Wallenstein’s Power Problem and Its Consequences

This paper wants to be both: an introduction to game-theoretical thinking as well as a game-theoretical discussion of Schiller’s Wallenstein. Note that the intention of this article is to convince theatergoers and people who work in the theatrical arts that it is worthwhile to study some game theory. Others will hopefully profit from the unusual Wallenstein interpretation. It is not this article’s purpose to teach game theorists, but rather to inspire applications. The drama is depicted as a game and consequently submitted to a formal analysis that is based on the economic concept of rationality. Weber’s definition of power is operationalized and applied to Wallenstein’s decision situation.Power, bargaining, mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, theater, Wallenstein

Phenomenological scaling laws for ‘‘semidilute’’ macromolecule solutions from light scattering by optical probe particles

Polymer solution dynamics may be inferred from light scattering spectra of dissolved optical probe particles. We compare a variety of probes in solutions of several polymers. In the ‘‘overlapping’’ concentration/molecular weight regime, the Stokes–Einstein equation fails by up to a factor of 2, while the probe diffusion coefficient D follows a scaling law D/D0=exp(−aMγcνRδ) (c, M, and R are the polymer concentration, molecular weight, and the probe radius, respectively). Experimentally, γ=0.8±0.1, ν=0.6–1.0, and δ=−0.1 to 0, contrary to the theoretical predictions γ=0 and δ=1. With very high molecular‐weight polymers, we observe a further ‘‘entangled’’ regime, characterized by huge (104) failures of the Stokes–Einstein equation and the appearance of ‘‘fast’’ modes in the scattering spectrum.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/70873/2/JCPSA6-82-11-5242-1.pd

Dual disadvantage and dispersion dynamics for income distributions

Income distribution has been a longstanding focus of social and economic interest, but never more so than in recent times. New metrics for disadvantage and spread enable a more precise differentiation of directional asymmetry and dispersion, drawing on an internal contextual perspective. The dual metrics for asymmetry and spread can be plotted over time into a phase plane, enabling comparative social welfare perspectives over time and between countries. The methods are utilised to study the dramatic changes that took place in Europe prior to and after the GFC. Major differences are revealed. In terms of asymmetry and spread, some countries have been fallers (lower in both) while other countries are risers

Asymmetry and performance metrics for equity returns

An assumption of symmetric asset returns, together with globally risk averse utility functions, is unappealing for fund managers and other activist investors, whose preferences switch between risk aversion on the downside and risk seeking on the upside. A performance return criterion is originated that is more consistent with the implicit Friedman-Savage utility ordering. Adapted from recent developments in the income distribution literature, the proposed metric weights the lower versus upper conditional expected returns, while a dual spread or dispersion metric also exists. The resulting performance metric is easy to compute. A point of departure is the conventional Sharpe performance ratio, with the empirical comparisons extending to a range of existing performance criteria. In contrast, the proposed W-metric results in different and more embracing performance rankings