5,961 research outputs found
GLOBALIZATION, TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES, AND OTHER THREATS TO AMERICAN AGRICULTURE: DISCUSSION
International Relations/Trade,
Stable, inflatable life raft for high seas rescue operations
Raft is easily deployed and highly maneuverable in water. It has false bottom of water ballast containers attached to underside, making it exceptionally stable platform from which swimmers can operate. Raft is attachable to external moorings
Revocation and Revival of Wills in Virginia
Kate Miller Levring executed two wills, the first in 1954, the second in 1955. The latter contained an express revocation clause. Following her death the second will which was last traced to her possession could not be found, thus giving rise to a strong presumption that she had destroyed it with intent to revoke. In an inter-partes proceeding, the executor named in the first will, offered that will for probate. Probate was contested by certain next of kin of the deceased. The only evidence introduced was a statement by the decedent that she planned to make certain undisclosed changes in her second will by a new will rather than by a codicil. The pre- siding judge of the Probate Court, Chancellor Brockenbrough Lamb of the Chancery Court of the City of Richmond, admitted the 1954 will to probate as the true last will of the decedent, on proof that it was executed in conformity with the statute of wills. At the instance of the contestants an appeal has been granted by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. How should the court rule? The question presented to the court is whether the 1954 will was revoked, and if so, was it revived by the subsequent revocation of the revoking instrument? This question cannot be fully appreciated without an understanding of the history of the revival of wills in England and in Virginia. This involves a survey of the judge-made rules and the statute designed to change those rules. This development will be illustrated by the use of supposititious cases
Content Externalism and Self-Knowledge
There appears to be a tension between two widely held philosophical theses: content externalism and what is often called “privileged access”. The first is the metaphysical thesis that the contents of many propositional attitude-types are at least partially determined by properties external to the thinking subject. The second is the epistemological thesis that we have a priori access to the contents of our own propositional attitudes. Those who hold that at least one of these theses must be false are called incompatibilists. My goal is to show that the incompatibilists are wrong, that content externalism and privileged access can both be true.
In Chapter 1, I briefly introduce content externalism and review the source of the alleged tension between the latter and privileged access. In Chapter 2, I address the so-called “discrimination argument” for incompatibilism. This argument appeals to the fact that, if content externalism is true, then we will not always be able to discriminate one thought-type from another. This generates problems for privileged access if we think that knowledge requires the ability to discriminate between relevant alternatives. I argue, however, that knowledge does not require such an ability. In Chapter 3, I address Jessica Brown’s illusion argument” for incompatibilism. While this argument might show that singular externalism is incompatible with privileged access, I argue that it does not generalize to other forms of content externalism. In Chapter 4 I evaluate Boghossian’s “memory argument”. First, I draw on existing criticism to show that the original 1989 version of the argument fails because it relies on false premises about memory. I then consider and reject the possibility, originally proposed by Sanford Goldberg, that the argument can be reconstructed without these false premises. Finally, in Chapter 5, I discuss and evaluate McKinsey’s reductio. First, I argue that the externalist cannot be expected to accept the closure principle on which McKinsey relies. Second, I argue that though the compatibilist may be committed to the apriority of certain environmental propositions, these propositions are modest enough that it is not obviously absurd to suppose that they might be a priori
THE SUPREME COURT, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE, AND STATE LEGISLATION
Recent decisions have revealed a growing rift in the Supreme Court on the question of the effect of the commerce clause on state legislation. This question, a perennial one in our constitutional history, concerns state legislation affecting in some way or other the carrying on of interstate business, and the validity of that legislation in view of the clause giving Congress the authority to regulate interstate commerce. The permissible scope of state activity in the absence of Congressional action has been the troublesome problem. If Congress acts, the issue is a relatively simple one. When the state action conflicts with federal legislation, the former is invalid. When Congress has not acted, however, it devolves upon the Supreme Court (according to the traditional approach, under its own reasoning at least) to decide whether the state law impinges on the unexercised Congressional authority. The Court from the beginning has devoted much of its time to the laborious task of working out rules and formulae with which to scrutinize state legislation challenged on this basis. These principles have undergone noticeable evolution and alteration through the years, but the Court has consistently attempted to find some logical basis for elaborating the implications of the dormant commerce power
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AND JUDICIAL SELF-RESTRAINT
The newly reconstituted Supreme Court of the United States has become the center of an earnest controversy with respect to the true role of the Court in constitutional interpretation. The general controversy is, of course, far from new. What makes it of more than ordinary significance is that the Court itself is revealing a tendency substantially to alter the extent, if not the nature, of judicial review. This tendency has not yet become clearly dominant, but it is apparent enough to shake the implicit faith in the Court of many of those to whom, before 1937, any criticism of the tribunal was something akin to heresy
Usury in the Purchase of Negotiable Paper
This monograph attempts to explore the nature of certain transactions in negotiable paper. In the transactions under consideration the plaintiff admittedly would qualify as a holder in due course under section 62 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, hereafter referred to as the NIL. In Lynchburg National Bank v. Scott, 91 Va. 652 (1895), it was held that the maker\u27s defense of usury between himself and the payee was not good against a subsequent holder in due course. The validity of that holding is not questioned here. It is important to distinguish the defense asserted in the unusual situations discussed herein from that in the Scott case, supra. In both, violation of the statute against usury was the defense; in the former, however, the defendant claimed that the plaintiff, a holder in due course, was a participant, though unwilling, in a usurious transaction and was therefore subject to the civil sanctions provided in the usury statute. Since emphasis will be placed on the case law in Virginia with only brief reference to decisions from other states, the reader, if interested, will find helpful discussions in Annot., 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 211 (1913) ; Annot., 5 A.L.R. 1447 (1920); 55 Am. Jur., Usury §§26 and 27 (1939); 29 A. & E. Enc. Law 473-78 (2d ed. 1896); 1 Daniel, Negotiable Instruments c. 23 (6th ed. 1919); Weinstein, When a Bill or Note Represents an Usurious Contract, 5 Tul. L. Rev. 211 (1931)
Life raft stabilizer
An improved life raft stabilizer for reducing rocking and substantially precluding capsizing is discussed. The stabilizer may be removably attached to the raft and is defined by flexible side walls which extend a considerable depth downwardly to one another in the water. The side walls, in conjunction with the floor of the raft, form a ballast enclosure. A weight is placed in the bottom of the enclosure and water port means are provided in the walls. Placement of the stabilizer in the water allows the weighted bottom to sink, producing submerged deployment thereof and permitting water to enter the enclosure through the port means, thus forming a ballast for the raft
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