Adaptationism and Trait Individuation

Adaptationism is often taken to be the thesis that most traits are adaptations. In order to assess this thesis, it seems we must be able to establish either an exhaustive set of all traits or a representative sample of this set. Either task requires a more systematic and principled way of individuating traits than is currently available. Moreover, different trait individuation criteria can make adaptationism turn out true or false. For instance, individuation based on natural selection may render adaptationism true, but may do so by presupposing adaptationism. In this paper, we show how adaptationism depends on trait individuation and that the latter is an open and unsolved problem

Adaptationism and Trait Individuation

Adaptationism is often taken to be the thesis that most traits are adaptations. In order to assess this thesis, it seems we must be able to establish either an exhaustive set of all traits or a representative sample of this set. Either task requires a more systematic and principled way of individuating traits than is currently available. Moreover, different trait individuation criteria can make adaptationism turn out true or false. For instance, individuation based on natural selection may render adaptationism true, but may do so by presupposing adaptationism. In this paper, we show how adaptationism depends on trait individuation and that the latter is an open and unsolved problem

Homology of process: developmental dynamics in comparative biology

Comparative biology builds up systematic knowledge of the diversity of life, across evolutionary lineages and levels of organization, starting with evidence from a sparse sample of model organisms. In developmental biology, a key obstacle to the growth of comparative approaches is that the concept of homology is not very well defined for levels of organization that are intermediate between individual genes and morphological characters. In this paper, we investigate what it means for ontogenetic processes to be homologous, focusing specifically on the examples of insect segmentation and vertebrate somitogenesis. These processes can be homologous without homology of the underlying genes or gene networks, since the latter can diverge over evolutionary time, while the dynamics of the process remain the same. Ontogenetic processes like these therefore constitute a dissociable level and distinctive unit of comparison requiring their own specific criteria of homology. In addition, such processes are typically complex and nonlinear, such that their rigorous description and comparison not only requires observation and experimentation, but also dynamical modeling. We propose six criteria of process homology, combining recognized indicators (sameness of parts, morphological outcome, and topological position) with novel ones derived from dynamical systems modeling (sameness of dynamical properties, dynamical complexity, and evidence for transitional forms). We show how these criteria apply to animal segmentation and other ontogenetic processes. We conclude by situating our proposed dynamical framework for homology of process in relation to similar research programs, such as process structuralism and developmental approaches to morphological homology

Оптимизация преподавания нормальной физиологии студентам-стоматологам

ВУЗЫВЫСШИЕ УЧЕБНЫЕ ЗАВЕДЕНИЯОБРАЗОВАНИЕ МЕДИЦИНСКОЕОБРАЗОВАНИЕ СТОМАТОЛОГИЧЕСКОЕСТУДЕНТЫ МЕДИЦИНСКИХ УЧЕБНЫХ ЗАВЕДЕНИЙФИЗИОЛОГИЯ /ОБУЧНОРМАЛЬНАЯ ФИЗИОЛОГИЯ (ДИСЦИПЛИНА)МЕТОДИКА ПРЕПОДАВАНИ

Developmental Homology

status: Published onlin

Kinds of Biological Individuals: Sortals, Projectibility, and Selection

Individuality is an important concept in biology, yet there are many non-equivalent criteria of individuality expressed in different kinds of biological individuals. This paper evaluates these different kinds in terms of their capacity to support explanatory generalizations over the systems they individuate. Viewing the problem of individuality from this perspective promotes a splitting strategy in which different kinds make different epistemic trade-offs which suit them for different explanatory roles. I argue that evolutionary individuals, interpreted as forming a functional kind, face difficulties of individuation and explanatory power that are mitigated by relying on more structurally based properties and non-evolutionary kinds

Merleau-Ponty's Ontology of Life

status: publishe

Token Physicalism and Functional Individuation

Token physicalism is often viewed as a modest and unproblematic physicalist commitment, as contrasted with type physicalism. This paper argues that the prevalence of functional individuation in biology creates serious problems for token physicalism, because the latter requires that biological entities can be individuated physically and without reference to biological functioning. After characterizing the main philosophical roles for token physicalism, I describe the distinctive uses of functional individuation in models of biological processes. I then introduce some requirements on token identity claims that arise from a position on individuation and identity known as sortalism. An examination of biological examples shows that these sortalist requirements cannot be plausibly met due to differences between individuation by functional biological criteria and by physical criteria. Even without assuming sortalism, token physicalism faces the more basic problem of excluding functionally irrelevant detail from the individuation of biological tokens. I close by suggesting that the philosophical roles for token identity are better fulfilled by a notion of token composition, which promotes a hierarchical picture of individualitystatus: publishe

Élan Vital Revisited: Bergson and the Thermodynamic Paradigm

The received view of Bergson’s philosophy of life is that it advances some form of vitalism under the heading of an “élan vital.” This paper argues against the vitalistic interpretation of Bergson’s élan vital as it appears in Creative Evolution in favor of an interpretation based on his overlooked ideas on entropy and energetics. Within the interpretation developed here, the élan vital is characterized not as a spiritualistic “vital force” but as a tendency of organization opposed to the tendency of entropic degradation. It is then shown how Bergson’s view of evolution and living organization resonates with more contemporary scientific approaches belonging to a “thermodynamic paradigm” in theoretical biology in different respects, including the critique of neo-Darwinism and the positing of a driving force behind evolution. Finally, the special interest that Bergson’s philosophical biology bears today is considered in terms of the connection between the concepts of élan vital and duration.status: publishe

Kinds of Biological Individuals: Sortals, Projectibility, and Selection

Individuality is an important concept in biology, yet there are many non-equivalent criteria of individuality expressed in different kinds of biological individuals. This paper evaluates these different kinds in terms of their capacity to support explanatory generalizations over the systems they individuate. Viewing the problem of individuality from this perspective promotes a splitting strategy in which different kinds make different epistemic trade-offs which suit them for different explanatory roles. I argue that evolutionary individuals, interpreted as forming a functional kind, face difficulties of individuation and explanatory power that are mitigated by relying on more structurally based properties and non-evolutionary kinds