THE USE OF CARBON FIBER REINFORCED ALUMINUM TO STIFFEN A PORTALEDGE STRUCTURE

Increased stiffness will be achieved through a unidirectional carbon fiber tube that will encase the aluminum tubing. This will give the structure the stiffness it needs to resist bending enabling the elimination of the spreader bar, while still maintaining the ductile material properties of the 6061 T-6 aluminum

Fifty Years of College Choice: Social, Political and Institutional Influences on the Decision-Making Process

Explores how the process of choosing colleges has evolved for high school students during the second half of the twentieth century, the factors behind the changes, and the implications of recent developments for postsecondary equity, access, and success

An Experimental Study of Auctions Versus Grandfathering to Assign Pollution Permits

We experimentally study auctions versus grandfathering in the initial assignment of pollution permits that can be traded in a secondary spot market. Low and high emitters compete for permits in the auction, while permits are assigned for free under grandfathering. In theory, trading in the spot market should erase inefficiencies due to initial mis-allocations. In the experiment, high emitters exercise market power in the spot market and permit holdings under grandfathering remain skewed towards high emitters. Furthermore, the opportunity costs of “free” permits are fully “passed through.” In the auction, the majority of permits are won by low emitters, reducing the need for spot-market trading. Auctions generate higher consumer surplus and slightly lower product prices in the laboratory arkets. Moreover, auctions eliminate the large “windfall profits” that are observed in the treatment with free, grandfathered permit allocations.market-based regulation, emissions trading, allocation, auctions, grandfathering, climate policy, windfall profits

An Experimental Analysis of Auctioning Emissions Allowances under a Loose Cap

The direct sale of emissions allowances by auction is an emerging characteristic of cap-and-trade programs. This study is motivated by the observation that all of the major implementations of cap-and-trade regulations for the control of air pollution have started with a generous allocation of allowances relative to recent emissions history, a situation we refer to as a “loose cap.” Typically more stringent reductions are achieved in subsequent years of a program. We use an experimental setting to investigate the effects of a loose cap environment on a variety of auction types. We find all auction formats studied are efficient in allocating emissions allowances, but auction revenues tend to be lower relative to competitive benchmarks when the cap is loose. Regardless of whether the cap is tight or loose, the different auction formats tend to yield comparable revenues toward the end of a series of auctions. However, aggressive bidding behavior in initial discriminatory auctions yields higher revenues than in other auction formats, a difference that disappears as bidders learn to adjust their bids closer to the cutoff that separates winning and losing bids.auction, carbon dioxide, greenhouse gases, allowance trading, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, RGGI, cap and trade

Biomass burning emisison inventory with daily resolution: Application to aircraft observations of Asian outflow

We develop a daily-resolved global emission inventory for biomass burning using AVHRR satellite observations of fire activity corrected for data gaps and scan angle biases. We implemented this inventory in a global three-dimensional model (GEOSCHEM) to simulate aircraft CO observations during the TRACE-P mission over the NW Pacific in February-April 2001. Seasonal biomass burning in SE Asia was a major contributor to the outflow of Asian pollution observed in TRACE-P and shows large day-to-day fluctuations that vary depending on location. Three simulations were conducted with the same 3-month total (February-April) emissions but different temporal distributions: 2001 daily resolved, 2001 monthly resolved, and climatological monthly resolved. The effect of daily resolved versus monthly resolved 2001 emissions in the simulation of CO is less than 8 ppbv in Asian outflow over the NW Pacific but can exceed 100 ppbv over source regions. The relatively small effect in Asian outflow reflects spatial and temporal averaging of emissions during ageing in the continental boundary layer. Significant improvement in the simulation of TRACE-P observations (as diagnosed by the resolved variance) is found when using 2001 monthly versus climatological monthly emissions, but using 2001 daily emissions does not offer further improvement. Copyright 2003 by the American Geophysical Union

Collusion in Auctions for Emission Permits: An Experimental Analysis

Environmental markets have several institutional features that provide a new context for the use of auctions and which have not been studied previously. This paper reports on laboratory experiments testing three auction forms -– uniform and discriminatory price sealed bid auctions and an ascending clock auction. We test the ability of subjects to tacitly or explicitly collude in order to maximize profits. Our main result is that the discriminatory and uniform price auctions produce greater revenues than the clock auction, both without and with explicit communication. The clock appears to be more subject to successful collusion because of its sequential structure and because it allows bidders to focus on one dimension of cooperation (quantity) rather than two (price and quantity).auctions, collusion, experiments, carbon dioxide, greenhouse gases

Price Discovery in Emissions Permit Auctions

Auctions are increasingly being used to allocate emissions allowances (“permitsâ€) for cap and trade and common-pool resource management programs. These auctions create thick markets that can provide important information about changes in current market conditions. This paper reports a laboratory experiment in which half of the bidders experienced unannounced increases in their willingness to pay for permits. The focus is on the extent to which the predicted price increase due to the demand shift is reflected in sales prices under alternative auction formats. Price tracking is comparably good for uniform-price sealed-bid auctions and for multi-round clock auctions, with or without end-of-round information about excess demand. More price inertia is observed for “pay as bid†(discriminatory) auctions, especially for a continuous discriminatory format in which bids could be changed at will during a pre-specified time window, in part because “sniping†in the final moments blocked the full effect of the demand shock.auction, greenhouse gases, price discovery, cap and trade, emission allowances, laboratory experiment

Temporary institutional breakdowns:the work of university traditions in the consumption of innovative textbooks

Although university traditions can be fun, they are ‘not just for fun’. Moving beyond the visual quaint imagery of university traditions, this study explores the workings of institutional traditions during the everyday consumption of pedagogic innovation. The study employs a Reader-Response Theory, a prominent school of literary criticism, of two textbook innovations within a university establishment which had a distinct tradition to research beginning in the early 1960s. The findings suggest that the temporary institutional breakdown provides a powerful medium to understand the work of university traditions in the consumption of innovative textbooks. We show that in the consumption of pedagogic innovation, the recipients are not passive but are co-constructors of university tradition defence, via the articulation of values, boundary containment and identity work. We identify, moreover, four types of readings of the pedagogic innovation – interpretative, instrumental, inversive and reflexive. The findings also reveal three distinct forms of tradition vocabularies employed in the university administration of pedagogic innovation – breach concerns, redress articulation and reintegration epistemology. Overall, the findings contribute to a more sophisticated understanding of the ‘past in the present’ in the workings of university traditions in the everyday consumption of pedagogic innovation

Mapping isoprene emissions over North America using formaldehyde column observations from space

We present a methodology for deriving emissions of volatile organic compounds (VOC) using space-based column observations of formaldehyde (HCHO) and apply it to data from the Global Ozone Monitoring Experiment (GOME) satellite instrument over North America during July 1996. The HCHO column is related to local VOC emissions, with a spatial smearing that increases with the VOC lifetime. Isoprene is the dominant HCHO precursor over North America in summer, and its lifetime (≃1 hour) is sufficiently short that the smearing can be neglected. We use the Goddard Earth Observing System global 3-D model of tropospheric chemistry (GEOS-CHEM) to derive the relationship between isoprene emissions and HCHO columns over North America and use these relationships to convert the GOME HCHO columns to isoprene emissions. We also use the GEOS-CHEM model as an intermediary to validate the GOME HCHO column measurements by comparison with in situ observations. The GEOS-CHEM model including the Global Emissions Inventory Activity (GEIA) isoprene emission inventory provides a good simulation of both the GOME data (r2 = 0.69, n = 756, bias = +11%) and the in situ summertime HCHO measurements over North America (r2 = 0.47, n = 10, bias = −3%). The GOME observations show high values over regions of known high isoprene emissions and a day-to-day variability that is consistent with the temperature dependence of isoprene emission. Isoprene emissions inferred from the GOME data are 20% less than GEIA on average over North America and twice those from the U.S. EPA Biogenic Emissions Inventory System (BEIS2) inventory. The GOME isoprene inventory when implemented in the GEOS-CHEM model provides a better simulation of the HCHO in situ measurements than either GEIA or BEIS2 (r2 = 0.71, n = 10, bias = −10%)

An Experimental Analysis of Auctioning Emission Allowances Under a Loose Cap

The direct sale of emission allowances by auction is an emerging characteristic of cap-and-trade programs. This study is motivated by the observation that all of the major implementations of cap-and-trade regulations for the control of air pollution have started with a generous allocation of allowances relative to recent emissions history, a situation we refer to as a “loose cap.†Typically more stringent reductions are achieved in subsequent years of a program. We use an experimental setting to investigate the effects of a loose cap environment on a variety of auction types. We find that all auction formats studied are efficient in allocating emission allowances, but auction revenues tend to be lower relative to competitive benchmarks when the cap is loose. Regardless of whether the cap is tight or loose, the different auction formats tend to yield comparable revenues toward the end of a series of auctions. However, aggressive bidding behavior in initial discriminatory auctions yields higher revenues than in the other auction formats, a difference that disappears as bidders learn to adjust their bids closer to the cut-off that separates winning and losing bids.auction, carbon dioxide, greenhouse gases, allowance trading, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, RGGI, cap and trade, Environmental Economics and Policy, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,