Political Resource Curse under Authoritarianism: Evidence from China *

Abstract By analyzing a panel constructed on the political turnovers of 4,390 county leaders in China during 1999-2008, we find that the revenue windfalls accrued to these officials from land sales since 1998 have both undermined the effectiveness of the promotion system for government officials and fueled corruption. Instead of rewarding efforts made to boost GDP growth, promotion is now also positively correlated with signaling efforts or specifically increased spending on flamboyant (so-called "image") public projects, with those politically connected to their superiors and those who are beyond the prime age for promotion being the primary beneficiaries. Likewise, the same revenue windfalls have also led to corruption, as gauged from the increases in the government workforce and administrative expenditure but not social welfare spending. Our findings highlight how land revenue windfalls can lead to a political resource curse in a highly politically centralized authoritarian regime

Do Secure Land Use Rights Reduce Fertility? The Case of Meitan County in China

Based on the belief that collective landownership is pro-natalist, the Chinese government experimented in a remote southwestern county (Meitan) in 1987 with the practice of freezing land reallocations in response to demographic change for twenty years. Premising on the norm of a two-children family in rural China, evidence suggests that demand for the third child is attributable to strong son preference. Neither secured land rights nor family planning policy can curb such a proclivity. The experiment has, however, stimulated an active land rental market, which may have long-term profound implications for the development of private land rights and fertility behavior.

The Emperor Strikes Back: Political Status, Career Incentives, and Grain Procurement during China's Great Leap Forward

Using China's Great Leap Famine as example, this article shows how political career incentives can produce disastrous outcomes under the well-intended policies of a dictator. By exploiting a regression discontinuity design, the study identifies the causal effect of membership status in the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee—full (FM) Versus alternate members (AM)—on grain procurement. It finds that the difference in grain procurement between AMs and FMs who ranked near the discontinuity threshold is three times that between all AMs and all FMs on average. This may explain why Mao exceptionally promoted some lower-ranked but radical FMs shortly before the Leap: to create a demonstration effect in order to spur other weakly motivated FMs into action

The structure and evolution of property rights in China's village enterprises : the case of Wuxi County

Ownership of town and village enterprises (TVEs) can be studied to shed light on the relationship between property rights and economic development. The incentives that local government officials have to generate revenues from TVEs may similar to the incentive of exclusive property rights. Drawing on a sample of sixteen villages in Wuxi County, where most of the village enterprises are genuinely owned by the villagers, this study confirms, with survey data, earlier theories about the active role of village officials in enterprise development. The study also sheds light on how property rights, in particular, control rights, are partitioned between the main actors involved in the enterprise relationship