Market-Based Allocation with Indivisible Bids

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/73571/1/j.1937-5956.2007.tb00275.x.pd

Market-based allocation with indivisible bids

Abstract. We study multi-unit double auctions accepting bids with indivisibility constraints. We propose different price-quote policies and study their influence on the efficiency of market-based allocation. Using a reconfigurable manufacturing scenario where agents trade large quantities of multiple goods, we demonstrate potential benefits of supporting indivisibility constraints in bidding. These benefits are highly sensitive to the form of price quote provided, indicating interesting tradeoffs in communication and allocation efficiency.

Storage exchange: A global trading platform for storage services

Abstract. The Storage Exchange (SX) is a new platform allowing storage to be treated as a tradeable resource. Organisations with varying storage requirements can use the SX platform to trade and exchange storage services. Organisations have the ability to federate their storage, be-it dedicated or scavenged and advertise it to a global storage market. In this paper we discuss the high level architecture employed by our platform and investigate a sealed Double Auction market model. We implement and experiment the following clearing algorithms: maximise surplus, optimise utilisation and an efficient combination of both.