Why we still don't need/want variables: Two SALTy case studies

This paper defends the claim that variables and assignment functions are not needed as part of the semantic machinery against two apparent challenges.  The relevant domains at first glance appear to show the need for variable names - but only if the variable-ful theory is supplemented with a stipulation preventing 'meaningless coindexation'.  I argue that not only are both domains amenable to variable free analyses, but that indeed the variable free analyses have advnatages over the analyses using variables

Kennedy's Puzzle: What I'm Named or Who I Am?

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Binding Connectivity in Copular Sentences

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Antecedent Contained Deletion and Pied-Piping: Evidence for a Variable-Free Semantics

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Answering implicit questions: the case of namely

Though several prior works use English namely as evidence for the semantics of other elements, its own syntax and semantics have been mostly unexamined. In this paper, we focus on two central questions which we claim to be interrelated. First, what is the semantic contribution of namely? Second, how does namely combine with the surrounding material compositionally to produce appropriate overall sentence meanings? Given the apparent similarity of namely to fragments and Sluicing, one answer suggested in previous literature (e.g. Onea & Volodina (2011), Weir (2014), Ott (2016)) is that an example like Someone coughed, namely Bill. involves deletion of silent linguistic material . . . Bill coughed. Here, we argue against this idea, arguing that namely introduces an answer to an implicit specificational question combining with its complement (i.e. Bill in the above example) directly, similar to Qu-Ans analysis of fragments (Groenendijk & Stokhof (1984), Jacobson (2016))

The Iowa Homemaker vol.4, no.2

Table of Contents To the High School Girls of Iowa by Anna E. Richardson, page 3 For the College Room by Barbara Mills Dewell, page 4 The Junior-Senior Banquet by Viola Jammer and Pauline Peacock, page 4 Picnic Preparations by Louise Evans Doole, page 5 Finding Yourself by H. M. Hamlin, page 6 Stories of the Sand by Katherine Holden, page 7 Appropriate Pictures for the Home by Amanda Jacobson, page 8 The Individual Scarf by Rhea Fern Schultz, page 9 Using Your Kodak by H. P. Doole, page 10 Something Plus by Laura E. Bublitz, page 11 The Ideal Homemaker by Rosalie Larson, page 12 University Life in France by Mercie Carley, page 12 Homemaker as Citizen by Jeanette Beyer, page 13 Who’s There and Where by Dryden Quist, page 14 Editorial, page 15 The Eternal Question, page 1

'Tough'-constructions and their derivation

This article addresses the syntax of the notorious 'tough' (-movement) construction (TC) in English. TCs exhibit a range of apparently contradictory empirical properties suggesting that their derivation involves the application of both A-movement and A'-movement operations. Given that within previous Principles and Parameters models TCs have remained “unexplained and in principle unexplainable” (Holmberg 2000: 839) due to incompatibility with constraints on theta-assignment, locality, and Case, this article argues that the phase-based implementation of the Minimalist program (Chomsky 2000, 2001, 2004) permits a reanalysis of null wh-operators capable of circumventing the previous theoretical difficulties. Essentially, 'tough'-movement consists of A-moving a constituent out of a “complex” null operator which has already undergone A'-movement, a “smuggling” construction in the terms of Collins (2005a,b

Should UI Eligibility Be Expanded to Low-Earning Workers? Evidence on Employment, Transfer Receipt, and Income from Administrative Data

Recent efforts to expand unemployment insurance (UI) eligibility are expected to increase low-earning workers’ access to UI. Although the expansion’s aim is to smooth the income and consumption of previously ineligible workers, it is possible that UI benefits simply displace other sources of income. Standard economic models predict that UI delays reemployment, thereby reducing wage income. Additionally, low-earning workers are often eligible for benefits from means-tested programs, which may decrease with UI benefits. In this paper, we estimate the impact of UI eligibility on employment, means-tested program participation, and income after job loss using a unique individual-level administrative data set from the state of Michigan. To identify a causal effect, we implement a fuzzy regression discontinuity design around the minimum earnings threshold for UI eligibility. Our main finding is that while UI eligibility increases jobless durations by up to 25 percent and temporarily lowers receipt of cash assistance (TANF) by 63 percent, the net impact on total income is still positive and large. In the quarter immediately following job loss, UI-eligible workers have 46-61 percent higher incomes than ineligibles

The History and Prehistory of Natural-Language Semantics

Contemporary natural-language semantics began with the assumption that the meaning of a sentence could be modeled by a single truth condition, or by an entity with a truth-condition. But with the recent explosion of dynamic semantics and pragmatics and of work on non- truth-conditional dimensions of linguistic meaning, we are now in the midst of a shift away from a truth-condition-centric view and toward the idea that a sentence’s meaning must be spelled out in terms of its various roles in conversation. This communicative turn in semantics raises historical questions: Why was truth-conditional semantics dominant in the first place, and why were the phenomena now driving the communicative turn initially ignored or misunderstood by truth-conditional semanticists? I offer a historical answer to both questions. The history of natural-language semantics—springing from the work of Donald Davidson and Richard Montague—began with a methodological toolkit that Frege, Tarski, Carnap, and others had created to better understand artificial languages. For them, the study of linguistic meaning was subservient to other explanatory goals in logic, philosophy, and the foundations of mathematics, and this subservience was reflected in the fact that they idealized away from all aspects of meaning that get in the way of a one-to-one correspondence between sentences and truth-conditions. The truth-conditional beginnings of natural- language semantics are best explained by the fact that, upon turning their attention to the empirical study of natural language, Davidson and Montague adopted the methodological toolkit assembled by Frege, Tarski, and Carnap and, along with it, their idealization away from non-truth-conditional semantic phenomena. But this pivot in explana- tory priorities toward natural language itself rendered the adoption of the truth-conditional idealization inappropriate. Lifting the truth-conditional idealization has forced semanticists to upend the conception of linguistic meaning that was originally embodied in their methodology