Assessing policy stability in Iraq: a fuzzy approach to modeling preferences

The first Council of Representatives elected under the new Iraqi Constitution was unable to pass legislation required to achieve the political benchmarks set by the government. We argue that the exercise of a qualified veto by the three-member Presidency Council essentially required near unanimity among the nine parties of the governing coalition. Given the policy positions of these parties, unanimity was not possible. Our analysis makes use of a fuzzy veto players model. The placement of the government parties along a single dimension based on fuzzy preference measures derived from party text data reveals no common area of agreement

Characterizations of ordered semigroups in terms of (∈, ∈ ∨q)-fuzzy interior ideals

In this paper, we give characterizations of ordered semigroups in terms of (∈, ∈ ∨q)-fuzzy interior ideals. We characterize different classes regular (resp. intra-regular, simple and semisimple) ordered semigroups in terms of (∈, ∈ ∨q)-fuzzy interior ideals (resp. (∈, ∈ ∨q)-fuzzy ideals). In this regard, we prove that in regular (resp. intra-regular and semisimple) ordered semigroups the concept of (∈, ∈ ∨q)-fuzzy ideals and (∈, ∈ ∨q)-fuzzy interior ideals coincide. We prove that an ordered semigroup S is simple if and only if it is (∈, ∈ ∨q)-fuzzy simple. We characterize intra-regular (resp. semisimple) ordered semigroups in terms of (∈, ∈ ∨q)-fuzzy ideals (resp. (∈, ∈ ∨q)-fuzzy interior ideals). Finally, we consider the concept of implication-based fuzzy interior ideals in an ordered semigroup, in particular, the implication operators in Lukasiewicz system of continuous-valued logic are discussed

A critique of fuzzy rational choice models

The rational choice model developed for economics has been adopted by the political science communtity. Unfortunately the rational choice model does not seem to be as applicable to political situations as it is to economic situations. Reasonable models lead to undesirable conclusions, as exemplified by Arrows theorem, which uses for reasonable axioms to conclude that dictatorship is inevitable. Of course, the axioms used have come under comprehensive analysis, and weaknesses have been shown, however, none of the axioms are blatantly unrealistic. Most are quite reasonable. Researchers have tried using fuzzy rational choice functions to get around Arrow, to produce a model of choice that is reasonable but non-dictatorial. However, the methodology used is often straightforward fuzzification of crisp concepts. This paper argues that these concepts really do not translate as well as one would like. © 2012 IEEE