitutes to settle their clearing balances with other member banks. Borrowing banks paid a flat 7% interest rate. If a borrowing bank failed to repay its CLCs, the membership of the NYCH internally split the cost based on each member bank’s share of capital and surplus. The NYCH required borrowing banks to deposit collateral, typically commercial paper and commercial loans, with its Loan Committee. In total, the NYCH issued about $26.6 million in CLCs from September 22 to November 20. On September 20, the NYCH announced it was requiring its members to pool their cash reserves, a controversial measure that it had used in earlier crises but would not use again after 1873. The 1873 crisis was also the first time clearinghouses in cities outside New York issued CLCs. The NYCH’s final CLC was canceled on January 14, 1874, as stability had returned to the New York banking sector. However, the Long Depression would inflict damage on the real economy for an additional five years