A 'Reciprocal Dumping' Model of International Trade

This paper develops a model in which the rivalry of oligopolistic firms serves as an independent cause of international trade. The model shows how such rivalry naturally gives rise to "dumping" of output in foreign markets, and shows that such dumping can be "reciprocal" -- that is, there may be two-way trade in the same product. Reciprocal dumpingis shown to be possible for fairly general specification of firm behaviour.The welfare effects of this seemingly pointless trade are ambiguous. On one hand, resources are wasted in the cross-handling of goods; on the other hand, increased competition reduces monopoly distortions. Surprisingly,in the case of free entry and Cournot behaviour reciprocal dumping is unanibiuously beneficial.

International Trade Between Consumer and Conservationist Countries

We consider trade between a consumer' country with an open access renewable resource and a conservationist' country that regulates resource harvesting to maximize domestic steady-state utility. In what we call the mild overuse' case, the consumer country exports the resource good and suffers steady-state losses from trade, as suggested by the conventional wisdom' that weak resource management standards confer a competitive advantage on domestic firms in the resource sector but cause welfare losses. Strikingly, however, when the resource stock is most in jeopardy, the conservationist country exports the resource good in steady state and both countries experience gains from trade.

International Oligopoly and Asymmetric Labour Market Institutions

Asymmetries in labour relations can have important effects on imperfectively competitive rivalries between firms. Such asymmetries are particularly striking in cross-country comparisons and are therefore of greatest interest in international markets. Using a simple duopoly model, we focus on two asymmetries. First, one firm may face a noncooperative union and second, institutional factors may allow one firm to commit itself to particular labour input before its rival sets output, giving it a natural Stackelberg leadership role. We examine the trade policy incentives resulting from these labour asymmetries, focusing on profit shifting tariffs, quotas and subsidies.

Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry

Countries often perceive themselves as being in competition with each other for profitable international markets. In such a world export subsidies can appear as attractive policy tools, from a national point of view, because they improve the relative position of a domestic firm in noncooperative rivalries with foreign firms, enabling it to expand its market share and earn greater profits. In effect, subsidies change the initial conditions of the game that firms play. The terms of trade move against the subsidizing country, but its welfare can increase because, under imperfect competition, price exceeds the marginal cost of exports. International noncooperative equilibriumis characterized by such subsidies on the part of exporting nations, even though they are jointly suboptimal.

Trade Warfare: Tariffs and Cartels

National governments have incentives to intervene in international markets, particularly in encouraging export cartels and in imposing tariffs on imports from imperfectly competitive foreign firms. Although the optimal response to foreign monopoly is usually a tariff, a specific subsidy will be optimal if demand is very convex, as with constant elasticity demand. If ad valorem tariffs or subsidies are considered, a subsidy is optimal if the elasticity of demand increases as consumption increases.The critical conditions in both ad valorern and specific cases hold generally for Cournot ologopoly. Noncooperative international policy equilibrium will be characterized by export cartels and rent-extracting tariffs.

International Trade and Open Access Renewable Resources: The Small Open Economy Case

This paper develops a two-sector general equilibrium model of an economy with an open access renewable resource. We characterize the autarkic steady state, showing that autarky prices (and 'comparative advantage') are determined by the ratio of intrinsic resource growth to labor. Under free trade, steady state trade and production patterns for a small open economy are determined by whether the resource good's world price exceeds its autarky price. Strikingly, if the small country exports the resource good while remaining diversified, then steady-state utility is lower than in autarky, and increases in the world price of exports are welfare-reducing.

Taxation of Foreign-Owned Land

This paper examines the welfare effects of a tax on foreign purchases of domestic land. Using a simple static framework the paper shows that an appropriately chosen tax will generally be welfare-improving for the domestic country.

Election Polls, Free Trade, and the Stock Market: Evidence from the Canadian General Election

This paper examines the relationship between the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) and election polls during the 1988 Canadian General Election campaign. Two hypotheses are investigated: first, did polls influence the TSE, and secondly, if so, did the nature of the influence suggest that investors were reacting to expectations concerning the effect of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA)? I find that the TSE was positively related to Conservative popularity as measured by polls, but that the differential movement of TSE subindices does not offer additional support to an FTA based interpretation of events.