Revenue Sharing, Demand Uncertainty, and Vertical Control of Competing Firms

This paper argues that revenue sharing is a valuable instrument in vertically separated industries when there is intrabrand competition among the downstream firms, demand is stochastic or variable, and downstream inventory is chosen before demand is realized. In these environments, the upstream firm would like to simultaneously soften downstream competition and encourage efficient inventory holding. Traditional two-part tariffs cannot achieve both objectives in the presence of downstream competition. Raising the price of the inputs softens price competition but distorts the downstream firms' inventory decisions. We argue that revenue sharing, combined with a low input price, aligns the incentives in the vertical chain. The use of revenue sharing in video rental retailing is discussed. Blockbuster in particular has used revenue sharing in conjunction with heavy marketing of availability to grow significantly in the video rental retail industry. Many other outlets use revenue sharing as well. Some antitrust concerns have been raised by smaller firms suggesting that revenue sharing might be an anticompetitive vertical restraint. Although our model does not address retailer market power, we show that revenue sharing contracts can be used by upstream firms increase inventory holding and consumer welfare.

Product Variety and Demand Uncertainty

We show that demand uncertainty leads to vertical product differentiation even when consumers are homogeneous. When a firm anticipates that its inventory or capacity may not be fully utilized, product variety can reduce its expected costs of excess capacity. When the firm offers a continuum of product varieties, the highest quality product has the highest profit margins but the lowest percentage margin, while the lowest quality product has the highest percentage margin but the lowest absolute margin. We derive these results in both a monopoly model and a variety of different competitive models. We conclude with a discussion of empirical predictions together with a brief discussion of supporting evidence available from marketing studies.

Does the Plaintiff Matter?: An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions

With the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLR) the U.S. Congress introduced sweeping substantive and procedural reforms for securities class actions. A central provision of the Act is the lead plaintiff provision, which creates a rebuttable presumption that the investor with the largest financial interest in a securities fraud class action should be appointed the lead plaintiff for the suit. The lead plaintiff provision was adopted to encourage a class member with a large financial stake to become the class representative. Congress expected that such a plaintiff would actively monitor the conduct of a securities fraud class action so as to reduce the litigation agency costs that may arise when class counsel\u27s interests diverge from those of the shareholder class. Now, more than ten years after the enactment of the lead plaintiff provision, the claim that the lead plaintiff, and particularly the lead plaintiff that is an institutional investor, is a more effective monitor of class counsel in securities fraud class actions continues to be intuitively appealing, but remains unproven. In this study, Professors Cox and Thomas inquire anecdotally and empirically whether the lead plaintiff provision has performed as projected. The anecdotal evidence they uncover is mixed: in some instances demonstrating the virtues of the lead plaintiff provision, while in others showing that the provision has encountered difficulties, including hesitance among institutional lead plaintiffs to take on the burden of serving as lead plaintiff (though recently more institutional investors are taking on the role of lead plaintiff) and allegations of pay-to-play schemes between plaintiffs\u27 law firms and potential lead plaintiffs. Professors Cox and Thomas then conduct a series of statistical analyses of the lead plaintiff provision\u27s costs and benefits. Surprisingly, their results indicate that the ratio of settlement amounts to estimated provable losses in securities class actions---the most important indicator of whether investors have been compensated for their damages---has been lower since the passage of the PSLRA and that settlement size has not increased since the passage of PSLRA. However, they also find that the presence of an institutional investor increases the dollar amount of settlements in those cases in which they appear, suggesting that the current trend for institutional investors to be lead plaintiffs in securities class actions will positively affect average settlement size in such actions in the future. Their analysis also sheds new light on the relative impacts other types of lead plaintiffs, such as individuals versus an aggregation of individuals, have on the outcome of settlements. They conclude with a discussion of the policy implications of their findings

SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry

This Article examines the overlap between SEC securities enforcement actions and private securities fraud class actions. We begin with an overview of data concerning all SEC enforcement actions from 1997 to 2002. We find that the volume of SEC enforcement proceedings is relatively modest. We next examine the scope of the recently enacted Fair Fund provision that authorizes the SEC to designate civil penalties it recovers from defendants to benefit defrauded private investors. We conclude that this provision offers only limited potential relief for private investors. We complete this Part of the Article with an analysis of the serious resource limitations faced by the SEC. The second portion of the Article contains an empirical analysis of the determinants of SEC enforcement actions and the overlap of private fraud suits and SEC enforcement proceedings. Using bivariate analysis, we find that (1) private suits with parallel SEC actions settle for significantly more than private suits without such proceedings; (2) SEC enforcement actions target significantly smaller companies than private actions alone; (3) private cases with parallel SEC actions take substantially less time to settle than other private cases; and (4) private cases with parallel SEC actions have significantly longer class periods than other private actions. Finally, we create a model for estimating damages to compare settlement ratios in cases with parallel SEC actions to those in private actions. We find that one-fourth of all the private class action settlements occurring in suits that yield less than 10 percent of provable losses are settled for less than 2 percent of provable losses, but that there are no private actions with parallel SEC suits with such small settlements. In the final Part of the Article, we conduct a multivariate regression analysis of the determinants of when SEC enforcement actions are filed. We find that the most highly significant determinant of SEC actions is financial distress. Estimated losses do not appear to be a statistically significant factor in the SEC\u27s decision to file these suits

Competition in Price and Availability when Availability is Unobservable

This paper presents a strategic model of competition in both price and availability when firms can publicly commit to prices but not inventories (or capacities). Demand is uncertain and firms stock out in equilibrium. Consumers choose where to shop on the basis of price and expected service rate (the probability of being served). In a one period model, I show that although firms cannot affect consumers' expectations of their service rates by increasing inventory, they can signal higher service rates with higher prices (regardless of whether price or inventory is chosen first). This extra incentive to raise price generates a floor on equilibrium prices and industry profits that exists regardless of the number of firms. When price is set before output, high prices create incentives for firm to hold more inventory. So rational consumers anticipate high priced firms will have higher service rates. Applications of this model to video rental competition and other retail competition are discussed. When output is set before price, high prices act as a signal of high availability. This equilibrium is the unique equilibrium satisfying the never-a-weak-best-response property. Rational consumers anticipate high priced firms will have higher service rates and that firms that deviate to low prices must have changed their availability as well. In a repeated game firms that maintain reputations for higher service rates may earn even higher profits.

Dynamic Oligopoly Pricing: Evidence from the Airline Industry

We explore how pricing dynamics in the European airline industry vary with the competitive environment. Our results highlight substantial variations in pricing dynamics that are consistent with a theory of intertemporal price discrimination. First, the rate at which prices increase towards the scheduled travel date is decreasing in competition, supporting the idea that competition restrains the ability of airlines to price-discriminate. Second, the sensitivity to competition is substantially increasing in the heterogeneity of the customer base, reflecting further that restraints on price discrimination are only relevant if there is initial scope for price discrimination. These patterns are quantitatively important, explaining about 83 percent of the total within-flight price dispersion, and explaining 17 percent of the observed cross-market variation of pricing dynamics

Oligopoly Price Discrimination: The Role of Inventory Controls

Inventory controls, used most notably by airlines, are sales limits assigned to individual prices. While typically viewed as a tool to manage demand uncertainty, we argue that inventory controls can also facilitate intertemporal price discrimination in oligopoly. In our model, competing firms first choose quantity and then choose prices in a series of advance-purchase markets. When demand becomes less elastic over time, as is the case in airline markets, a monopolist can easily price discriminate; however, we show that oligopoly firms generally cannot. We also show that using inventory controls allows oligopoly firms to set increasing prices, regardless of whether or not demand is uncertain

Intertemporal Price Discrimination in Sequential Quantity-Price Games

This paper develops an oligopoly model in which firms first choose capacity and then compete in prices in a series of advance-purchase markets. We show the existence of multiple sales opportunities creates strong competitive forces that prevent firms from utilizing intertemporal price discrimination. We then show that intertemporal price discrimination is possible, but only when firms adopt inventory controls (sales limit restrictions) and demand becomes more inelastic over time. Therefore, in addition to being useful to manage demand uncertainty, inventory controls are also a tool to soften price competition. We also discuss model extensions, including product differentiation, aggregate demand uncertainty, and longer sales horizons

Metallurgical and Corrosion Assessment of Submerged Tanker S.S. \u3ci\u3eMontebello\u3c/i\u3e

The Union Oil Tanker S.S. Montebello was torpedoed and sunk six miles (9.7 km) off the coast of Cambria, California by a Japanese submarine on December 23, 1941, two weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor. With close proximity to the National Monterey Bay Marine Sanctuary, concern about possible crude oil contamination led to the most recent expedition to the site in October 2011. Assessment of the shell plate found that the average corrosion rate was very low and the structure will remain stable for many decades