Banking and payment system stability in an electronic money world

Electronic funds transfers ; Payment systems

Alternative arrangements for the distribution of intraday liquidity

In July 2006, the Federal Reserve will end its provision of free daylight credit to government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), financial services corporations created by Congress to establish a secondary market in mortgages and other consumer loans. To meet their payments to investors, the GSEs can use a wide variety of alternative funding arrangements. While such arrangements can in theory distribute liquidity efficiently, a decline in the intraday funds in circulation following the Fed's move may lead to some slowing in payments by both the GSEs and commercial banks.Bank liquidity ; Government-sponsored enterprises ; Credit ; Federal funds

ATM surcharges

The recent spread of ATM surcharges has sparked significant debate among consumers, policymakers, and ATM owners. Much of this debate has focused on the direct costs that surcharges impose on consumers. The use of ATM surcharges, however, also raises broader questions about ATM deployment, customer convenience, and the nature of banking competition.Automated tellers ; Banks and banking - Service charges

Network issues and payment systems

Highways, railroads, pipelines—we see or hear about these types of physical networks almost every day. But information systems, such as the Internet, and payment systems, such as ATMs and credit cards, also involve networks. Hence, understanding the economics of networks and the unique features of network-dependent industries is crucial to modern life. In this article, James McAndrews outlines some of the unique features of network-dependent industries. He also analyzes some related payment-system issues and demonstrates that determining appropriate public policy would be difficult without a knowledge of the economics of payment networks.Payment systems

Antitrust and payment technologies: commentary

Antitrust law ; Payment systems

A model of check exchange

The authors construct and simulate a model of check exchange to examine the incentives a bank (or a bank clearinghouse) has to engage in practices that limit access to its payment facilities, in particular delaying the availability of check payment. The potentially disadvantaged bank has the option of directly presenting checks to the first bank. The authors find that if the retail banking market is highly competitive, the first bank will not engage in such practices, but if the retail banking market is imperfectly competitive, it will find it advantageous to restrict access to its facilities. Lower costs of direct presentment can reduce (but not eliminate) the range over which these practices are employed. The practice of delayed presentment can either reduce or increase welfare, again depending on the degree of competition in the market. The model suggests that, were the Federal Reserve System to exit the business of check processing, practices such as delayed presentment would b e more prevalent.Check collection systems ; Clearinghouses (Banking)

Payment intermediation and the origins of banking

The medieval banks of continental Europe facilitated trade by serving as payment intermediaries. Depositors commonly would pay one another by transferring bank balances with the aid of overdraft credit. We model this process in an environment of intermediate good exchange with incomplete contract enforcement. Our model suggests that the early banks were capable of accessing the "netting credit" that exists by virtue of there being a high proportion of offsetting transactions in an economy. Individual traders are unable to net their individual positions because of difficulty in enforcing contracts for future performance with the other traders. Banks, by standing between buyer and seller on a centralized basis, can internalize the offsetting nature of the whole set of trades. This original role of banks is still a vital one.

The emergence of electronic communications networks in the U.S. equity markets

Recent regulatory and technological changes have spurred the development of automated trading systems known as ECNs, or electronic communications networks. Proponents of the networks contend that ECNs can cut transaction costs, accelerate trade execution, and expand the price information available to investors. While some critics have questioned the effects of the ECNs on market integration, it is clear that the networks are poised to play an increasingly important role in the new electronic environment.Electronic commerce ; Securities

An economic analysis of liquidity-saving mechanisms

A recent innovation in large-value payments systems has been the design and implementation of liquidity-saving mechanisms (LSMs), tools used in conjunction with real-time gross settlement (RTGS) systems. LSMs give system participants, such as banks, an option not offered by RTGS alone: they can queue their outgoing payments. Queued payments are released if some prespecified event occurs. LSMs can reduce the amount of central bank balances necessary to operate a payments system as well as quicken settlement. This article analyzes the performance of RTGS systems with and without the addition of an LSM. The authors find that, in terms of settling payments early, these mechanisms typically outperform pure RTGS systems. However, there are times when RTGS systems can be preferable to LSMs, such as when many banks that send payments early in RTGS choose to queue their payments when an LSM is available. The authors also show that the design of a liquidity-saving mechanism has important implications for the welfare of system participants, even in the absence of payment netting. In particular, the parameters specified determine whether the addition of an LSM increases or decreases welfare.Payment systems ; Banks and banking, Central ; Bank liquidity

The economics of two-sided payment card markets: pricing, adoption and usage

This paper provides a new theory for two-sided payment card markets by positing better microfoundations. Adopting payment cards by consumers and merchants requires a fixed cost, but yields lower marginal costs of making payments. Considering this together with the heterogeneity of consumer income and merchant size, our theory derives card adoption and usage pattern consistent with cross-section and time-series evidence. Our analyses also help explain the observed card pricing pattern, particularly the rising merchant (interchange) fees over time. This is because a private card network, besides internalizing the two-sided market externality, has the incentive to inflate the card transaction value. We show that privately determined card pricing, adoption and usage tend to deviate from the social optimum, and imposing a ceiling on interchange fees may improve consumer welfare. ; Also issued as a Payments System Research Working Paper.