An Evaluation of the Federal Legal Services Program: Evidence from Crime Rates and Property Values

This paper uses the city level roll-out of legal service grants to evaluate their effects on crime. Using Uniform Crime Reports from 1960 to 1985, the results show that there is a short run increase of 7 percent in crimes reported and also a 13 percent increase in crimes cleared by arrest. Results show an increase in the staffing of police officers in cities that received legal services. These cities are also associated with having higher median property values 10 years later. This supports the narrative that legal services changed police behavior through litigation or threats of litigation

Essays on Economics of Law, Crime, and Social Capital.

Chapter 1 and 2 examines the impact of the Legal Service Program on crime and divorce by using the roll-out of legal service grants to evaluate empirically the effects of the legal services program on reported crime as well as other economic outcomes. Chapter 1 shows that there is a short run increase of 7 percent in crimes reported and 13 percent in crimes cleared by arrest. Further analysis provides evidence that the increase in reported crime is mostly driven by changes in reporting after subsidized legal service become available as opposed to an increase in actual crime. These cities are also associated with having better police relationships with the poor as well as higher median property values by 1980. Using the Vital Statistics from 1960 to 1988, chapter 2 shows that there is a short run increase of 6 percent in the divorce rates in counties that receive legal service grants. The increase in divorce translate to an average treatment effect on the treated of 124 divorces per 100,000 poor residents. Also results show a convergence of divorce rates in long run that reflect changes in social norms about divorce. The large treatment effect is consistent with the political debate surrounding the program as well as legal services lawyers’ reflection on the volume of caseloads devoted towards family matters. Chapter 3 uses new mayoral election data to analyze implications of election cycles on changes in the size of the police force. According to estimates, election years are associated with a 2 percent increase in the number police officers available. Cities with the population larger than 250,000 residents have an average increase in the size of the police force of 2.3 percent during election years. Two-stage least squares estimates produce an elasticity of police on violent crime between -0.74 and -1.88.PhDEconomicsUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/110394/1/jamein_1.pd